FOIA Results For Clipper Chip Development from the NSA

by John Gilmore

Here are some FOIA results from J. Gilmore on Clipper for anyone who missed them. Expect to see many more Clipper revelations over the future.

If anyone has other FOIA responses this is an excellent forum to post them. please do so!

Other FOIA requests by CPSR confirmed that NSA dominated the DSS (digital signature standard) process in spite of congressional intent. They also show how NSA classified major aspects of their proposals only cleared to `high level officials'. (This is paralleled in the FOIA documents below.) For someone who isn't even allowed to be there, NSA has an extremely coercive and manipulative approach (to say the least) in skewing what is supposed to be an open and impartial process of selection.

The major revelations in these documents: at one point the terminology `required' is noted, suggesting a mandatory encryption scheme was conceived from the start (although some question the Defense Department involvement). Interestingly, it is absent in the memorandum passed lower in the chain of command. Why was it removed?

Also, NSA is hiding various `classified' reasons for use of Clipper, and is *not* commenting on their ability to read it routinely. This is extremely ominous, because they don't even attempt to make any vague promises like `NSA has no advantage over other listeners in decrypting Clipper by its design.' That is, they do *not* rule out a designed-in weakness.

First is a bit of J. Gilmore's commentary followed by the actual FOIA documents. The first message came via Bernard Galler via Dave Farber. The second was posted to the cypherpunks mailing list by Gilmore.

I'm esp. interested in Gilmore's attempt to get the supposed Presidential Directives that endorsed Clipper, because (1) Clipper was definitely developed by the initiative of NSA (not any president) in defiance of laws restricting their domestic role, (2) this happened starting with the Bush administration despite the Clipper announcement, (3) I would be rather surprised if any such `directives' actually exist. (Visions of some desperate NSA bureacrat trying to figure out how to pre-date a freshly cooked document and get Clinton to sign it.) Either that, or we will have some vague echoes from people who claim not to be associated with NSA "But..." think it is irrelevant whether the President *requested* it, the only relevance is that the president *endorses* it, and any initial directives are implicit. Well, perhaps so, but then the Clipper announcement (and these memorandums) is an *admitted* lie.

If anyone has questions, please feel free to email.

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The FOIA suits that Lee Tien and I filed re Clipper are starting to bear fruit. Lee, thanks for forwarding this material.

The 20? Apr 1993 memorandum for the acting asst secry defense says, paragraph 2, "The law enforcement and national security communities ... propose that cryptography be made available AND REQUIRED which contains a ``trapdoor'' that would allow law enforcement and national security officials, under proper supervision, to decrypt enciphered communications." (emphasis mine)

Also note that it says, bottom of 2nd page, "The President has also directed that the fact that law enforcement officials will have access to the keys will not be concealed from the public. National security officials are not mentioned."

Other documents from NIST reveal:

Can NSA read mesasge encrypted with this device?

It is not our policy to comment on our analytic capability.

Will NSA have access to the keys?

NSA could seek access to the keys only if it can satisfy the key holders that it needs access to carry out its foreign intelligence mission and that the surveillance is lawful and authorized. Because NSA's mission is limited to the collection of foreign intelligence, we believe the likelihood NSA will seek access to escrowed key [sic] is remote.

In short, NSA will not say whether they can read encrypted data, but it is unlikely that they will try to get acces to escrowed keys to do so.

Also:

Functions specified by NSA; logic designed by MYKOTRONX; chip fabricated by VLSI, Inc.: manufactured chip programmed (made unique) by MYKOTRONX to security equipment manufacturers willing to follow proper security procedures for handling and storage of the programmed chip; equipment sold to customers;

This confirms a suspicion Whit Diffie had, based on the CCEP, that not everyone will be able to get the chips, only companies that agree to (secret) conditions on how they use them.

Lee,

Please scan in the documents from the office of the asst secretary of defense, into ASCII.

Please also appeal their denial of portions of the documents. Also indicate that not all responsive documents may not have been provided, since the released documents refer to others under the control of the office of the asst. secry. of defense (e.g. in the May 3 "Executive Summary", paragraph 1: "In response to DEPSECDEF's tasking of 21 Apr 93 (TAB A) information is provided." We don't have a copy of the tasking in TAB A.

Also, a memo from Daniel J. Ryan contains "Comments on PRD-27/NSA Draft", and refers to "your proposed memorandum to Jim Lweis, Department of State". We do not have either that draft or the proposed memorandum.

The Dan Ryan and Ray Pollari memos say, "The President has also directed that the fact that law enforcement officials will have access to the keys will not be concealed from the public." We do not have a copy of this directive from the President.

The justification for appealing the denied material is that, as the released documents themselves indicate, "A full-scale public debate is needed to ascertain the wishes of U.S. citizens with regard to their privacy and the impact on public safety of preserving privacy at the expense of wiretapping and communications intercept capabilities of law enforcement and national security personnel. It is not clear what the public will decide." We obviously cannot have a full-scale debate without a full public airing of all parties' concerns. For example, the denied paragraph in Ray Pollari's memo is immediately followed by "Despite these concerns, ...". The public interest in knowing all sides of the issue, as the citizenry makes a decision that will have a long-lasting impact on personal privacy, national security, and orderly enforcement of laws, overrides the government's desire to keep its concerns secret from the public. Documents classified under Cold War secrecy laws should not hide the government's legitimate national security concerns from this public decision-making process, when the issues being decided are of this magnitude.

The copies that I got of this material have off-center xeroxing that is missing words in the right hand margin of the page mentioned above, and in the left margin of the last page (signed by Ray Pollari). If this is just a defect in your xeroxing them for me, please send me better ones; if it's in the originals you have, please ask them in the appeal to provide better originals.

John

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Lee Tien and I have submitted a pile of FOIA requests about Clipper. Here is scanned-in text from some of the more interesting results, courtesy of Lee. Search for "required", for a mention of the proposal to require the use of Clipper. Also note that the role of the "national security community" has been deliberately withheld from the public statements (search for "mentioned").

Most agencies have not yet responded with documents. FBI is claiming it will take them a year, and we are preparing to file suit to force them to do it within 10 days like the law requires. (Our NSA suit over the same thing, is continuing through the gears of the court process.)

John Gilmore

[This page originally XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX TOP SECRET; now UNCLASSIFIED]

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3040

COMMAND CONTROL COMMUNICATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE

MEMORANDUM FOR MS. JOANN H. GRUBE, NSA REPRESENTATIVE/NSC PRD-27 EXPORT CONTROL WORKING GROUP

SUBJECT: Comments on PRD-27/NSA Draft (U)

(U) Following are comments concerning your proposed memorandum to Jim Lewis, Department of State:

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(U) The assertions in this draft are merely unsupported statements. Recommend that the memorandum provide more empirical evidence to back up its assertions, and that the above comments be reflected in its contents.

(signed)
Daniel J. Ryan
Director, Information Systems Security

CLASSIFIED BY: OASD(C3I)/DIR, ISS
DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

[This page originally XXXXXXXX SECRET; now UNCLASSIFIED]

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON DC 20301-3040

COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE

30 APR 1993 (stamped)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (C3I)

Subject: PRD/NSC-27 Advanced Telecommunications and Encryption (U)

(U) Advances in telecommunications have created the opportunity for public use of encryption to ensure the privacy and integrity of business and personal communications. These same advances threaten the capabilities of law enforcement and national security operations that intercept the communications of narcotraffickers, organized criminals, terrorists, espionage agents of foreign powers and SIGINT targets. Diverse interests are in diametric opposition with regard to industry's right to sell and the public's right to use such capabilities. A highly-emotional, spirited public debate is likely.

(U) In its simplest construct, this complex set of issues places the public's right to privacy in opposition to the public's desire for safety. The law enforcement and national security communities argue that if the public's right to privacy prevails and free use of cryptography is allowed, criminals and spies will avoid wiretaps and other intercepts and consequently prosper. They propose that cryptography be made available and required which contains a "trapdoor" that would allow law enforcement and national security officials, under proper supervision, to decrypt enciphered communications. Such cryptography exists, and while there are many practical problems to be solved, this proposal is technically possible to achieve.

(U) Opponents of the proposal argue that the public has a right to and an expectation of privacy, that a trapdoor system would be prone to misuse and abuse, and that the proposed solution would not work in any practical sense. They assert that people who are deliberately breaking much more serious laws would not hesitate to use cryptography that does not have a trapdoor, and that secure cryptography will inevitably be supplied by offshore companies. Thus, freedom will be lost and many tax dollars spent to no effect.

(U) This situation is complicated by the existence of other interests. For example, there currently exist strict controls on the export of cryptography. The computer industry points out that it has one of the few remaining positive trade balances and that it is vital that the dominance of the American computer industry in world markets be preserved. The industry fears that this will be lost if offshore developers incorporate high-quality cryptography into their products while U.S. industry either cannot do so or suffers higher costs or delays due to requirements for export licenses. The industry argues persuasively that overseas markets (much less drug lords or spies) will not look with favor on U.S. products which have known trapdoors when offshore products which do not have them are available. In support of their argument, they note that powerful public-key cryptography developed and patented by RSA using U.S. tax dollars is free to developers in Europe, subject to royalties in the United States, and cannot be exported without expensive and time-late export licenses. These charges are true.

(U) The national security community is especially interested in preventing the spread of high-quality encipherment routines overseas, and argues that more extensive use here at home will inevitably result in such a proliferation. Actually, it is too late. The Data Encryption Standard (DES) is already widely available throughout the world in both hardware and software forms, and DES software can be downloaded anywhere in the world from public bulletin boards by anyone with a PC, a MODEM and a telephone. In one recent experiment it took three minutes and fourteen seconds to locate a source-code version of DES on the INTERNET. Widespread availability of DES and RSA will enable offshore developers to provide high-quality encipherment for voice and data communications in competition with U.S. industry's products.

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(U) Despite these concerns, the President has directed that the Attorney General request that manufacturers of communications hardware use the trapdoor chip, and at least AT&T has been reported willing to do so (having been suitably incentivised by promises of Government purchases). The Attorney General has also been directed to create a system for escrow of key material. The Secretary of Commerce has been directed to produce standards based on the use of the trapdoor chip.

(U) The President has also directed that the fact that law enforcement officials will have access to the keys will not be concealed from the public. National security officials are not mentioned.

(U) The new administration is committed to the development of an information superhighway and a National Information Infrastructure in support of the economy. This worthy goal is independent of arguments as to whether or not law enforcement and national security officials will be able to read at will traffic passing along the information superhighway. A full-scale public debate is needed to ascertain the wishes of U.S. citizens with regard to their privacy, and the impact on public safety of preserving privacy at the expense of wiretapping and communications intercept capabilities of law enforcement and national security personnel. It is not clear what the public will decide. In the meantime, DoD has trapdoor technology and the Government is proceeding with development of the processes needed to apply that technology in order to maintain the capability to perform licit intercept of communications in support of law enforcement and national security.

(signed)
Ray Pollari
Acting DASD (CI & SCM)

[This page originally SECRET; now UNCLASSIFIED]

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON DC 20301-3040

May 3, 1993

COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: CHARLES A. HAWKINS, JR., ACTING ASD(C3I) (initialed C. Hxxx)
SUBJECT: Advanced Telecommunications and Encryption (U)
PURPOSE: INFORMATION

DISCUSSION:

(U) In response to DEPSECDEF's tasking of 21 Apr 93 (TAB A) this information is provided. Advances in telecommunications have created the opportunity for public use of encryption to ensure the privacy and integrity of business and personal communications. These same advances threaten the capabilities of law enforcement and national security operations that intercept the communications of narcotraffickers, organized criminals, terrorists, espionage agents of foreign powers and a broad range of SIGINT targets. Diverse interests are in diametric opposition with regard to industry's right to sell and the public's right to use such capabilities. A highly-emotional, spirited public debate is likely.

(U) The law enforcement and national security communities argue that if the public's right to privacy prevails and free use of cryptography is allowed, criminals and spies will avoid wiretaps and other intercepts. They propose that cryptography be made available to the public which contains a "trapdoor" that would allow law enforcement and national security officials, under proper supervision, to decrypt enciphered communications. Such cryptography exists, and while there are many practical problems to be solved, this proposal is technically possible to implement.

(U) Opponents of the proposal argue that the public has a right to and expectation of privacy, that such a system would be prone to misuse and abuse, and that the proposed solution would not work in any practical sense. They assert that criminals and spies will not hesitate to use secure cryptography supplied by offshore companies. Thus, the loss of privacy would outweigh any advantages to law enforcement or national security.

(U) The computer industry points out that it has one of the few remaining positive trade balances and that it is vital that the dominance of the American computer industry in world markets be preserved. The industry fears that this will be lost if offshore developers incorporate high-quality cryptography into their products while U.S. industry either cannot do so or suffers higher costs or delays due to requirements for export licenses because of strict controls of export of cryptography. The industry argues persuasively that overseas markets (much less drug lords or spies) will not look with favor on U.S. products which have known trapdoors when offshore products which do not have them are available.

CLASSIFIED BY: DASD(CI&SCM)
DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

[This page originally XXXXXXXX SECRET; now UNCLASSIFIED]

(U) The national security community is especially interested in preventing the spread of high-quality encipherment routines overseas, and argues that more extensive use here at home will inevitably result in such a proliferation. This would increase the cost of performing the SIGINT mission or decrease the amount of intelligence, or both. The Data Encryption Standard (DES) is already widely available throughout the world in both hardware and software forms, and DES software can be downloaded anywhere in the world from public bulletin boards by anyone with a PC, a MODEM, and a telephone. Thus far, widespread availability has not led to widespread use. However, widespread availability of DES and RSA will make it possible for offshore developers to provide high- quality encipherment for voice and data communications in competition with U.S. industry's products.

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(U) The President has directed that the Attorney General request that manufacturers of communications hardware use the trapdoor chip. The Attorney General has also been directed to create a system for escrow of key material. The Secretary of Commerce has been directed to produce standards based on the use of the trapdoor chip. The President has also directed that the fact that law enforcement officials will have access to the keys will not be concealed from the public. National security officials are not mentioned.

(U) The new administration is committed to the development of an information superhighway and a National Information Infrastructure in support of the economy. This worthy goal is independent of arguments as to whether or not law enforcement and national security officials will be able to read at will traffic passing along the information superhighway. A full-scale public debate is beginning which will ascertain the wishes of U.S. citizens with regard to their privacy and the impact on public safety of preserving privacy at the expense of wiretapping and communications intercept capabilities of law enforcement and national security personnel. It is not clear what the public will decide. In the meantime, DoD has trapdoor technology and the Government is proceeding with development of the processes needed to apply that technology in order to maintain the capability to perform licit intercept of communications in support of law enforcement and national security.

Prepared by: Dan Ryan/ODASD(CI & SCM)/x 41779/28 Apr 93/OSD