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Battlefield of the Future: Parallel War and Hyperwar
by Richard Szafranski
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Battlefield of the Future
Chapter 5
Parallel War and Hyperwar: Is Every Want a Weakness?
Col Richard Szafranski, USAF
Something happened in Desert Storm never witnessed before. Air
power in thousands and thousands of Coalition sorties-appeared
to have defeated an enemy. Advocates of air power earnestly want
others to accept what they believe Desert Storm proved. Desert
Storm proved, they assert, that air power can be or is dominant and
decisive,1 fulfilling the vision of Gulio Douhet, Billy Mitchell,
Jimmy Doolittle,2 and others3-or so advocates believe and want
us to believe.
That want may be a weakness. This essay examines the notions of
parallel war and hyperwar, principally as they apply to air
campaigns, revealing minor flaws in the ideas and their application.
First, it examines parallel war to determine what is new in the idea.
Second, it examines this "new" kind of air warfare to illuminate the
strengths and shortcomings parallel war evidences in theory and
practice. Third, it argues that the theory is useful if applied against
weak industrial states. Next, it postulates theoretical ways to defeat
an adversary intending to employ parallel war. Defeating parallel
war is possible whether the United States is the nation intending to
employ it, or whether some post-Gulf War aficionado embraces the
theory. None of this intends to do any more than add greater
discernment to the theory of parallel war and hyperwar. Theories of
parallel warfare are not "bad" or "wrong." Rather, their
shortcoming is that they have only limited utility in the emerging
world.
But, What If . . .?
Even so, one caveat remains: if parallel war is the new air warfare
form, it would be a valuable one indeed. If authentic parallel war
were possible, it would, as its advocates argue, render much of
Clausewitz irrelevant. Clausewitz himself noted that
"if war consisted of one decisive act, or a set of simultaneous
decisions, preparations would tend toward totality, for no omission
could ever be rectified. . . . "
But, of course, if all the means available were, or could be,
simultaneously employed, all wars would automatically be confined
to a single decisive act or a set of simultaneous ones-the reason
being that any adverse decision must reduce the sum of the means
available, and if all had been committed in the first act there could
really be no question of a second. Any subsequent military
operation would virtually be part of the first-in other words,
merely an extension of it.4
Three "ifs," with three "coulds" and two "woulds" in tandem,
suggest skepticism. Since everything pivots on "if," the ideas bear
close examination.
What Is Parallel War?
The idea of parallel war arises from understanding the enemy as a
"system" or "organism," simultaneously more complicated and less
complicated than the people-state-armed forces system described by
Clausewitz.5 The enemy state theoretically has five key organic
components: (1) fielded military forces at the periphery; (2) the
masses of the people who are not direct combatants; (3) a
transportation infrastructure providing organic essentials; (4) the
organic essentials themselves; and, (5) residing at the center,
leadership or a controlling mechanism for the entire system.
Advocates refer to these orbits or concentric "rings" as "the five
rings."6 Like a fractal, each of the rings also has within it the five
components. Thus, the fielded forces at the periphery, from the
army to the individual soldier, have within them leadership or some
internal controlling mechanism.
In this taxonomy, the entire system and each ring has within it key
nodes or "centers of gravity."7 Leadership, the controlling
mechanism, is the key node in each ring and throughout. The theory
is that simultaneous and coordinated operations against all the key
nodes in the system and in each of the rings are the essence of the a
new kind of offensive military air campaign. Air, the theory holds,
is the superior medium for prosecuting these operations. It is air
power, the theorists argue, that allows attacks against the internal
rings and all the other rings without first collapsing the outer rings
that surround the inner ones.8
In contrast, serial warfare is, or was, warfare that engaged each ring
and its categories of targets in turn, ad seriatim, moving from the
periphery toward the center.9 In the past it was not possible to
attack the sovereign in the castle until the opposing army had
defeated the enemy monarchs fielded forces and moved through the
population toward the center. In World War II, air attempted to
engage its targets in parallel, but more often engaged its air targets
and target sets serially within the organic whole of Germany, giving
ball-bearing factories, submarine pens, petroleum, airfields, rail and
road networks, and cities some priority for air attack at any given
time. Parallel war, on the other hand, theoretically employs air
power to attack all the decisive points in each ring and the decisive
point of the entire system simultaneously. The object is not just the
destruction of targets. Destruction is the means to an end. The
object is to destroy or damage (or to render dysfunctional) those
targets that produce a strategic effect by causing loss of the enemy
system's organic capabilities.10 When these parallel warfare
attacks occur with simultaneity or great speed, hyperwar results.
In a later iteration of the theory, and as information war11 becomes
an intriguing notion within the services and the Department of
Defense, information becomes the "bolt" running through all the
rings and holding the rings together.12 John Warden, the leading
theorist, also asserts that whatever else "weapons" may be or do,
they are essentially "information" because they communicate
"messages," or "meaning." Thus, air power delivers "information"
to the enemy leadership. The most important information delivered
in this ethereal sense is the message "stop fighting," or "your
strategy has been defeated and you are paralyzed," or, in the
extreme case, "you are dying."
Death or paralysis of the systems military or warfighting capability
is the objective and intended effect of the air campaign. The goal is
to visit the cumulative "death of a thousand cuts" on the enemy
system.13 Because the object sought is paralysis, parallel war and
hyperwar aim at the sudden and simultaneous reduction of the
enemy systems overall "energy level," so that the organic system
goes into "shock." The simultaneous engagement of centers of
gravity prevents recovery from this shock because the energy
available to the system is inadequate to restore the system to full
functioning. Thus, attacks against the centers of gravity must occur
not only in parallel, but also with "hyper" speed. Since ground
forces cannot do this, since forces afloat cannot do this (except
through their air power), then air forces are the forces best suited
for employing parallel war at hyperwar tempo. Or so the theory
goes.
What is New Here?
According to Jeffrey R. Cooper, what might be new is a way of
fighting, enabled by technology, that could evidence both
coherence and simultaneity. Cooper writes:
At the operational level, the impact of these coherent operations is
to overwhelm the opponent's ability to command and control his
forces, denying him the ability to respond to our campaign plan and
operations, and forcing him at the limit to execute only
uncoordinated preplanned actions.
The attacks themselves are
a (massively) parallel series of synchronized integrated operations
conducted at high-tempo, with high lethality and high mobility,
throughout the depth and extent of the theater, intended to force the
rapid collapse of both the enemy's military power and the enemy's
will.
The consequence of the attacks is rapid defeat of the enemy force
due to the simultaneous parallel operations, the high mobility, the
high lethality, and the capability for sustained high tempos of
operations, so many enemy units can be defeated in detail
simultaneously that the operation may resemble a more classic coup
de main executed in a single main-force engagement.14
But is this a new theory? Military forces since Clausewitz have
been enjoined to identify and engage the "center of gravity" of an
enemy's military capability. Simultaneous and integrated attacks
have long been the goal of combined arms. Attacks on the leader
and leadership are not new goals of warfare, whether the enemy was
viewed as a system or not in the past. Even in chess, not a new
game, it is possible to impose checkmate without the serial
destruction of all the adversary's knights, rooks, and pawns. Nor is
it novel that such a campaign theory would be advanced by
airpower advocates. What the air aspects of the theory promise
seem to differ little from what Douhet, Mitchell, and the faculty of
the Air Corps Tactical School promised. Air power, we have always
been told-even promised-by air power advocates, will be
decisive. That the United States Strategic Bombing Survey and The
Gulf War Airpower Survey both used empirical data to show that
some of the undertakings of airpower fell short of the vision of
airpower cannot be ignored.15
Nor should anyone ignore that the idea that parallel warfare, as
distinguishable from serial warfare, is not a new strategic
conception. As early as 1951, a naval officer, Capt (later Rear
Adm) J. C. Wylie, asserted that there were two types of strategy:
"sequential" and "cumulative." He described the cumulative
approach in an article that appeared in Proceedings in 1952. Wylie
later wrote that
there are actually two very different kinds of strategies that may be
used in war. One is the sequential, the series of visible, discrete
steps, each dependent on the one that preceded it. The other is the
cumulative, the less perceptible minute accumulation of little items
piling one on top of the other until at some unknown point the
mass of accumulated actions may be large enough to be critical.
They are not incompatible strategies, they are not mutually
exclusive. Quite the opposite. In practice they are usually
interdependent in their strategic result.16
Moreover, the architects of the nuclear single integrated operations
plan (SIOP), like Wylie, promoted and planned for instant
cumulative war, or parallel war and hyperwar, decades before
current theorists articulated "the five rings." As Desmond Ball has
shown, SIOP nuclear weapons were allocated against target sets in
the former Soviet system characterized as "leadership" (leadership),
"nuclear force" (nuclear forces), "economic and industrial" (organic
essentials and logistics infrastructure), and "other military" (other
fielded forces).17 The, SIOP also evidenced coherence and
simultaneity, using Cooper's terms. Thus, there is scant difference
between the targeting logic of the SIOP approach and the targeting
logic of the five-rings approach, save for the important distinction
that one employed nuclear weapons effects and the other did not,
but might have.18 While the difference between the nuclear SIOP
and parallel war waged with conventional weapons is critically
important, there are more similarities between the theories than
differences. Both approaches sought to strike decisive points, both
sought to checkmate enemy leadership, both were executed
simultaneously and with hyper speed,19 both aimed at driving
down enemy "energy levels" dramatically, both sought to impose
shock and paralysis on the enemy system, and both sought to
eliminate rapid (or almost "any," in the case of the SIOP) enemy
post-attack recovery capability.20 Nuclear weapons use does make
a difference. The SIOP intended to be so threatening that it also
may have been self-deterring. Parallel warfare using nonnuclear
appears no less threatening in terms of its immediate consequences,
but has fewer constraints on its employment. Even so, the
difference in weapons is not a difference in the theory qua theory
nor in the proximate effects the SIOP and nonnuclear parallel war
sought.21
Strengths and Shortcomings
The strength of cumulative strategies, both the SIOP and parallel
war, even though they are the same theory, is that they promise to
reduce more rapidly the war-making capacity of an industrialized
enemy state.22 It is indisputable that industrial states may be
organized as the kind of system represented. The logic of a
cumulative model appears sound, albeit somewhat mechanical, in
the case of the five rings, and there are lucrative targets for air
attack throughout the enemy system. The air campaign in Desert
Storm demonstrated that the combat power of Iraq or a state like
Iraq can be reduced by apparently simultaneous and coherent
attacks against important targets. The SIOP, had it been executed,
would likely also have proven the point against a more robust
belligerent and war-fighting system.23 Conventional weapons have
the additional advantage of being easier to employ and having fewer
constraints on their employment than nuclear weapons.
Unconventional weapons have the added advantage, in some cases,
of producing effects that can be reversed. Thus, the ability to
prosecute these kinds of nonnuclear attacks, using SIOP targeting
logic under a new name, is a valuable adjunct to warfare in the
latter years of the "second wave."24
While a cumulative strategy promises to be effective against any
enemy, one difficulty with the five-rings model is that it is ill
equipped for coping with organisms that are not industrialized or
industrializing state systems. Certainly a terrorist organization is a
"system" that has separate component parts. Of course an insurgent
organization is a "system" that has differentiated component parts.
While theoretically possible to differentiate the component parts of
both terrorist systems and insurgent organizations, it is not always
easy actually to identify or to isolate these parts. As physical
entities, the component parts, or five rings of terrorist and insurgent
organization are exceedingly difficult for the air campaign planner
to target. Thus, the model holds, but becomes exquisitely irrelevant
for these types of organizations and counterterrorism warfare and
counter- insurgency warfare. Worse, airpower cannot make the
decisive and dominant contribution to these kinds of fights, much
to the chagrin of airpower advocates. Fighting in the former
Yugoslavia, the ill-starred intervention in Somalia, and our
impotence in stopping the genocide in Rwanda are only the more
recent examples of the limits of airpower. Airpower, it would seem,
works best in massive doses applied as an antidote against the
strength of industrial or industrializing states, uniformed armed
forces, and identifiable leaders and other targets.
The five-rings model thus becomes illogical or at least impractical
for nontrinitarian warfare, or what Gen John Boyd calls "irregular
warfare." Nontrinitarian warfare, as described by Martin van
Creveld, is warfare wherein the warring sides do not manifest the
organization of Clausewitz's remarkable "trinity" of state, people,
and armed forces. If, as John Keegan, Carl Builder, Martin van
Creveld and others suggest, conventional war between industrial
states is the less likely warfare form for the future,25 this need not
invalidate the theory entirely. The model remains extremely useful
for its heuristic value to novitiate students of warfare and as a
thesis to stimulate antithesis and debate.
Nontrinitarian warfare is only one of the challenges with which the
theory cannot contend. Some of the characteristics of warfare on
the eve of the "third wave" also confound the theory:
demassification, diversity, and ninjitsu. Demassification is the
fractionating of large conventional targets into much smaller ones.
For example, mainframe computers are an attractive and easy-to-
target set of nodes. Distributed laptops are less attractive targets
because they are simultaneously more numerous, less easy to
locate, mobile, and less easy to target. "Third-wave" information
technology liberates leader- ship and leadership command centers
from the requirement to reside in fixed locations. Just as
telecommuting is possible for nonwarfare "knowledge workers"
today, it is not inconceivable that the leaders of warfare operations
in the future can command these operations from their domiciles,
from nonbelligerent states, or from offshore. As hierarchies yield to
networks, leadership will also become demassified. "Virtual"
presence makes distance command and control possible. Thus, even
among warring states, the leaders need not reside in the states to
direct the fighting.
Miniaturization combines with demassification to complicate the
challenge. A satellite dish receiver that measures three to five
meters in diameter is an easy target for precision-guided or even
area weapons. A satellite receiver or transmitter that measures one-
half meter in diameter is a more difficult target to strike, especially
if thousands are employed in a distributed network. While the
model may be valid, the targeting challenge is such that the model
might as well be invalid since it has little utility.
Dual-use technologies and facilities also confound the five- rings
campaign planner. Fermentation chambers, for example, are
essential components of a system that brews beer. These same
fermenters are also essential for the production of biological
weapons. Beer is good. Biological weapons are not good. Dual-use
systems do not fit easily into the targeting template. Information
technology is ubiquitous and much of it serves multiple
constituencies. The Global Positioning System (GPS) would be a
lucrative target, but the constellation of these satellites is
demassified and distributed. Moreover, GPS users are military and
civilian. Thus, the consequences of attacking GPS must be borne
by friendly forces, enemy forces, and neutrals. Most
communications satellites pose the same type of problem for
campaign planners. Demassification, miniaturization, and dual-use
also make ninjitsu-the "art of invisibility"-possible. By
distributing important elements of a system, reducing them
dramatically in size, embedding them in other things (religious
facilities, civilian hospitals, university research centers), these
elements effectively become invisible to the campaign planner.26
There are at least seven additional minor problems. First, the
attacks may not actually occur simultaneously, except when
compared to warfare of the distant past. Next, like the SIOP, the
current model strives for the "decisive battle" in new form. Third, it
neglects evolution in the attacked organism or system. Fourth, it
pays insufficient attention to war-termination issues. Fifth, the
current model neglects the reality of the challenges posed by the
post-attack damage assessment architecture, the Air Tasking Order
(ATO) system, and the reality of combined arms operations. Sixth,
the assertion that "information is the bolt that holds the rings
together" seems to give the lie to the entire theory. And last, in the
world that is emerging, there may be little room for this type of air
campaign. Each of these lesser challenges deserves a few words.
The simultaneous attacks celebrated by the five-rings theorists in
the Gulf War did not occur simultaneously. They occurred
sequentially and over time. For airpower to be effective, air
superiority, or control of the air, is necessary. To achieve air
superiority, enemy air defenses must be defeated, circumvented, or
suppressed. Thus, and even though the initial onslaught may have
attacked other targets in other categories, elimination or reduction
of the capabilities of the enemy's air defenses always must be the
first priority of an air campaign.27 If the theorists and air
campaigners assert that suppression of enemy air defenses was not
their first priority in time and in space, that assertion appears to
contradict current air doctrine. If they accept that coping with
enemy air defense capability was the first priority, but reply that the
first wave of attacks included other targets, then the attacks were
not simultaneous, but merely very close in time. (Zeno probably
would argue that any separation in time, however, constitutes serial
warfare.) In truth, the opening salvos of the Desert Storm air
campaign were directed-as they must be for air power to be
effective-against the enemy air defense system, the "crucial first
step" in the air campaign.28 Sea-launched Tomahawk cruise
missiles and Army Apache helicopters were part of this first wave
of airpower attacks for airpower's benefit. How quickly other
targets in the series followed, becomes less relevant to the theory. A
compressed serial attack is still serial warfare, even though time
compression may create the appearance and, more important, the
effect of simultaneity.29
Because the five-rings model for air campaign planning asserts that
the consequence of its attacks will be paralysis of the enemy
system, it in effect asserts that the Napoleonic and Clausewitzian
"decisive battle" is its aim. Moreover, it seeks to annihilate enemy
capability.30 (It does this, by the way, even while some of its
advocates suggest that their theories now might have rendered much
or most of Clausewitz irrelevant.) If the aim of the air campaign is
not achieved-that is, if the consequent is not affirmed-then the
fault must reside not in the air campaign, but somewhere else.31
Dogmatic adherence to the air campaign plan list of priority targets
is necessary to "prove" the theory. Close air support, the theory
holds, is less important than strategic attack. If sorties have to be
reapportioned because of some "ground emergency," then the
dogma has been violated and, of course, the opportunity to win a
decisive battle may have then been lost. Where the targeting list is
followed religiously, failure to achieve a decisive battle can also be
attributed to inadequate intelligence. Or it could be bad weather,
the bane of aviation. Or it could be caused by an adaptive enemy.
The reality is that organisms are autopoietic; that is, they struggle
to preserve themselves.32 Any attacked organism can be expected
to struggle for survival by responding and adapting to stimuli, to
internal changes, and to its new environment. Rigid adherence to an
air campaign plan specifying a series of parallel attacks in advance
is rigid adherence to a set of attacks designed against the initial
organism, not the evolved one. The danger with a wonderfully
deterministic air campaign plan is that it may adapt poorly to an
organism that evolves in unexpected ways. When flying weather
impedes mechanical execution of the air campaign plan, allowing
the enemy respite and the opportunity to recover, it is the fault of
chaos. When mobile missiles are introduced in unexpected ways, it
is the fault of intelligence. When operations against mobile
missiles deplete sorties intended to achieve the decisive victory of
the air campaign, it is the fault of the politicians. Airpower
advocates did in fact argue that the Iraqi Scuds were not militarily
significant.33 That the missiles might have rent the Gulf War
Coalition asunder had they not been actively pursued and engaged
shows an immature understanding of what constitutes "military"
significance in state warfare. Mobile missiles ought to have been
priority targets in the air campaign: as political weapons they might
have altered the course and outcome of the war.
War termination issues, not neglected in the SIOP, also appear to
be neglected in the five-rings approach. The posited aim of the air
campaign is strategic paralysis-the expectation being that
"paralysis" must somehow equate to "surrender." The reality is
somewhat different. Wars may end because the losers sense that
there is something they value more than the object of the war and
that continuing the war imperils preservation of this more important
value or preference set.34 The five-rings model attacks everything
but population centers, perhaps encouraging the enemy to fight to
the death. Even simple attacks can then have unintended
consequences. Attacks against communications designed to
separate leadership from fielded forces, for example, may also
deprive leadership of feedback regarding damage to the organism.
Thus, the organism may neither realize its paralysis nor behave as a
paralytic. Certainly, if attacks annihilate a large part of the enemy's
capability, defeat in detail is then possible, whether the enemy
fights on or not-that is, if public opinion on the winning side
supports the bloodletting required to defeat an enemy in detail.
None should, of course, underestimate the ruthlessness of a United
States forced to fight for its vital interests. It would be equally
foolhardy to underestimate the power of public opinion in fights
not perceived by our citizens as involving their vital interests.
The five-rings approach may work well against a weak enemy and a
transparent target set. If the enemy-the resistant element described
by Clausewitz-is not weak or stupid, or if the target set is
characterized by attention to ninjitsu, problems arise for the air
campaign planner. Prewar intelligence, very effective damage
assessment, and close coordination are all required to make the
ATO system function effectively. (Where the ATO is less effective
and the fault cannot be attributed to "intelligence," it is, we are told
by some, the fault of the Army and the Marines.35) The ATO takes
a long time to produce.36 This fact alone ensures that it directs
attacks against an organism that no longer exists. If damage
assessment is imperfect-normally imperfection is the status quo
unless the weather is perfect, intelligence is precise and abundant,
and the enemy is perfectly inept or stupid-the problems are
compounded. That Saddam was not stupid, albeit an excessively
bold risk-taker (and even though Gen H. Norman Schwarzkopf
reviled him as a strategist), is shown by his pawns gambit on the
border of Kuwait in 1994. Perhaps the Gulf War educated him.
If the Gulf War educated us, we should now appreciate that warfare
is a poor laboratory for validating air-only, or naval-only, or
ground-only theories.37 Warfare against a small and inferior state
is an even poorer laboratory. We fight with combined arms and
depend on their interaction, their combined effects, to defeat the
enemy's strategy. An enemy facing a 400,000 or a one-half million
person allied army on its border will invariably behave differently
than one only facing air attacks, no matter how wonderful the
pounding to which air subjects that enemy. It may be as divisive as
it is short-sighted to resign forces in other media to the null set
when attempting to use an actual fight with a third-, fourth-, or
tenth-rate opponent to illustrate or prove a theory.
Airpower-Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, and other nation
airpower-was powerful in Desert Storm. Of that there can be no
doubt. But was it powerful because Iraq was so inferior? Was
airpower powerful alone, or was it powerful because of the force-
the well-armed, well-trained, belligerent and hot-blooded human
beings-poised to take the fight to Baghdad on land and from the
sea? Would not have true parallel war, horizontal and vertical
parallel war, brought the interactive power of land warfare and
amphibious assault to bear on Iraq even as the air campaign
unfolded? Has our desire for few casualties become yet another
weakness; a weakness leading us away from sound strategy?38
This last question is an important one when examining the air
campaign's quest for parallel war. Wars occur and warfare occurs
within a much broader context than the battlespace. Will the
strategic context of the future-the entire social, political,
economic, and military gamut of goals, interests, and behaviors-
tolerate the kind of Desert Storm air campaign advocated? Parallel
war is and has been a wonderful theory. Yet, the move from theory
to practice is both a torturous and tortuous one. Preparedness to
execute the SIOP, for example, cost the United States trillions of
dollars over decades. Preparedness to execute a Desert Storm-type
air campaign against any but small and weaker states might require
an equivalent investment. Would such warfare work against a large
country? Against a peer? Will the United States ever again have the
surplus resources it had in Desert Storm? Not likely, seems to be
the answer.
Iraq was and is a small country. When proportional silhouettes of
Iraq are superimposed over a larger nation, as they are in Figure 3,
the aerial achievements of Desert Storm appear in a different light.
This is not to suggest any adversarial relationship with or hostile
designs against China. Rather, this perspective merely illuminates
the fact that Iraq is a very small country.
<Picture>
Finally, if information is "the bolt that holds the five rings
together," then information is the decisive center of gravity.
Accordingly, should we not aim all attacks at information? Even
though our understanding of information operations or information
warfare is imperfect and immature, the evolving theory demands
that the connectivity between and within the rings becomes the
object of attack. Electrical power production facilities, roads and
rails, airfields, missile production installations, and government
buildings are not difficult for the air campaigner to target.
Information is, or would be, difficult to target. Inclusion of
information as a lucrative target may be a trendy afterthought on the
part of airpower advocates on the one hand. On the other hand, it
may be creation of another precondition for success of the air
campaign. The precondition, if not met, then becomes the fault not
of the theory, but of prehostility target intelligence or the clumsy
execution of a brilliant air campaign plan.
Defeating Parallel War
Perhaps the more valuable contribution the five-rings model makes
to the study of warfare is that it elucidates how one can falsify or
defeat the theory. The first priority, the best way to defeat an
adversary, Sun Tzu tells us, is to defeat an adversary's strategy. Air
campaigners do not appear to be strategists. More likely they are air
tacticians-their protestations to the contrary notwithstanding. If
the five rings support the overall strategy or constitute the strategy
of the air campaign, how can one defeat the strategy? There are at
least five ways, with each one examined in turn. (Recall, please,
that this discourse aims at theory and antithesis. In practice, some
of these countervailing means are as risky as they are illegal. Even
so, we would do well to keep in mind that our conceptions of risk
and legality may be ours alone. There are antithetical notions out
there in the real world.)
Disguise, diversify, and demassify the system. Force the air
campaign planner and the air campaigner to strike what appear to
be widely distributed and primarily civilian targets. The center of
gravity of United States armed forces may be public opinion. If
public opinion is the Clausewitzian hub upon which all movement
depends in most democratic states, attacking this hub is both a
prewar and wartime priority. To defeat parallel war even before it
commences, a wise adversary will strive to disguise, diversify, and
"demassify" key elements of the system so that total war is
necessary. Such a cunning adversary will have mobile systems
wherever possible. Where mobility is not possible, the adversary
will embed military activities in civilian ones. Weapons production
will occur in facilities producing civilian goods. Weapons research
activities will be collocated in hospitals, universities, and religious
centers. Command and control transmitters and receivers will be
placed on schools, hotels, temples, and recreational facilities.
Airfields will be joint commercial-military facilities, routinely used
by commercial and military entities. Dual-use systems-
telecommunications media, fiber optics, direct broadcast and very
small aperture satellites-will be used for administrative military
communications. An adversary might build tanks in automobile
factories, ballistic missiles in refrigerator factories, might
commingle military and civilian transport, and could build its
military garrisons in populous areas. The adversary would also be
wise to move from military leadership hierarchies to military
leadership networks. Where possible, the enemy will put foreign
contractors in all militarily significant facilities. The adversary will
encourage engagement, enlargement, tourism, and foreign
investment. The adversary's objective is to up the ante for the
attacker by forcing him to war on the innocents and against the
investors. The wise adversary will attack and defeat its opponent's
strategy even before declaration of a state of hostilities.
Acquire weapons of mass destruction (WMD) on mobile systems.
WMD so raise the risks and consequences of an attack that mere
possession of WMD and mobile delivery systems may impose
prewar paralysis on the attacker. To defeat parallel war, the
adversary will distribute WMD among the innocents with the same
impunity that other military capability is commingled. Nuclear
weapons production facilities may have bold, bright signatures.
Chemical and biological weapons production facilities do not.
Since those may be the WMD of choice in the third wave, an
adversary intending to defeat parallel war will acquire them.
Acquisition of any deliverable WMD changes the political and
military calculus dramatically.
Where immobile, be invisible. One of the best ways to create
invisibility is to go underground; the deeper, the better. Lateral is
better than merely vertical. A cunning adversary will realize that
whatever is the key node in the underground facility should also
reside beneath a civilian facility. Schools, orphanages, and "baby
milk" factories may have high utility for concealing these kinds of
basements. Distinctive painting or marking, source-identifiable
military communications, and even uniforms do not contribute to
invisibility. The obvious and key point is that whatever cannot be
identified cannot be targeted. An astute adversary will also
capitalize on the attackers cultural myopia and mirror-imaging.
When attacked, mutate. Defeating parallel war also requires
planning how the organism will adapt, transform itself, and recover,
if attacked. The adversary intent on defeating parallel war will
anticipate a reduction in energy levels after an attack. Even so, the
adversary also will realize that a planned mutation at the
bifurcation point is superior to a random one. Especially cunning
adversaries will choose an asymmetrical and unpredictable response
to attacks, not a symmetrical or predictable one. If, for example,
electrical power production comes under intense attack, the
adversary might respond by intentionally shutting down all visible
electrical power. (One cannot be especially cunning without having
considered and prepared for this in advance.) This unexpected
mutation makes damage assessment difficult. The air campaign
planner may cope with this difficulty by forcing an extensive search
for corroboration that attacks have achieved required damage
expectancies, may fall into the trap of wishful thinking and
reallocate sorties to other roles, or-and this is the likely case-
may mindlessly continue to adhere to the installation-driven or
target-driven air campaign plan. Another useful mutation might be
to withdraw uniformed fielded forces and employ terrorists or
special operations forces in the attacker's homeland.
Attack information. The five rings exist in peacetime as well as in
wartime. If information is indeed the bolt that holds them together,
an adversary will realize that attacks should begin in the
prehostility phase. The object of preliminary attacks in the
prehostility phase will be to paralyze or destroy a target set called
"any public opinion that does not support my aims." Combining
propaganda with more active measures, such as assassination and
other kinds of terrorism, may prevent a weak-willed attacker from
taking the offensive. (On the other hand, active measures might
stimulate uncharacteristically ferocious responses.) Failing the
success of propaganda and anticipating an attack, an adversary may
turn to "worms" and "viruses" as its swords. As one
communications analyst has noted:
Computer "hackers" have relatively easy access to software
programs called "worms" and "viruses." A worm is used to delete a
portion of a target computer's memory, and the aptly named virus
calls forth a machine's files and copies itself onto them, creating an
unfixable mess. Database records can be (and have been) altered by
outside interference, just as broadcasting airwaves have been
intercepted and preempted. Even on a small budget, it seems, where
there is a will there is a way.39
As Brigadier V. K. Nair, VSM (Retired), wrote in his book War In
The Gulf: Lessons for the Third World:
Active measures to degrade attacking electronic systems should be
cost effective and simple. For example, the most sophisticated
system such as that of the United States, could be totally disrupted
by the projection of a suitable virus that would automatically find
their [sic] way back into the computers on which the systems are
dependent. Cheap, simple and effective avenues must be exploited
on a priority.40
Thus, it is only a matter of technique and time before these
countermeasures to parallel war are employed. What are the
counter-countermeasures? There may be none, although
information technology may provide the homeopathy of future
warfare.41 In the quest for primacy in warfare, the pendulum will
continue to swing between measures and countermeasures. The
elusive search for the technologies, the weapons, and the concepts
of operations and organization that allow Vernichtungschlacht
likely will continue.
Conclusions
There may not really be much that is revolutionary in contemporary
notions of parallel war and hyperwar. It is the logical evolution of a
nonnuclear SIOP accelerated in serial applications. The ability to
execute a nonnuclear SIOP against a large state or peer would
require SIOP-level investments. After acquiring the capability, an
adversary could checkmate it by simple tactical adjustments
modulating the strategic environment. Dispersing and disguising
targets and making the public opinion consequences of striking
them unacceptable cause the more obvious of these modulations.
Absent the powerful real or imagined survival motives that impelled
the SIOP, it is unlikely that the United States or any other nation
will acquire the kind of airpower required to satisfy the needs of
the parallel war and hyperwar air campaign. Absent the acquisition
of the required technologies, the theory remains a rather large and
important footnote to the Gulf War.
A problem with contemporary air campaign theories may be the
progressive detachment of these presumptive airpower theories-
presumptive from the realities of warfare.42 The new theories seem
to be less about warfare than they are about the ways in which some
believe the battlespace ought to be apportioned and the resources
that ought to be acquired once the roles of force elements are
determined. Warfare is about human beings, human aspirations,
and human passions. No one should thoughtfully relegate the study
of warfare to the investigation of sterile technology and the targets
that reside in precisely defined systems or rings. Warfare between
humans is a hot thing, not a cold thing. It is more about blood, fear,
surprise, and friction than it is about technology. Precision
targeting depends on speed and certainty, including the assurance
that humans can know and understand causal relationships. Parallel
war theorists require the ready availability of the technologies that
allow speed, precision, and the chimera of accurate knowledge and
authentic understanding. Parallel war requires massive resource
investments.43
Thus, airpower in this current formulation seems to have become no
more nor less than the power of detached, dispas- sionate
technology.44 Technology is applied science. The science of the
parallel war theorists is cold, deterministic, and-from the
perspective of those who value jointness or integration-
misapplied. "If this, then that" is a supposition that warfare rarely
substantiates. The hubris of contemporary airpower theorists may
be that they so badly want airpower to be dominant or decisive that
they have made the Desert Storm air campaign the mechanistic
template for all future wars. This want is a potentially dangerous
weakness. Airpower, as Carl Builder suggests in The Icarus
Syndrome, still lacks a theory.45 Even so, one must applaud those
who search for one, even while cautioning them that they may not
have found one yet.
Notes
1. Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, The Generals War:
The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf (Boston: Little, Brown
and Co., 1994); and John A. Warden III, "Air Theory for the
Twenty-first Century," in Karl P. Magyar, ed., Challenge and
Response: Anticipating US Military Security Concerns (Maxwell
AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1994), 326-329. Warden asserts
that one of the ten concepts that describe "the revolution of the
Gulf War and must be taken into account "as we develop new force
levels" is "The dominance of airpower." Some disagree regarding
airpower's contribution in the Gulf War. See Robert H. Scales,
Certain Victory (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing
Office, 1993).
2. "The function of the Army and the Navy in any future war will
be to support the dominant air arm." See James H. Doolittle, speech
to the Georgetown University Alumni Association, 30 April 1949,
cited in Robert D. Heinl, Jr., Dictionary of Military and Naval
Quotations (Annapolis: United States Naval Institute, 1966), 6.
3. Airpower advocates believe airpower was both dominant and
decisive in the Gulf War. In the wake of the war, the principal
architect of the Desert Storm air campaign plan, Col John A.
Warden III, emerged as the lead airpower theorist in the United
States Air Force. His prewar book, The Air Campaign: Planning for
Combat, is pirated, translated, and studied abroad. The Swedish Air
Force uses his theories as the model for the most stressful kind of
air attack against which they must be prepared to defend. In
Australia, Warden is ranked along with Douhet and Trenchard as
an important air theorist. Colonel Warden is a former commandant
of the Air Command and Staff College, Air University.
4. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. by Michael Howard
and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), bk.
one, chap. 1, 79. Emphasis in original.
5. The characteristics of parallel war and the air campaign primarily
are those provided by Colonel Warden. Like Col John R. Boyd
before him, most of Warden's brilliant exposition of parallel air
warfare is in the oral tradition: briefings and briefing slides. Where
primary written works are available, they are cited.
6. Warden, "Air Theory for the Twenty-first Century," 311-318.
7. Dan Hughes reminded me that in physics, just as in jujitsu, a
body has and can have only one center of gravity. Dr Hughes is a
colleague at the Air War College, Air University.
8. Warden, "Air Theory," 326-331. See also John A. Warden III,
"Employing Air Power in the Twenty-first Century," in Richard H.
Schultz, Jr., and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., eds., The Future of Air
Power in the Aftermath of the Gulf War (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air
University Press, 1992), 64-69.
9. John R. Pardo, Jr., "Parallel Warfare: Its Nature and
Application," in Karl P. Magyar, ed., Challenge and Response:
Anticipating US Military Security Concerns ( Maxwell AFB, Ala.:
Air University Press, 1994), 277-296.
10. David Deptula, draft, unpublished manuscript, "Firing for
Effect- Change in the Nature of Warfare," 14 October 1994, 12-
21. The author is grateful to Col Jeffrey Barnett, OSD/NA, for
pointing out this essay.
11. "Information Dominance Edges Toward New Conflict
Frontier," Signal Magazine, August 1994, 37-40. See also George
Stein, "NetWar-CyberWar- Information War," June 1994,
forthcoming in Air Power Journal; John Arquilla and David
Ronfeldt, "Cyberwar is Coming!" Comparative Strategy, 2, April-
June 1993, 141-65; and Norman B. Hutcherson, "Command and
Control Warfare: Putting Another Tool in the War-Fighters Data
Base" (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press), 5 August 1994.
12. Conversation with Colonel Warden, 10 November 1994. See
also Warden, "Air Theory," 329-330.
13. John Warden sometimes uses the example of 150 tornadoes
simultaneously striking the United States. Such a large number of
tornadoes hitting at the same time would make recovery
exceedingly difficult since recovery resources could not be shared
easily.
14. Jeffrey R. Cooper, Another View of the Revolution in Military
Affairs (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: US Army War College, 1994), 29-
30. Cooper's insightful conclusions about the constraints on an
authentic revolution in military affairs (RMA) can also be applied
to the air campaign theory of parallel war.
15. The United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Summary Report
(European War), 1945; reprinted in The United States Strategic
Bombing Surveys (European War) (Pacific War) (Maxwell AFB,
Ala.: Air University Press, 1987); and Thomas A. Kearney and
Elliot A. Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Survey: Summary Report
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1993). The
bomber does not "always get through" (sometimes bombers have
difficulty getting through the budget process), nor are precision
weapons of much use unless supported by precise prestrike
information on the target and poststrike damage to it.
16. J. C. Wylie, Military Strategy: A General Theory of Power
Control (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1967),
26. Italics added. Wylie introduced the differentiations of
sequential and cumulative in "Reflections on the War in the
Pacific," US Naval Institute Proceedings 78, no. 4 , April 1952,
351-361. See also J. C. Wylie, Military Strategy: A General
Theory of Power Control, in Classics of Sea Power (Annapolis:
Naval Institute Press, 1989), 101.
17. Desmond Ball, "Development of the SIOP, 1960-1983," in
Desmond Ball and Jeffrey Richelson, eds., Strategic Nuclear
Targeting (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986), 80-81.
18. A historian assigned to the Gulf War Airpower Survey team,
speaking under the promise of nonattribution, pointed out to the
Air Force officers detailed to assist with the study that the targeting
logic of the Instant Thunder air campaign briefing was the same as
the SIOP. He was told that "parallel war" was "an Air Force idea,"
while the SIOP was a "joint idea." Parallel war is an old idea. It
remains an important one for nuclear operations, since deterring
and fighting a peer may require a return to dependence on nuclear
weapons.
19. Ballistic missile attack options evidenced extraordinary
coherence and simultaneity. Theoretically it was possible, for
example, to time sea-based and land-based ballistic missile
launches so that all attacking warheads arrived at the first possible
point of enemy radar detection simultaneously. Source is a
discussion with Lt Gen Jay W. Kelley, USAF, Maxwell AFB,
Alabama, 1 December 1994. General Kelley is the commander of
Air University.
20. What may be "new" here may be that some in the tactical air
forces discovered the approach that strategic air and missile forces
had long taken to warfare. The Air Force Directorate of
Warfighting Concepts Development (AF/XOXW) lays claims to
the notion of parallel warfare, using the differences between
parallel and serial electrical circuits as the illustrative model.
Admiral Wylie would probably be pleased; imitation is the highest
form of flattery.
21. CMDR J. M. van Toal, OSD Net Assessment, suggests that the
difference between employing nuclear weapons and nonnuclear
weapons creates distinctions that are "definitive."
22. A state like Iraq is an even easier target set. A very senior air
officer involved in the Desert Storm air campaign, speaking under
the promise of nonattribution, asserted that achieving air supremacy
against Iraq was about as difficult as "shooting at a tethered goat."
23. Dan Hughes suggests that there are at least two sides to this
issue. Perhaps it was awareness of this likelihood in the leadership
of the former Soviet Union (or the US) that made such a US (or
Soviet) attack unnecessary.
24. Alvin and Heidi Toffler, War and Anti-War: Survival at the
Dawn of the 21st Century (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1993).
Desert Storm was not third wave warfare. It may, however, have
been nearly the epitome of second wave warfare.
25. John Keegan, A History of Warfare (New York: Alfred A.
Knopf, 1994); Martin van Creveld, The Transformation of War
(New York: Free Press, 1991); and Carl Builder, "Guns or Butter:
The Twilight of a Tradeoff?" (May 1994), a presentation to the
USAF Air University National Security Forum, Maxwell AFB,
Alabama. Used with permission.
26. Maj Gen Peter D. Robinson, former commandant of the Air
War College, points out that the techniques of mobility, deception,
disguise, dispersion, misinformation, and diversion are still useful
ways of creating ninjitsu.
27. The demassification and dehumanization of attack systems
could make the suppression of enemy air defenses a much lower
priority. A strength of the SIOP was the land-launched and sea-
launched ballistic missiles that preceded attacks by manned
aircraft. SSBNs are "stealthy" by virtue of their operations. The
five-rings' parallel war air campaign planner may not have such
missiles to employ. Cruise missiles and stealth as a design feature
become the analog of intercontinental ballistic missiles and were
employed- as we would expect them to be if the SIOP and parallel
warfare theories are the same-in advance of manned systems.
28. James A. Winnefeld, Preston Niblack, and Dana J. Johnson, A
League of Airmen: U.S. Air Power in the Gulf War (Santa Monica,
Calif.: RAND, 1994), 120-121.
29. Barry R. Schneider points out that "compacted serial warfare
may `be parallel warfare in effect " if the adversary does not have
the time to respond effectively. I would argue that this further
illuminates a limitation in the theory: to produce the "effect"
desired in time, we must use Clausewitzian mass in space. Absent
nearly unlimited mass, the notion of parallel air warfare may only
be valid if applied against small countries. Dr Schneider is a
colleague at the Air War College, Air University.
30. Advocates argue that the objective is not annihilation but
"control." The possibility that control actually is secured by
annihilating military capability should not be overlooked.
31. David Deptula, draft, "Firing for Effect," 20.
32. Erich Jantsch, The Self-Organizing Universe (Oxford:
Pergamon Press, 1980), 7, quoted in Margaret J. Wheatley,
Leadership and the New Science: Learning about Organization
from an Orderly Universe (San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler
Publishers, Inc., 1992), 18.
33. Alexander S. Cochran et. al., Gulf War Air Power Survey,
Volume I: Planning (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing
Office, 1993), 103-4. Dr Cochran is a colleague at the Air War
College, Air University.
34. Joseph A. Engelbrecht, "War Termination: Why Does A State
Decide To Stop Fighting?" (Unpublished doctoral dissertation,
Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, Columbia University, 1992).
Col Engelbrecht is a colleague at the Air University's Air War
College.
35. According to a senior Air Force officer speaking to the Air War
College under the promise of nonattribution, the Army is to blame
for its passion for "deep attack" and the way in which it uses the
fire support coordination line (FSCL) to apportion the battlespace.
The Marines are to blame for withholding sorties from the joint
forces air component commander (JFACC). All of this, the official
argued, reduces the power of airpower.
36. The importance of time and opportunity in warfare, dimensions
currently neglected in Army doctrine, is developed in Robert R.
Leonhard, Fighting by Minutes: Time and the Art of War
(Westport, Conn.: Praeger Publishers, 1994). See the discussion of
some of the limits of the ATO system on page 74.
37. As Gen Al Gray, the former commandant of the Marine Corps,
says, "I've never seen a battlefield too crowded to exclude anyone
who wants a shot at the enemy."
38. The Department of Defense plans to increase investment in
nonlethal technologies significantly. One wonders if unwillingness
to kill the enemy or employ friendly ground forces in mortal
combat against an adversary's homeland forces renders the United
States weak to the point of impotence. If the Army and Marine
Corps ground forces are unused in combat, they will eventually
become less useful for and effective in combat.
39. Joseph N. Pelton, Future View: Communications Technology
and Society in the 21st Century (Boulder, Colo.: Baylin
Publishing, 1992), 196.
40. V. K. Nair, War In The Gulf: Lessons for the Third World
(New Delhi, India: Lancer International, 1991), 110.
41. Said another way, information warfare may provide the antidote
for parallel warfare. Eventually, and embellished by technology to
intrude into acoustic, tactile, olfactory, and visual space,
information technology may be the antidote for all warfare. See
Marshall and Eric McLuhan, Laws of Media: The New Science
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988); Gregory L. Ulmer,
Heuretics: The Logic of Invention (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1994); and Diane Chotikul, "The Soviet Theory
of Reflexive Control in Historical and Psychocultural Perspective:
A Preliminary Study," Technical Report NPS55-86-013 (Monterey,
Calif.: Naval Postgraduate School, 1986).
42. A theory that asserts, for example, that an air force "owns"
responsibility for everything that transits the air is not a warfare
theory. A theory that asserts, for example, that an air force "owns"
responsibility for the "deep battle" or the "high battle" is not a
warfare theory. These are roles and missions, or defense resource
appropriation, theories. A theory, on the other hand, hypothesizes
that the battlespace is seamless.
43. Where the maintenance and modernization of large land armies
continue to sap national investments, the required technologies are
less likely to be forthcoming. France, England, and Germany
provide good examples. The "army" structurally and financially
dominates the defense debate and budget. Thus, airpower is
foredoomed to structural impotence in France, Germany, and
England.
44. A senior Air Force officer speaking to the Air War College
under the promise of nonattribution asserted that "without
technology, there is no Air Force." Technology is a tool, a means to
an end. When it becomes an end in itself, it may serve itself instead
of warfare.
45. Carl Builder, The Icarus Syndrome: The Role of Air Power
Theory in the Evolution and Fate of U.S. Air Force (New
Brunswick, NJ.: Transaction Publishers, 1994).
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those
of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic
environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official
position of the US Government, Department of Defense, the United
States Air Force or the Air University.
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