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Program and Bugdet Structure, US Military Space Pr
Program and Budget Structure
OVERVIEW
According to estimates published by the United States Government,
the American military space budget is approximately $15 billion,
slightly greater than the $14 billion spent by NASA. This suggests
a rough balance between the military and civilian space programs.
However, a closer analysis reveals that this government estimate
significantly understates total American national security space
spending, which is actually in the range of $25 billion.
There are at least three sources for this understatement.
First, the $15 billion only includes spending by the Department of
Defense, explicitly excluding national-security spending by other
government agencies. The most notable exclusion is the more than
$2 billion that is the CIA's portion of the National Reconnaissance
Office budget. Also excluded is national-security related spending
by NASA, which in the past was over $1 billion annually in the
form of a significant subsidy for military Space Shuttle flights, and
continues in the discrepancy between the cost of running the
TDRSS communications network (which supports the Lacrosse
intelligence satellite) and the payments from the Defense
Department.
Second, the US Government estimates largely focus on satellite
producers and operators, and generally exclude satellite users. The
$15 billion includes the budgets builders such as the Air Force
Space and Missiles Systems Center, and of operators such as the
Air Force Space Command. But it clearly excludes spending for
military components which are largely devoted to the utilization of
satellites, such as the Defense Mapping Agency, the Naval
Telecommunications and Computer Command, or the Air Weather
Service.
The exclusion of these users perpetuates an outmoded
conceptualization of the military's use of space systems. In the early
decades of the space age, military space systems were largely the
provenance of national intelligence agencies and strategic combat
components. But in the past decade, space systems have become
increasingly useful to a much broader range of military formations.
A similar definitional problem arises in other space arenas. Thus, in
the realm of commercial communications satellites, to focus merely
on satellites and launch vehicles would overlook the much larger
investment in ground segment, and a view restricted to hardware
would ignore the extensive activities of programmers and other
communications companies. Similarly, annual spending on remote
sensing satellites is small relative to the value-added image
processing industry, which is also small relative to the broader
Geographic Information Services industry.
There is, of course, some sense in which the entire military has
been transformed into consumers of military space system services.
But between space system producers and operators, and the
Defense Department as a whole, there stands an intermediate cadre
of users, which are largely devoted to processing satellite data or
supporting satellite services, though they are not the final
consumers of these products. The military support components in
fields such as communications, meteorology and intelligence have
no ultimate interest space services, but are intermediaries using
space systems in support of other military components.
In the civil space science community, the Hubble Space Telescope
Institute would be accounted part of the space program, as would
other processing and archival facilities. Though much of the
academic space science and astronomy communities are consumers
of data from these entities, they are generally not counted as part of
the space program. Thus, while it would be trivial to count the
entire US military as part of the space program, intermediate users,
such as the Defense Mapping Agency, which are analogous to the
Hubble Space Telescope Institute, should properly be included.
A third source of understatement lies in the high degree of
classification of intelligence-related space activities, which account
for nearly 40% of the American national security space budget.
Those who argue against publicly releasing the aggregate amount
for the entire intelligence budget (reportedly about $28 billion)
contend that revealing this single number might reveal information
on the budgets of individual agencies. The foolishness of this
argument, as well as the irrelevance of the debate over releasing the
aggregate total, is clear when it is understood that much more
detailed budget data on America's most secret intelligence agencies
is regularly revealed in the Pentagon budget. It is popularly
believed that the intelligence budget is completely invisible -- in
fact it is astonishingly thinly disguised, since it is hard to entirely
hide tens of billions of dollars. Like the purloined letter, it is
concealed in the open, for all to see if they but know where to look.
To paraphrase Einstein, the intelligence budget is subtle, but it is
not perverse. Appreciation of this subtlety can provide surprising
insight into the budgets of the National Reconnaissance Office
(NRO), the National Security Agency (NSA), and the Defense
Intelligence Agency (DIA). With a few clear exceptions, the
budgets of NRO, NSA and DIA are presented in the Defense
Department's annual budget request and its unclassified supporting
documents according to the same logic and rules as is used by other
less highly classified programs. Simple arithmetic readily reveals
the budgets of these agencies with a margin of error of perhaps
10%, to within a few hundred million dollars.
The continued pretense that the budgets of these agencies are
"secret" only serves to protect them from accountability to the tax-
paying public. The overall NRO budget nearly tripled during the
decade of excess, increasing from about $3.5 billion (in constant
FY94 dollars) in 1980, to nearly $9 billion in the mid-1980s, with
the 1994 Clinton Administration request totalling about $7 billion.
The reduction of more than $2.5 billion in the NRO budget over the
past five years indicates that reductions in the intelligence budget
are indeed possible. The fact that the 1994 Clinton Administration
request for NRO is over twice the level of spending at the time of
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan suggests that further savings are
equally possible.
US Governement Estimates
Beginning in 1963, each year the Director of Defense Research and
Engineering (DDR&E) would release annual aggregates for
military space spending. This practice was discontinued in 1989, as
a result of the realignment of the responsibilities of this position.
Subsequently however, the National Space Council did release
graphs disclosing the total military space budget in current and
constant year dollars. But it was not until 1993 that a new official
Defense Department estimate was released. The Defense
Department aggregates the military space budget into eleven broad
categories:(7)
Manned Space Flight consisted primarily of funding for the X-20
Dyna Soar and the KH-10 Manned Orbiting Laboratory, as well as
military support to NASA. No funding was displayed in this
category after 1970.
Communications consists of communications satellites and related
equipment, including AFSATCOM, DSCS, FLTSATCOM, UHF
Followon, and MILSTAR. It also includes aircraft modification
programs like PACCS/WWABNCP EC-135 and NECAP Class V
mods.
Navigation consists mainly of the Navstar GPS and Transit user
equipment and space and ground segments.
Mapping, Charting and Geodesy includes efforts to obtain more
accurate data for maps and charts and provide geophysical
information to strategic and tactical weapons systems, such as
knowledge of the size, shape and gravity field of the Earth for
supporting ballistic missile forces.
Meteorology and Oceanography consists mainly of the DMSP and
other environmental programs that supply timely weather
information to help DoD effectively employ forces.
Space Defense included such anti-satellite weapon projects as
SAINT, Program 437 and Program 505. With the termination of
these projects, no funding was displayed in this category after
1974.
Tactical Warning and Attack Assessment / Early Warning consists
of various satellite and ground programs, such as DSP, NORAD
Cheyenne Mountain Complex, BMEWS, and NDS that together
provide attack warning information.
Launch Vehicle Acquisition and Development consists of programs
for space launch vehicles and space launch and Shuttle support,
including the Advanced Launch System, Shuttle operations, and the
Vandenberg Shuttle launch complex.
Ground Support consists mainly of operations and maintenance
funding neccessary to support range support, instrumentation and
launch facilities (the Eastern and Western Test Ranges), satellite
control (such as CSOC and SCF), Spacetrack satellite detection
and tracking networks. It also includes funding for Air Force Space
Command Headquarters.(8)
Supporting Research and Development consists mainly of support
for basic and applied research, development in areas such as rocket
propulsion, aerospace technology, advanced spacecraft technology
test and evaluation projects, including the development and testing
of launch systems, the Space Test Program, LIGHTSAT/SPINSAT,
SDI and NASP programs.
General Support and Intelligence(9) covers various functions such
as technical and mission support for space related activities and
classified Air Force and Navy programs.(10) This category also
includes such programs as MIT Lincoln Laboratory, NORAD
Cheyenne Mountain Space Defense Systems, Professional Military
Education, Development Planning, TENCAP, FOREST GREEN,
General Defense Intelligence Program, and Special Activities.(11)
Also included are laboratory and research center in-house
programs, development and support organizations, general
operational support, and space-related military construction not
otherwise charged to specific space projects.(12)
These definitions disclose a number of ambiguities and
inconsistencies. The Launch Vehicle category includes
development of new launch vehicles such as the Shuttle and ALS,
while development of other new launch vehicles, including NASP,
is included in the Research and Development category. Similarly,
launch facilities for the Shuttle are encompassed under Launch
Vehicles, while launch support facilities for expendable launch
vehicles are included in the Ground Support category. Missile
warning functions at Cheyenne Mountain are placed under the
Tactical Warning area, while anti-satellite actitities at Cheyenne
Mountain are placed under General Support, and other satellite
tracking functions are included under Ground Support. Similarly,
non-mission specific research and technology activities are
included both in Supporting Research and Development and in
General Support.
It must be noted that apart from these definitional shortcomings,
there are additional problematic aspects to these US Government
estimates. The aggregate categories are clearly not consistent time
series, but rather represent year-to-year appraisals of what should
or should not be included as "space." Thus NORAD headquarters
funding was excluded in the early 1980s, though the same activity
was included upon the formation of the US Space Command.
Particular inconsistency is notable in the treatment of the Strategic
Defense Initiative. In 1985 it appears that the entire program was
included, whereas more recently only space-based systems have
been included.
A close examination of these estimates discloses a several other
puzzling features. Although throughout the Cold War it was
deemed possible to release numbers for the General Support
category (which includes headquarters functions as well as the Air
Force and Navy portions of the NRO budget), with the demise of
the Soviet adversary this category was deemed too sensitive for
public disclosure, as was the surveillance category which includes
missile warning satellites.
With the various adjustments previously discussed, it is possible to
recreate through the aggregation of individual line-items the overall
top-line US Government estimates with reasonable accuracy. In
fact, this bottom-up line item aggregation is in better agreement
with the Defense Department estimate than is the National Space
Council current year dollar estimate. And the National Space
Council inflation-adjusted constant dollar estimate is clearly
(though inexplicably) inconsistent with all other estimates.
A bottom-up line item aggregation also reproduces the Defense
Department's estimates for broad mission areas with an error of less
than +-10% in almost every year in the 1980s. However, there are
several puzzling anomolies in specific programs which resist easy
explanation. The four programs with the clearest and most
consistent definitions are Communications, Navigation, Mapping
and Meteorology.
A bottom-up line-item aggregation in the Meteorology program
area successfully reproduces with negligible divergence the DoD
estimates from 1980 through 1986, and from 1991 through 1994.
However, there is a gross discrepancy from 1987 through 1990,
during which the DoD estimate is nearly twice the total that can be
derived through line-item aggregation. There is no apparent
explanation for this, as a close examination of budget documents
reveals no meteorology or oceanography related programs not
included in the line-item estimates.
One possible explanation for this anomoly may lie in the fate of the
Naval Remote Ocean Sensing Satellite/System (N-ROSS). N-
ROSS was intended to be a lower-cost version of the Naval Ocean
Surveillance Satellite (NOSS), to gather oceanographic data in
support of anti-submarine warfare operations. NOSS was cancelled
in the early 1980s when its estimated total cost had risen to $782
million.(13) But N-ROSS, with a planned September 1990 launch
on a Titan 2, fell victim to a significant cost overrun, with total
projected costs increasing from $270 million to $420 million, amid
charges of Navy mismanagement.(14) However, in early 1987, Navy
Secretary John Lehman attempted to revive the N-ROSS effort,(15)
with a launch anticipated in late 1991 or early 1992.(16) Under the
revived program, Lockheed and GE Astro-Space would compete for
the contract to build the satellite.(17) However, the program was
apparently terminated in 1988.(18)
It may be that the failure to gain broad political support for this
program led to a decision in late 1987 to abandon the overt
acknowledged N-ROSS program, while proceeding with a similar
covert unacknowledged program. The timing and level of the
anomolous funding in the Meteorology mission area is consistent
with this intepretation. If this is the case, it is less than apparent
precisely where this covert funding was located in the Navy budget.
Although the Navy's RDT&E budget is littered with special axcess
program line items with exotic names such as LINK PLUMERIA,
CHALK WEED, and LINK EVERGREEN, there are no line items
with funding profiles that precisely match that of the meteorology
funding anomoly. But at least two line items appear in proximity to
other budget items for space systems and anti-submarine warfare,
so they are certainly in the right neighborhood. The closest fit is
LINK LAUREL, the funding for which rises and falls with that of
the anomoly. But it would be neccessary to include 1989 through
1991 funding from the RETRACT MAPLE line item to roughly
match the required amount, while excluding this line item for prior
and subsequent years. Though this could be accomodated by
assuming that LINK LAUREL funded part of the program, and that
a project under RETRACT MAPLE funded another part for a three
year interval. Although this budget analysis does not exclude the
existence of a covert N-ROSS program, neither does it come close
to establishing its existence. However, there is no other apparent
explanation for the discrepancy in meteorological funding.
Even more puzzuling are the discrepancies in navigation and
communications. For the early 1980s the DoD summary figure for
navigation and the line-item aggregation are in very close
agreement, with the glaring exception of 1982, when the DoD
summary figure is some $185 greater than the line item total. That
this is a one-time anomoly is indicated by the very close agreement
between the two estimates in the years immediately preceeding and
following. But a minute examination of DoD budget documents
fails to disclose any indication of an explanation of this peculiarity.
The divergence in the late 1980s and early 1990s might be
explained by the costs of modifying in-service aircraft to
accomodate GPS user equipment, but there is no indication of such
expenditures in published budget documents.
Similar eccentricities are to be noted in the realm of
communications. The 1986 DoD estimate is over $200 lower than
the line-item total, while the next year the situation reverses, with
the DoD estimate over $200 higher than the line-item estimate.
Another wild gyration is also observed in the early 1990s, when the
DoD summary is $200 million in excess of the line-item aggregate
in 1991, and falls to more than $300 million lower by 1993.
Although differences in accounting for MILSTAR might account
for the excursion in the 1980s, there is no apparent explanation for
the more recent excursion. But this later anomoly is part of a larger
pattern of a substantial, growing and inexplicable divergence in the
most recent Defense Department estimates, with a substantial
deficit in communications and a major surplus in General Support.
Given the vague and shifting definitions of the other summary
categories, no attempt has been made to reconcile the DoD and
line-item aggregate totals.
One final observation further confirms the limited utility of the
DoD budget analysis. The most recent Defense Department
estimates included for the first time a breakdown of the budget into
functional categories. There is a fair degree of correspondence
between the bottom-up line item aggregation and the Defense
Department's estimates for military personnel, operations and
maintenance, and military construction. However, there is a major
discrepancy in RDT&E and Procurement, with the Defense
estimate of Procurement standing over $2 billion higher, and the
RDT&E account a similar amount lower, that would be anticipated
on the basis of line item aggregation. Unless the Defense estimate
is simply in error, there must be a substantial misrepresentation of
budget categories at the line time level. The simplest explanation it
that the Air Force Special Activities RDT&E line item, which
covers NRO launch vehicles and spacecraft, is treated as
procurement in this aggregation, though why this would be remains
obscure.
In light of the limitations of the US Government budget categories,
a more consistent and illuminating classification system is needed.
Communications consisting of communications satellites and
related equipment, including AFSATCOM, DSCS, FLTSATCOM,
UHF Followon, and MILSTAR. It also includes aircraft
modification programs like PACCS/WWABNCP EC-135 and
NECAP Class V mods.
Navigation consisting of the Navstar GPS and Transit user
equipment and space and ground segments.
Mapping, Charting and Geodesy including efforts to obtain more
accurate data for maps and charts and provide geophysical
information to strategic and tactical weapons systems, such as
knowledge of the size, shape and gravity field of the Earth for
supporting ballistic missile forces.
Meteorology and Oceanography consists mainly of the DMSP and
other environmental and oceanographic programs that supply timely
weather information to help DoD effectively employ forces.
Surveillance consisting of various broad-area surveillance satellite
programs for detecting and tracking targets such as nuclear
explosions, ballistic missiles, aircraft and surface vessels, using
infrared and radar sensors, including systems such as DSP and
NDS, as well as such MASINT programs as FOREST GREEN, but
excluding high resolution imaging and signals intelligence systems.
Intelligence consisting of all signals intelligence programs, as well
as high resolution radar and optical imaging intelligence space
systems. This includes space related activities and classified Air
Force and Navy programs, TENCAP, General Defense Intelligence
Program, and Special Activities.
Space Defense including anti-satellite weapon projects and other
programs, such as deception and evasion, to negate adversary space
systems, as well as satellite survivability measures.
Ballistic Missile Defense consisting of space-based and ground-
based exo-atmospheric interceptors, sensors, and related research
and technology programs, notably those of the SDI program.
Space Surveillance including items such as NORAD Cheyenne
Mountain Complex, NORAD Cheyenne Mountain Space Defense
Systems, BMEWS, that provide missile attack warning
information, as well as Spacetrack satellite detection and tracking
networks.
Launch Vehicle Acquisition and Development consisting of
programs for space launch vehicles and space launch and Shuttle
support, including the Advanced Launch System, Shuttle
operations, and the Vandenberg Shuttle launch complex, as well as
including the development and testing of launch systems such as
the NASP program, along with range support, instrumentation and
launch facilities (the Eastern and Western Test Ranges),
Ground Support consists mainly of operations and maintenance
funding neccessary to support satellite control (such as CSOC and
SCF).
General Support covers various functions such as technical and
mission support for basic and applied research, development in
areas such as rocket propulsion, aerospace technology, advanced
spacecraft technology test and evaluation projects, the Space Test
Program, LIGHTSAT/SPINSAT. This category also includes such
programs as MIT Lincoln Laboratory, Professional Military
Education, Development Planning, Also included are laboratory
and research center in-house programs, development and support
organizations, general operational support, and space-related
military construction not otherwise charged to specific space
projects. It also includes funding for unified and service Space
Command headquarters.
A NOTE ON BUDGET TERMS AND CONCEPTS(6)
Spending the Money
The Defense Budget goes through several phases before the money
is actually spent. Once the budget has been authorized and money
appropriated by the Congress, the Defense Department obligates
the funds to individual contractors. When the money is
subsequently transferred to the contractor, this results in an actual
outlay of funds. In some cases there can be a delay of several years
between the time of Congressional action and actual outlays.
The Future Years Defense Program
The heart of the Defense Budget is the Future Years Defense
Program (FYDP), pronounced "fidip"). Formerly known as the Five
Year Defense Program, failures to systematically update this
document during the Bush Administration led to the change to a
more generic nomenclature. The FYDP was initiated by Secretary
of Defense McNamarra, and brought a modicum of rationality to
what had previously been a chaotic process. Beginning with the
Fiscal Year (FY) 1963 budget, the FYDP projected the Defense
Budget five years into the future, as a basis for evaluating the
current year's budget request. Each year the FYDP is advanced into
the future by one year, and accumulates another prior year of data.
In addition, the Extended Planning Annex to the FYDP projects
general funding requirements to ten years into the future from the
date of the budget submission.
Budget Categories
The defense budget is divided into five broad categories of activity.
Funding for Program Elements are reported to the Congress and the
public through such documents as the R-1 which lists Research,
Development, Test and Evaluation programs, the P-1 which lists
Procurement Programs, and the C-1 which lists Construction
projects (unfortunately, there is no "O-1" for Operations and
Maintenance, or "M-1" for Military Personnel). The R-1 displays
the level of spending for each Program Element, and the format of
the P-1 roughly parallels the program element structure, though
program element numbers are not listed for budget line items.
These documents are the basis for debate on defense programs.
Program Element Descriptive Summary and Justification of
Estimates budget documents provide narrative descriptions at the
Program Element level indicate such important information as
contract activity and the overall mission of the program.
Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E)
The defense budget divides the research and development process
into five stages. A program's stage of development is generally
indicated by the first two digits of its Program Element Number,
although the decision as to which category a Program belongs in is
somewhat arbitrary. The five stages are:
6.1 Basic Research: efforts directed toward the expansion of
specific knowledge of natural phenomena, but not tied to a specific
program.
6.2 Exploratory Development: efforts directed toward the
expansion of technological knowledge and the development of
materials and components with potential application to new
military weapons and equipment. Emphasis on exploring the
feasibility of various approaches to military problems up to the
point of breadboard and prototype fabrication.
6.3A Advanced Development: efforts directed toward the
development of experimental hardware for technical or operational
testing of its suitability for military use.
6.3 Advanced Development: efforts directed toward the
development of experimental hardware for technical or operational
testing of its suitability for military use.
6.4 Engineering Development: efforts directed toward the
development of a particular system engineered for service use, but
which has not yet been approved for production and deployment.
6.5 Test Ranges and Support: test, development, evaluation and
design facilities for research programs, as well as projects which
have already entered (or have been approved for) the production-
deployment stage.
Procurement
Major weapon system acquisition costs are directly associated with
the appropriate program element or elements in accordance with the
mission or missions assigned to the weapon system. Unit related
items are associated with the program elements according to the
unit's identity, relative wartime deployment priorities, the
equipment authorizations for each unit, and world-wide asset
position for equipment items. Some resources, such as light
vehicles, are allocated to base operations program elements. In
some cases, particularly in the Navy, summary program elements
are used to accumulate procurement resources to avoid an arbitrary
allocation.
Military Construction (MILCON)
When a construction project is identified, the dominant user is
determined, and a specific program element is assigned on this
basis.
Operations and Maintenance (O&M)
Several methodologies are used to identify operation and
maintenance costs. Force-related resources are applied according to
workload requirements, such as flying or steaming hours or
overhaul schedules of force units. Costs associated with General
Schedule (GS) civilian government employees are covered in this
account.
Military Personnel (MILPERS)
Military personnel costs are applied to program elements by a
computation of average salaries times the number of personnel for
each program.
Defense Programs
A program is an aggregation of program elements that reflects a
force mission or a support mission of the Department of Defense
and contains the resources needed to achieve an objective or plan.
The major programs of the FYDP may overlap areas of management
and functional responsibility within the Office of the Secretary of
Defense, and the programs are not considered to be the exclusive
responsibility of the Office of Primary Responsibility.
Program 1 - Strategic Purpose Forces
Offices of Primary Responsibility (OPR) Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy (USDP), Under-Secretary of Defense for
Research & Engineering (USDR&E), Director of Program Analysis
and Evaluation (DPAE). Strategic forces are those organizations
and associated weapons systems whose force missions encompass
intercontinental or transoceanic inter-theater responsibilities.
Program 1 is further divided into strategic offensive and strategic
defensive forces, including operational management headquarters,
logistics, and support organizations identifiable and associated
with these major subdivisions.
Program 2 - General Purpose Forces
Offices of Primary Responsibility (OPR): USDR&E; USD(P)
General purpose forces are those organizations and associated
weapons systems whose force mission responsibilities are, at a
given point in time, limited to one theater of operation. Program 2
consists of force-oriented program elements, including the
command organizations associated with these forces, the logistic
organizations organic to these forces, and the related support units
that are deployed or deployable as constituent parts of military
forces and field organizations. Also included are other programs,
such as the Joint Tactical Communications Program (TRI-TAC),
JCS-directed and coordinated exercises, Coast Guard ship support
program, war reserve materiel ammunition and equipment, and
stockfunded war reserve materiel.
Program 3 - Intelligence and Communications
Offices of Primary Responsibility (OPR): USDR&E; USD(P).
Consists of intelligence, security, and communications program
elements, including resources related primarily to centrally-directed
DoD support mission functions, such as mapping, charting, and
geodesy activities, weather service, oceanography, special activities,
nuclear weapons operations, space boosters, satellite control and
aerial targets. Intelligence and communications functions that are
specifically identifiable to a mission in the other major programs
shall be included within the appropriate program.
Program 4 - Airlift and Sealift Forces
Offices of Primary Responsibility (OPR): USDR&E; DPAE.
Consists of program elements for airlift, sealift, traffic management,
and water terminal activities, both industrially-funded and non-
industrially-funded, including command, logistics, and support
units organic to these organizations.
Program 5 - Guard and Reserve Forces
Offices of Primary Responsibility (OPR): Assistant Secretary of
Defense (Reserve Affairs (ASD(RA)), DPAE. The majority of
Program 5 resources consist of Guard and Reserve training units in
support of strategic offensive and defensive forces and general
purpose forces. In addition, there are units in support of
intelligence and communication; airlift and sealift; research and
development; central supply and maintenance; training, medical,
general personnel activities; administration; and support of other
nations.
Program 6 - Research and Development
Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR) USDR&E. Consists of all
research and development programs and activities that have not yet
been approved for operational use, and includes basic and applied
research tasks and projects of potential military application in the
physical, mathematical, environmental, engineering, biomedical,
and behavioral sciences. It also includes development, test and
evaluation of new weapons systems equipment and related
programs.
Program 7 - Central Supply and Maintenance
Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR) Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Military Installations and Logistics ASD (MI&L).
Consists of resources related to supply, maintenance, and service
activities, both industrially funded and non-industrially-funded,
and other activities, such as first and second destination
transportation, overseas port units, industrial preparedness,
commissaries, and logistics and maintenance support. These
functions, which are usually centrally managed, provide benefits
and support necessary for the fulfillment of DoD programs.
Program 8 - Training, Medical and Other General Personnel
Activities
Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR) Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Health Affairs ASD (HA) and ASD (MI&L). Consists
of resources relate to training and education, personnel
procurement services, health care, permanent change of station
travel, transients, family housing, and other support activities
associated with personnel. Excluded from this program is training
specifically related to and identified with another major program.
Housing subsistence, health care, recreation, and similar costs and
resources that are organic to a program element, such as base
operations in other major programs, are also excluded from this
program. Program 8 functions and activities, which are mainly
centrally managed, provide benefits and support necessary for the
fulfillment of DoD programs.
Program 9 - Administration and Associated Activities
Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR) Assistant Secretary of
Defense (Comptroller) ASD (C). Consists of resources for the
administrative support of departmental and major administrative
headquarters, field command, and administration and associated
activities not accounted for elsewhere. Included are activities such
as construction planning and design, public affairs, contingencies,
claims, and criminal investigations.
Program 10 - Support of Other Nations
Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR) Assistant Secretary of
Defense for International Security Affairs ASD (ISA). Consists of
resources in support of international activities, including support to
the Military Assistance Program (MAP), foreign military sales, and
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Infrastructure.
Program 11 - Special Operations Forces
Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR) Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Low Intensity Conflict ASD (LIC). Consists of
resources in support of special operations forces, particularly the
Special Operations Command, a unified command.
Program Elements
The Defense Department budget is structured like a cake with three
layers. The top layer consists of what are called Program Elements
(PE), which is the basic component of the FYDP. These are the
large aggregations of activities, such as the B-1B bomber or the
MX missile.
The next level of detail is provided by Projects which are
constituent components of some Program Elements. Project-level
budget data is not displayed in the R-1 and P-1 documents, though
information is provided about individual Projects in the Program
Element Descriptive Summary documents.
The lowest layer of the budget cake are Tasks. This is the working
level of the Program, where actual activities are described. In some
programs, Tasks are sometimes referred to as Work Packages. But
budget documents normally provide no detailed information
concerning Task-level program activity.
The first digit of the Program Element number identifies the
defense Program. The second and third digits provide additional
programmatic characterization, which varies from Program to
Program (Figure 1-1).
The fourth and fifth digits uniquely identify the Program Element.
There are four sets of program elements that are located throughout
the FYDP structure and are identified by a common code in these
positions.
xxx90x Audiovisual Activities
xxx94x Real Property Maintenance
xxx96x Base Operations
xxx98x Management Headquarters
The last position, which is alphabetic, identifies the DoD
component to which the element is assigned (Figure 1-2).
Figure 1 - 1
Program Element Number Structure
First Digit Second Digit Third Digit
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1 Strategic Forces
0 Strategic Offense/Defense 1 Aircraft
1 Strategic Offense 2 Missiles
2 Strategic Defense 3 C3 Systems 4 Surveillance & Warning
5 Safeguard
6 Ballistic Missile Defense
7
8 Other
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2 General Purpose Forces
1 Unified Commands
... ........................... ... ...........................
2 Forces - Army 1 Alaska
2
3 Europe
4 Pacific
5 South
6 FORCECOM
7 8 Other CONUS
3 Ops Sys Development - Army
... ........................... ... ...........................
4 Forces - Navy 1 Sea Control / Projection
2 Sea Control Forces
3 Mine Warfare
4 Sea Projection
5 Space/Electronic Warfare
6 Support - Shore Based
5 Ops Sys Development - Navy
... ........................... ... ...........................
6 Forces - Marine Corps 1 Division/Wing Teams
2 Divisions
3 Combat Support
4 Other Support
5
6 Ops Sys Development - USMC
Figure 1 - 1 (continued)
Program Element Number Structure
First Digit Second Digit Third Digit
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2 General Purpose Forces (continued)
... ........................... ... ...........................
7 Forces - Air Force 1 Combat Aircraft Units
2 Combat Support Aircraft Units
3 Missile Units
4 Units - Other
5 Other Support
... ........................... ... ...........................
8 Other
------------------------------------------------------------------------
3 Intelligence/Communications
1 General Intelligence & Cryptological Activity
2 National Military Command System
3 Communications
4 Special Activities
5 Activities (Other)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
4 Airlift & Sealift
1 Airlift 1 Industrially funded
2 Non-Industrially funded
3 Tactical Airlift
4
5
6
7
8 Other
... ........................... ... ...........................
2 Sealift 1 Industrially funded
... ........................... ... ...........................
3 Traffic Management
4 Special Operations
5
6
7
8 Other
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Figure 1 - 1 (continued)
Program Element Number Structure
First Digit Second Digit Third Digit
------------------------------------------------------------------------
5 Guard & Reserve Forces
0 Support of Other Nations
... ........................... ... ...........................
1 Strategic Forces 1 Strategic Defense
2 Strategic Defense
3 Strategic Defense Warning
4 Strategic Offense
... ........................... ... ...........................
2 General Purpose Forces 0 Management Headquarters
1 Management Headquarters
2 Management Headquarters
3 Naval Reserve
4 Navy Headquarters
5 Marine Corps Reserve
6 Air National Guard
7 Air Force Reserve
8 Army National Guard
89 Naval Reserve
9 Army Reserve
99 Naval Reserve
... ........................... ... ...........................
3 Intelligence/Communications 11 Air National Guard
12 Air Force Reserve
13 Naval Reserve
14 Naval Reserve
15 Naval Reserve
16
17 Naval Reserve
18
19 Naval Reserve
29 Naval Reserve
30 Other
... ........................... ... ...........................
4 Airlift & Sealift 1 Airlift
2 Airlift
31 Sealift
33 Tactical Airlift
39 Other
Figure 1 - 1 (continued)
Program Element Number Structure
First Digit Second Digit Third Digit
------------------------------------------------------------------------
5 Guard & Reserve Forces (continued)
... ........................... ... ...........................
5 Base Operations
6 Research & Development
7 Central Supply & Maintenance
8 Training, Medical & Personnel
9 Administration
10 Support of Other Nations
11 Special Operations Forces
------------------------------------------------------------------------
6 Research & Development
1 Research 0 R&D Support
2 Exploratory Development 1 Research / Military Science
3 Advanced Development 2 Aircraft
4 Engineering Development 3 Missiles
5 Management & Support 4 Astronautics
6 Test & Evaluation 5 Ships & Small Craft
7 Operational System Dev 6 Ordnance & Combat Vehicles
7 Other Equipment
8 Management & Support
------------------------------------------------------------------------
7 Central Supply & Maintenance
1 Supply
2 Maintenance & Service 0 Industrial Funded
1 Headquarters
2 Non-Industrial Funded
3
4
5
6
7
8 Other
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Figure 1 - 1 (continued)
Program Element Number Structure
First Digit Second Digit Third Digit
------------------------------------------------------------------------
8 Training, Medical & Personnel
1 Personnel Procurement
2
3
4 Individual Training & Education
5 Base Operations
6 Individual Training - Health Care
7 Health Care Delivery
8 Personnel Activities
71 Armed Forces Info Service
72 Holding
73 Travel
74 Defense Family Housing
75 Other
9 Other
------------------------------------------------------------------------
9 Administration
1 General Support 1 General Support
2
3
4
5 Other Support Activities
... ........................... ... ...........................
2 Headquarters
3 Security & Legal
4 Undistributed
------------------------------------------------------------------------
10 Support of Other Nations
------------------------------------------------------------------------
11 Special Operations Forces
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Figure 1 - 1 (continued)
Program Element Number Structure
Component Identifier Codes
A Army
B Defense Mapping Agency
C Strategic Defense Initiative Organization
D Office of the Secretary of Defense
E Advanced Research Projects Agency
F Air Force
G National Security Agency
H Defense Nuclear Agency
I Defense Reconnaissance Support Program
J Joint Chiefs of Staff
K Defense Information Systems Agency
L Defense Intelligence Agency
M Marine Corps
N Navy
O
P
Q
R Defense Contract Audit Agency
S Defense Logistics Agency
T
U [Undistributed Resources]
V Defense Investigative Service
W Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences
X Inspector General
Y Defense Audiovisual Agency
Z
6. 6 Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller),
The Five Year Defense Program; Book 1 FYDP Program Structure,
DoD 7045.7-H, August 1984, chapter 2, is the primary source for
this section.
7. Sources for these descriptions include:
Stares, Paul, The Militarization of Space - US Policy, 1945-1984,
(Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York), page 257.
United States Senate Appropriations Committee Defense
Subcommittee, Department of Defense Appropriations for Fiscal
Year 1988, 100th Congress, 1st Session, part 3, 23 April 1987,
pages 472-473.
General Accounting Office, Military Space Programs,
GAO/NSIAD-90-154FS, June 1990, page 86.
8. Space Command Headquarters was specified in the 1987 Senate
enumeration but not in the 1990 GAO list.
9. Although most enumerations characterize this category simply as
"General Support," the 1987 Senate list calls this category "Support
and Intelligence."
10. According to the 1990 GAO list.
11. According to the 1987 Senate list.
12. According to Stares.
13. Cushman, Jack, "Satellite Failures Derail Navy's N-ROSS
Project," Defense Week, 27 August 1984, page 13-14.
14. Eisestadt, Steven, "Navy Scraps Space Plan's Cornerstone,"
Defense News, 22 December 1986, page 1, 12.
15. Eisestadt, Steven, "Lehman Does an About Face, Resucitates
N-ROSS Program," Defense News, 6 April 1987, page 8.
16. Palca, Joseph, "US Navy Oceanography Satellite Heading for a
Comeback," Nature, 6 August 1987, page 468.
17. Starr, Barbara, "Navy May Renew Controversial N-ROSS
Competition," Defense News, 19 October 1987, page 4.
18. "Navy Pushes to Kill N-ROSS Satellite Program in FY89
Budget Process," Inside the Pentagon, 5 February 1988, pages 4-5.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
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