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Cyberocracy is Coming
by David Ronfeldt
Abstract
The government world lags behind the business world in
feeling the effects of the information technology revolution and
related innovations in organization. But government may change
radically in the decades ahead. This essay fields a concept--
"cyberocracy"--to discuss how the development of, and demand for
access to, the future electronic information and communications
infrastructures--i.e., "cyberspace"--may alter the nature of
bureacracy. While it is too early to say precisely what a cyberocracy
may look like, the outcomes may include new forms of democratic,
totalitarian, and hybrid governments. Optimism about the
information revolution should be tempered by a constant,
anticipatory awareness of its potential dark side.
Copyright notice: This article is copyrighted 1992 by Taylor &
Francis, 1900 Frost Road, Suite 101, Bristol, PA 19007, 1-800-
821-8312. It was originally published in The Information Society
journal, vol. 8, no. 4, pp. 243-296. Electronic reproduction and
transmission for individual, non-commercial use only is permitted.
Author's note: This ascii file contains corrections of a few errata
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This is a revised version of David Ronfeldt, Cyberocracy,
Cyberspace, and Cyberology: Political Effects of the Information
Revolution, P-7745, RAND, Santa Monica, 1991. I thank Robert
Anderson, Roger Benjamin, Steve Bankes, Carl Builder, and Kevin
McCarthy at RAND, William Dutton of the Annenberg School at
USC, and Steven Rosell of Canada's Institute for Research on
Public Policy for their comments and criticisms.
INTRODUCTION
This is a think-piece about how the information and
communications technology revolution may affect politics and
government in the future. The study does not subscribe to
technological determinism, but it is enthusiastic, for its author has
been captivated by thoughts like the following: "Perhaps it gets
tiresome to read, as we have read for years, that advances in
computing are going to change the world. But it's true."[1] "The
world now taking shape is not only new but new in entirely new
ways."[2] At the same time, the author's enthusiasm is tempered by
a concern that the information revolution may have a dark side.
One idea--that something called "cyberocracy" is coming--motivates
this essay.[3] It begins by reviewing the effects that the information
revolution is having on business and government. This revolution
and its associated technologies seem to be at an early stage of
development, and analysts have barely begun to discern its likely
political effects.
The essay then focuses on how the modern bureaucratic state may
give way to the "cybercratic state" early in the next century. The
conclusion recommends the creation of a new field of study around
the concept of information, and suggests some items for a future
research agenda.
CYBEROCRACY: CONCEPT FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
People have riddled history with their "-isms" and "-ocracies."
Feudalism, imperialism, capitalism, fascism, socialism,
communism, theocracy, aristocracy, democracy, bureaucracy--each
historical age has created new ideas and institutional forms.
Most "isms" and "ocracies" of our day have existed for a long time.
Socialism and communism, once heralded as the waves of the
future, have been around more than a century. Capitalism and
liberal democracy have endured much longer. Meanwhile,
bureaucracy has spread throughout the public and private sectors of
all modern administrative systems.
We thus continue using the vocabulary of the past to interpret the
present and speculate about the future. But technological and other
innovations are changing the world so rapidly, and so many more
are on the horizon, especially in the areas of information and
communications, that we may soon need a new vocabulary of
concepts to comprehend the new age we are presumably entering--
what is termed the "post-industrial age" by some, the "information
age" by others.[4]
What new "ism" or "ocracy" may arise? The purpose of this paper is
to suggest that "cyberocracy" is coming. This term, from the roots
"cyber-" and "-cracy," signifies rule by way of information. As it
develops, information and its control will become a dominant
source of power, as a natural next step in man's political evolution.
In the past, under aristocracy, the high-born ruled; under theocracy,
the high priests ruled. In modern times, democracy and bureaucracy
have enabled new kinds of people to participate in government. In
turn, cyberocracy, by arising from the current revolution in
information and communications technologies, may slowly but
radically affect who rules, how, and why.
Perhaps the literature does not need another attempt to field
another term about the shape of things to come. Awful terms like
"compunications," "technetronic society," and "computopia" have
already come and gone.[5] The term cyberocracy may fare no better.
Be that as it may, to the extent that something like the phenomenon
under discussion develops, it may affect the organization of
governments and societies, the meaning of authority and
democracy, the nature of bureaucracies, the behavior of elites, even
the definition of progress. It may transform how people think about
the "system" and the world in which they live. And it may give rise
to new patterns of conflict and cooperation at all levels of society.
CAVEATS AND CLARIFICATIONS
This paper may seem to promise more than can be delivered. Its aim
is to persuade the reader that something called cyberocracy is on
the horizon, and to provide a general sense of what it may look like
and how it may affect politics. But I do not presume to foretell with
precision what a fully developed cyberocracy may look like. That
may not be clear for decades. The best the essay may do is propose
the concept, identify some forms that it may assume and some
issues that its development may involve, and indicate some
implications for policy analysis.
A few terms used throughout this essay--information, information
technology, and information revolution--deserve clarification. How
best to define the term "information" remains one of the key
problems of the information revolution. There are many definitions
out there, but none of them seem satisfactory, so I will not cite and
pick from among them. Yet as a rule, many analysts subscribe to a
rising hierarchy with data at the bottom, information in the middle,
and knowledge at the top (some would add intelligence or wisdom
above that).[6] In some versions of this hierarchy, data are defined
as raw facts, and information as organized data or patterns that
arise from the data. Some analysts presume that more of the former
will mean more of the latter--e.g., more data will mean more
information, and more information more knowledge-- but this is not
necessarily true. Also, it should not be presumed that the hierarchy
is driven from the bottom by data; values and value judgements may
intrude at all levels. Depending on context, I often use the term
information to refer collectively to the hierarchy, but at other times
I use the term to mean something more than data but less than
knowledge. It may turn out that knowledge is to the study of
information what wealth has been to the study of economics, and
power to the study of politics. (It may also turn out that networks
are to the study of information what markets have been to the study
of economics, and institutions to the study of politics.)
The term "information technology," also expressed as "information
and communications technology," and in short as "the new
technology," includes computers but rarely refers solely or
primarily to them. As used here, the term encompasses not only
computer hardware and software but also the communications
system, networks, and databanks and other information utilities to
which computers may be connected. In some allusions, this
technology may be located in an office, but in others, it may be
spread web-like around the world. Advances in television, radio,
and telephone technologies are also increasingly part of the
information technology revolution. That all these technologies will
come into play as the demand grows for new kinds of information-
related goods and services may be illustrated with the following
question: Will the morning newspaper be delivered electronically
to subscribers by a computer network, an interactive cable
television , a wireless radio, or a telephone company?
However, the term "information revolution," or "information and
communications revolution," is not used in a merely technological
sense. This revolution derives partly from the new technologies, but
it is not determined by them. Many recent developments in the
theory and practice of management reflect the information
revolution, but have little to do with technology per se. They owe to
conceptual changes in the awareness of the role of information in
human behavior, organization, and society. The information
revolution is a social, political, economic, cultural, and
psychological, as well as technological revolution.
Cyberocracy is the new term here. Terms with "cyber-" as the
prefix--e.g., cyberspace--are currently in vogue among some
visionaries and technologists who are seeking names for new
concepts and realities related to the information revolution. The
prefix is from a Greek root, kybernan, meaning to steer or govern,
and a related word, kybernetes, meaning pilot, governor, or
helmsman.[7] The prefix was introduced by Norbert Wiener in the
1940s in his works creating the field of "cybernetics" (a term
related to cybernetique, a French word meaning the art of
government). Some readers may object to my addition to the
lexicon, but I prefer it to alternatives like the "informatization" of
government and the "informated" bureaucracy.[8] In my view, a
good case exists for using the "cyber-" prefix, for it bridges the
concepts of information and governance better than any other
available prefix or term. Indeed, kybernan is also the root of the
word "govern" and its extensions.
INFORMATION AS POWER
The new information and communications technologies are
spreading rapidly throughout offices, factories, and homes around
the world. The popular and professional literature is filled with
news and ideas about the latest computer hardware and software,
about databanks and expert systems, about fiber-optic cables,
communications satellites, and emerging global networks for
electronic mail, conferencing, and data transmission, about privacy,
security, and computer crime, about electronic cottage industries,
automated production lines, and offices of the future, and about the
vast societal changes that may result.
These developments have affected how people think about power
and its use. Agreement is spreading that information should be
viewed both as a new source of power and as an agent for
transforming one kind of power into another. In the words of two
very different observers:
"The crucial point about a post-industrial society is that knowledge
and information become the strategic and transforming resources of
the society, just as capital and labor have been the strategic and
transforming resources of industrial society." (Daniel Bell)[9]
"We are witnessing a historic transformation of the traditional
modes of power. Power today is becoming based less on physical
and material parameters (territory, military forces) and more on
factors linked to the capability of storing, managing, distributing,
and creating information." (Regis Debray)[10]
In short, we are beginning to live in an "information economy" and
an "information society"--we are entering an "information age."[11]
But just how far into it are we?
STRONG EFFECTS ON BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS
Business leaders have recognized and responded to these trends
more quickly than have government leaders. Economic thinking and
behavior are already heavily affected by the information revolution.
The production, dissemination, and consumption of information
have become major growth activities, especially in the United
States where more than half the jobs may be information-
related.[12] In the advanced nations, jobs in the information sector
are said to be growing more rapidly than jobs manufacturing
physical goods, while manufacturing is becoming less labor-
intensive and more knowledge-intensive. Management economist
Peter Drucker estimated in 1986 that, "In all developed countries
'knowledge' workers have already become the center of gravity of
the labor force."[13] Meanwhile, investors and "knowledge elites"
in the private sector have found that creating new wealth is
depending more on information than on other resources.
It used to be said that money is power. Now one hears instead that
"Information is power, and economic information is economic
power."[14] Former Citicorp Chairman Walter Wriston has
reportedly claimed that information about money is more valuable
than money itself.[15]
Thus information is increasingly treated as a valuable source of
competitive advantage, and capital and information are becoming
more interchangeable as factors of production. For some business
leaders, this means that information is important as a source of
capital; for others, that information is succeeding capital as a
source of economic and political power. The effects of such
rethinking appear throughout the business world.
Conceptual Changes
Concepts of business management are changing partly because of
the new technology. The private sector has found that a dispersed
business can now be managed directly from a single center or from
several locations. Corporate officers and management theorists tout
the end of hierarchy and the rise of flat organizations. Top
management finds that the new information systems may enable
them to run complex operations without relying heavily on middle
management. In some cases, the new technology means that a wider
span of economic and social control may be exercised from the top;
in other cases, the technology may open new channels for lower
echelons and outside investors to challenge management decisions.
Access to telephone lines and satellite systems for high-speed data
transmission has become an important consideration in decisions
about where to locate new foreign investments.
Concepts of markets are changing. A marketplace used to mean a
geographic area with a boundary that expanded and contracted. But
as Daniel Bell notes, the Rotterdam spot market for oil "is no
longer in Rotterdam. Where is it? Everywhere. It is a telex-radio-
computer network." As work becomes detached from place, and
operations from central headquarters, "we see a change of
extraordinary historical and sociological importance--the change in
the nature of markets from 'places' to 'networks.'"[16] The entire
planet is becoming a real-time market for electronic financial
transactions. As the global economy grows, what were once called
"multinational corporations" are evolving into "global companies"
that regard the entire world as a production platform and
marketplace, virtually irrespective of national borders.
Concepts of capital are changing. Corporations now buy, sell,
store, and transmit information as though it were money (and vice-
versa). Capital is viewed as a form of information (and vice-versa).
"Capital today exists largely in terms of credit information. Banks
no longer ship around large quantities of cash; instead they
transmit credit information."[17] Electronic transactions and
financial news result in immediate, worldwide adjustments in
monetary exchange rates without any bullion or currency physically
changing hands. Thus, in Wriston's view, a new "information
standard" is replacing the gold standard.[18]
Wriston, who has been praised for building Citibank into "the one
institution that understands that finance no longer has to do with
money but with information,"[19] says that new terms and concepts
are needed.
"[M]ost of the terms we use in standard economic analysis were
invented in the industrial age, and while many are still relevant,
some no longer measure what they once did, because the base has
changed....If we think about our economy, another word we use is
"capital." Economists of many schools tend to agree that capital is
stored-up labor which has been expressed in dollars. A good case
can now be made that knowledge and information are becoming the
new capital in today's world.... A strong argument can be made that
information capital is as important, or even more critical, to the
future growth of the American economy than money. Despite this
perception, this intellectual capital does not show up in the
numbers economists customarily look at or quote about capital
information."[20]
Meanwhile, traditional concepts of labor and work are also being
challenged; the new technology is transforming the nature of work
and relations between workers and managers. According to Harvard
Business School professor Shoshana Zuboff:
"The contemporary language of work is inadequate to express these
new realities. We remain, in the final years of the twentieth century,
prisoners of a vocabulary in which managers require employees;
superiors have subordinates; jobs are designed to be specific,
detailed, narrow, and task-related; and organizations have levels
that in turn make possible chains of command and spans of
control.... However, the images associated with physical labor can
no longer guide our conception of work."
In her view, "work organization requires a new division of learning
to support a new division of labor," because in the final analysis
"the informated organization is a learning institution."[21] The
image she offers for labor-management relations is one of
concentric rings rather than hierarchical pyramids.
Computer-Productivity Paradox
Despite these changes in theory and practice, the new technology is
far from fulfilling its promises for business. Instead of a paperless
"office of the future," only about 1 percent of business information
is currently kept in electronic form. Moreover, the new technology
has so far had few positive effects on efficiency and productivity,
and a "computer-productivity paradox" is widespread. As MIT
economist Robert Solow notes, "We see computers everywhere but
in the productivity statistics."[22] This does not mean that the
technology cannot fulfill its promise. The problem is not so much
the technology as the fact that organizations are still learning how
to absorb and use it.
For the most part, the technology is being inserted into existing
organizational forms--computers are being thrown at workers and
managers--as a tool to improve the speed and efficiency of
routinized parts of the production process. But analysts are finding
that many organizations may need some redesigning to take
advantage of the technology and its capacity to integrate the
production process. A few firms have figured this out--for example,
Frito-Lay Inc. and Raychem Corporation stand out for their use of
the new technologies to enhance productivity. But for each story of
successful redesign and adaptation, there are more stories of
failure. Many problems reportedly reflect the absence of
networking among the (often mismatched) computer systems that a
company has, a result being that even if individual offices are well
equipped and have computer-competent staff, they may lack
electronic access to vital data in another office or the company's
mainframe.[23]
Perhaps a productivity paradox should be expected in the early
phases of a revolutionary technology; the existence of the paradox
may be evidence that the information revolution is in an early
phase. Stanford economic historian Paul David has reportedly
found that the introduction of electric motors led to a similar lag in
productivity in the early 1900s until factories shifted entirely from
steam to electricity, redesigned their layouts, and got fully wired in
the 1920s.[24] David and others concerned about the current
productivity paradox feel it may be resolved in the 1990s,
particularly if a shift occurs from emphasizing the computer as a
tool for processing data to using it more as a tool for acquiring and
sharing information across vast networks.[25]
As part of the transition, the current U.S. recession may continue
(even worsen), or a global recession/depression may occur if either
of two propositions is valid: (a) that a revolutionary new
technology is likely to induce, or help induce, a major
recession/depression in the course of its adoption; and/or (b) that a
major recession/depression is required for a revolutionary
technology to take hold. The histories of the telephone and
telegraph in the late 1800s, and of electricity and electric motors in
the early 1900s, lend credence to both propositions, as does the
current U.S. recession.[26]
LAGGING EFFECTS ON GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS
The governments of all the post-industrial nations are acquiring the
new technologies, seeking competitive advantages from them, and
addressing the issues they raise. The governments of England,
France, Japan, and the United States have all produced major
studies of various policy implications of the information and
communications revolution since the 1970s. France is pursuing the
"informatization" of society. Japan has an aggressive plan to re-wire
the country with fiber-optic cables and connect businesses, homes,
and institutions to them by the year 2015. Meanwhile, the U.S.
government, notably with Congressional approval of a controversial
bill sponsored by Senator Albert Gore, is beginning to determine to
what extent, when, and how to connect the United States with
networks of fiber-optic cables and high-performance computers.
The new technology has given rise to a new generation of policy
issues. Foremost among them have been privacy and security
issues. Sweden was the first nation to enact a privacy law, in 1973,
after discovering that data on Swedish citizens was available in
2000 data banks stored outside the country. A year later, the United
States passed its first Privacy Act to protect individual rights that
could be jeopardized by the use of the new technologies. Since
then, numerous other countries have adopted laws to protect
privacy.
The technology has also obliged governments to focus on a new set
of international telecommunications issues. The growth of
transborder data flows and international trade in information
services, the rising demand for access to communications networks
and crowded radio-spectrum frequencies, and the prospect of direct
broadcast satellites have all raised complex commercial and
regulatory issues, and touched sensitive nerves about national
sovereignty and independence. International institutions and
agreements, like the International Telecommunications Union
(ITU), the Organization of Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) and the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT), have all been modified to deal with "a world
economy that is more and more driven by flows of
information."[27]
Thus governments are responding to the challenges that the new
technologies pose for the defense of individual and national rights.
But in a more general sense, the government world has been slower
than the business world at coming to grips with the information
revolution.
Recognition of Information's Power
Numerous corporate leaders have spoken and written about the
information revolution. But while a vast speculative literature exists
about the political effects of the information revolution, only a few
government leaders, notably France's President Francois Mitterand
and former U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz, have shown keen
interest in the significance of the new technology.
Shultz quickly realized in the 1980s that it represented a new
source of power. In his view, its diffusion was making the world
smaller and more interdependent, but also more turbulent. It was
altering the technological bases of national, regional, and global
economies. It was inducing political changes that would challenge
traditional concepts of national sovereignty and affect not only the
role of government in society but also the international balance of
power.[28] He foresaw that the outcome would be to the advantage
of the open, democratic societies of the West.
"The more they [communists] try to stifle these technologies, the
more they are likely to fall behind in this movement from the
industrial to the information age; but the more they permit these
new technologies, the more they risk their monopoly of control
over information and communication."[29]
Thus, recognition is spreading in governments around the world
that the new technologies may profoundly alter the nature of
political power, sovereignty, and governance.
The distribution of power and the prospects for cooperation and
conflict are increasingly seen as a function of the differing abilities
of governments and other political actors to utilize the new
technologies. A new distinction is emerging between the
information "haves" and "have-nots." Some actors may become
global information powers, but others, notably in the Third World,
fear "electronic colonization" and "information imperialism."
Information flows based on the spread of the new technology are
undermining traditional concepts of territorial sovereignty.[30]
Information in electronic form, unlike most goods and services, is
difficult to control; financial data flows, electronic mail between
computers and fax machines, and television broadcasts from remote
trouble spots do not halt at border check points. Clinging to closed,
autarchic notions of sovereignty is less and less a viable option for
ultra-nationalistic governments.
A key expectation about governance is that the new technology
benefits society over the state, and thereby strengthens the
prospects for democracy. The revolutionary upheavals of 1989,
especially in Eastern Europe, have provided evidence for this, and
raised optimism that open societies are superior and will triumph
over closed ones. But in the United States and other leading
democracies, the new technology may also lie behind trends that
could undermine the democratic process: e.g., the growth of single-
issue politics, media sound-bites, targeted mailings, and public
surveillance.
In addition, the new technology has raised expectations that top
leaders and their staff will eventually have access to better
information, from any part and level of government, virtually on
demand. But meanwhile, especially in U.S. foreign policy, the
modernization of an office's communications systems has
sometimes enabled it to expand its operational horizons in ways
that stimulate bureaucratic rivalries.
In short, the basis exists in the government world for conceptual
and structural shifts that are as profound as in the business world.
Yet, by comparison, the government world appears to be changing
much more slowly and uncertainly. With few exceptions,
policymakers and analysts are just beginning to discern how
government and politics may ultimately be affected by the
information revolution.[31]
Slow Progress in the U.S. Government
Applying the new technology to government has been a stressful
task for the U.S. government since the 1970s. In 1984, J. Peter
Grace, who had just headed a presidential commission on waste
and inefficiency in the federal government, observed that:
"Over three quarters of the federal government's white-collar work
force is involved in the processing of information--from mailing
Social Security payments to processing tax returns.... The federal
government is the single largest user of data processing systems in
the world."[32]
But his commission was appalled by the obsolescence,
incompatibility, and duplication of computerized information
systems scattered about the federal branch, by the rapid turnover of
systems personnel, and by the "woefully inadequate" quality of the
information available to federal managers.[33]
Federal offices and agencies had a terrible time in the 1980s trying
to modernize their information systems and computerize their
administrative activities.[34] The list included the Internal Revenue
Service, the Social Security Administration, the Census Bureau, the
Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Patent Office, and
offices in the Army and the Navy. According to a General
Accounting Office official testifying to Congress in 1989, "The
government spends about $20 billion each year on information
technology and management, but I would be hard-pressed to
identify a single ... systems development project that could be used
as a model."[35]
Efforts to install advanced information systems in the White House
did not fare well either. By the mid 1970s, when President Jimmy
Carter took office, the White House systems were much less
sophisticated than the business world's, and had been installed in a
haphazard, fragmented, and uncoordinated manner. The emphasis
was, and remained, on improving the efficiency of routine office
tasks more than on informing the decision makers and improving
their efficiency. Some analysts saw that the new technology could
provide tools to develop an institutional memory and support crisis
management. However, an effort to develop an integrated decision-
support system for the Carter White House, and a subsequent effort
under President Ronald Reagan, both ran afoul of internal power
politics and staff rivalries, and were halted.[36]
Yet a case may still be made that the improvements which have
occurred in the White House communications systems since the
1960s have had a significant effect on the ability of the President
and the White House and National Security Council (NSC) staffs
to take an increasingly operational and independent approach to the
conduct of foreign policy.
"The situation room and its communications systems thus helped
Presidents to seize control of the foreign-policy system. It helped
the NSC staff to serve the President as he must be served, even if it
offered also unfair advantages in the bureaucratic competition. But
established initially to bring Kennedy and his staff more fully into
the policy game, it would be employed by subsequent Presidential
aides-- especially Kissinger and Brzezinski--to keep out State and
Defense, sometimes even their Secretaries. The new communication
networks allowed both Presidents and the White House staffers to
get more deeply into the daily business of diplomacy, sometimes
acting without the knowledge of the officials actually charged with
those responsbilities. The machines have allowed the growth of the
operational Presidency."[37]
Congress did not advance more effectively than the Executive
branch in this period.
"As an organization, Congress adopted computerized information
services in a slow, halting, and fragmented manner.... The key to
understanding Congress's move into the computer age lies not in
discovering the nature of modern information systems, but rather in
delving into the nature of Congress as an organization."[38]
The House and the Senate installed separate networks to provide
access to electronic mail, to computer-based issue briefs from the
Congressional Research Service, and to the SCORPIO system of
databases. This system, which grew out of computerizing the
Library of Congress's card catalog, included files on the substance
and status of recent bills, on contents of the Congressional Record,
and on references to policy-relevant articles in the periodical
literature.[39] The new systems could also be used to track voting
records and compile data on congressional districts.
As in other parts of the government, the new technology affected
the distribution of knowledge and power on the Hill. It seemed to
have a democratizing effect; for example, it enabled members to
challenge the traditional "resident information" in the minds, staffs,
and files of committee chairs. But the Hill's new information and
communications systems also seemed to reinforce incumbency,
because members could use these systems, especially their
databases, to help get reelected.
The information systems of the executive and legislative branches,
already fragmented within each branch, were kept entirely separate
from each other. However, whereas executive branch officials could
sometimes gain access to the Congressional databases, its
representatives could rarely get their hands on databases and
simulation models used in the executive branch. Thus, in various
ways, "The introduction of the computer threatened to upset the
comfortable pattern of intrabranch and interbranch power
holding."[40]
This picture improved during the 1980s, but not much. While it is
difficult to ascertain the status of new applications in the
government, it appears that many departments and agencies now
have electronic mail, and are putting some basic records in
electronic databases. But most of these networks and databases are
rudimentary, are not interconnected, and may be jealously guarded.
The new technology has mostly been applied in ways that conform
to established bureaucratic practices. The U.S. government appears
to remain in a phase of trying to install the technology, to make it
improve efficiency, and to decide what else to do with it. Will it
change how officials obtain information, monitor policies, identify
options, and make decisions? Will the reluctance be overcome for
different departments and agencies to interconnect their networks,
and provide access to each others' databases? Will the result be a
more open and democratic process? Such questions are far from
answered.
A REVOLUTION BARELY BEGUN
In sum, the information revolution is well underway, but it is also
in its infancy. The beginnings of its maturation may be ten years
away. The technology remains in an incipient stage of development
compared to what is on the drawing boards and in the minds of the
visionaries. The best and worst are yet to come in terms of the
technology's effects on society, and especially on its politics.
A new technology usually has to prove itself first in terms of
efficiency. Advanced information and communications systems,
properly applied, are improving the efficiency and cost-
effectiveness of many activities. But improved efficiency is not the
only or even the best possible effect. The new technology is also
having a transforming effect, for it disrupts old ways of thinking
and doing things, provides capabilities to do things differently, and
suggests that some things may be done better if done differently:
"The consequences of new technology can be usefully thought of as
first-level, or efficiency, effects and second level, or social system,
effects. The history of previous technologies demonstrates that
early in the life of a new technology, people are likely to emphasize
the efficiency effects and underestimate or overlook potential social
system effects. Advances in networking technologies now make it
possible to think of people, as well as databases and processors, as
resources on a network. Many organizations today are installing
electronic networks for first-level efficiency reasons. Executives
now beginning to deploy electronic mail and other network
applications can realize efficiency gains such as reduced elapsed
time for transactions. If we look beyond efficiency at behavioral
and organizational changes, we'll see where the second-level
leverage is likely to be. These technologies can change how people
spend their time and what and who they know and care about. The
full range of payoffs, and the dilemmas, will come from how the
technologies affect how people can think and work together--the
second- level effects."[41]
In some areas, information technology is beginning to emerge from
the efficiency-proving stage. We may thus begin to see increasing
evidence of a lesson from the history of an earlier revolutionary
technology, the printing press: According to its greatest historian,
Elizabeth Eisenstein, it "created conditions that favored, first, new
combinations of old ideas and, then, the creation of entirely new
systems of thought."[42] Drucker has said that a radical technology
may not displace established technologies unless the new one
proves itself ten times more cost-effective.[43] Afterwards, the
structural changes implied by the new technology are much more
likely to occur. Indeed, a realization that institutional redesigns are
needed to take full advantage of a new technology may be an
important sign of maturation.
Extrapolating from the current effects of the new technology may
thus not be a good guide to its future effects. As the technology
lives up to its potential, new elites, institutions, and ideologies may
arise.
3. BEYOND BUREAUCRACY: CYBEROCRACY
Throughout history, information has been essential to government,
and different types of governments may be distinguished by the
ways in which they acquire, process, transmit, and control
information. Yet information per se has rarely been considered a
key organizing principle in theory or practice.[44] Cyberocracy
implies that information and its control will be elevated to a key
principle.
The term needs to be defined. A precise definition is not possible at
present, but in a general sense cyberocracy may manifest itself in
either or both of two ways:
- narrowly, as a form of organization that supplants traditional
forms of bureaucracy and technocracy;
- broadly, as a form of government that may redefine relations
between state and society, and between the public sector and the
private sector.
This section briefly elaborates on the first, Section 5 on the second.
In between, some infrastructural factors are discussed that may
affect the outcome.
Although the shape of a full-fledged cyberocracy remains obscure,
it should spell major changes in the nature and conduct of
government. It should not mean that a nation's intelligence services,
think-tanks, media, or other sources of informational power
dominate government, although the information revolution has
increased their visibility and importance. The major impact will
probably be felt in terms of the organization and behavior of the
modern bureaucratic state.[45]
Bureaucracies enable governments to generate, process, distribute,
and store information. Even the Egyptian, Roman, and other
ancient empires were administered in part by bureaucracies. Yet the
terms "bureaucracy," "bureaucratic," and "bureaucrat" are not
ancient; they date from the 1830s and 1840s. The growth of formal
bureaucracy is a phenomenon of the 19th and 20th centuries, and
the modern bureaucratic state is one of mankind's recent
accomplishments. For organizations in both the public and private
sectors, the bureaucracy represents an important, modern
technology of control.[46]
To some extent, a cyberocracy would be a bureaucracy changed by
computers. This new form presumes the diffusion of advanced
information and communications systems throughout a nation's
government (and its public and private sectors generally). It also
implies the rise of elites who rely on those systems and work to use
them to their fullest capabilities.
But it would be a mistake to define a cyberocracy as a
computerized bureaucracy, or a "cybercrat" as a bureaucrat with a
computer. The new technology opens the doors to new capabilities
and possibilities; it implies that things may be done differently.
This difference may stem less from the computer someone may have
than from the access it may provide to networks and databases
outside one's office, and potentially across all branches and levels
of government, in the private as well as the public sector, and
internationally as well as domestically.
While bureaucracies are organized along thematic lines, big
budgets and staffs are generally considered more important than
information as bases of bureaucratic power. Moreover, the
hierarchical structuring of bureaucracies into offices, departments,
and lines of authority may confound the flow of information that
may be needed to deal with complex issues in today's increasingly
interconnected world. Development of a "cybercratic state" may
mean that "big information" becomes a more important source of
power and authority than a budget.
Cyberocracy must surpass bureaucracy and its 20th century
iteration, "technocracy,"[47] if new techniques of acquiring and
using information are to take hold. Bureaucracy depends on going
through channels and keeping information in bounds; in contrast,
cyberocracy may place a premium on gaining information from any
source, public or private. Technocracy emphasizes "hard"
quantitative and econometric skills, like programming and
budgeting methodologies; in contrast, a cyberocracy may bring a
new emphasis on "soft" symbolic, cultural, and psychological
dimensions of policymaking and public opinion. Bureaucrats
command offices and channels. Technocrats command scientific
expertise and analytical skills. Cybercrats may not only command
all that their predecessors commanded, but also redraw the
boundaries of appropriate, authorized behavior.
Cyberocracy may mean that the traditional notions of bureaucratic
boundaries are broken and that the public and private sectors
become increasingly permeable to each other. The new technology
makes possible a degree of networking and bypassing that would
play havoc with the traditions of a hierarchical bureaucracy, but
that may become hallmarks of future organizational processes.
One key to being a cybercrat may be the ability to tap multiple
sources of information in electronic form, available inside and
outside the official system, from both public and private sectors, in
ways that bypass or break the conventional boundaries of
bureaucracy. Another key may be the ability to readily
communicate and consult, individually or in teams, with selected
individuals inside and outside of government who may be able to
contribute to a policymaking process, even though those
individuals may be far removed from one's immediate office area.
Policy consultation and coordination may become more extensive
than ever, but may unfold in ways that defy traditional bureaucratic
conceptions. At stake, then, is not only access to information, but
also control of how information is used to influence policymaking
and to direct behavior.
A wholly new information and communications infrastructure will
be required for such a system.
MIND-BENDING NEW INFRASTRUCTURE
Cyberocracy will require handy systems for selectively acquiring
and representing complex information about how a particular
political, economic, social, or other system may be performing, and
for assessing policy options about how to affect the performance of
a system. It should be possible to call up and use within minutes or
hours the kinds of information that may now take days or longer to
assemble.
Thus it is still too soon for cyberocracy, for it has technical
requirements that are not yet met. But they are under development
and may be available in little more than ten years. Better computer
hardware and software are needed, as well as much better
communications networks and data banks.
Computer Hardware and Software
The technology is still at a stage where we are very conscious of it;
it is not yet "transparent" to us.[48] Desk-top, lap-top, and palm-
top computers must be made much more powerful and convenient
than today's models.[49] Even the desk-top varieties should
probably have flat-console screens. Storage capacity should be
massive by today's standards. Software for working with mixed
media must be fully realized, so that text, sound, and graphics may
be easily mixed and transmitted together. And what works on one
machine should be workable on another. According to John
Walker, the visionary president of Autodesk, Inc.,
"What is happening today is that all of the barriers, hardware and
software, that once distinguished personal computers from
engineering workstations are being erased.... As the current
technological transition matures, we will enter an era in which the
easily-drawn distinctions among "PCs", "workstations", and even
"mainframes" begin to disappear. There will be, instead, a
continuum of computing capability and cost that ranges from
pocket pen-based portables to parallel supercomputers, all of which
can be accessed by users with a common user interface, and which
run a wide variety of industry standard applications."[50]
Technologists at Xerox's Palo Alto Research Center (PARC) forsee
adding active "badges," "tabs," "pads," and display-size "boards" to
the list of technologies for creating "ubiquitous computing" that is
seamless and invisible.[51]
Also, new techniques are needed for "envisioning information."[52]
This will not only enhance data representation and analysis, but
also result in human-computer interfaces that are smarter,
friendlier, and more realistic and informative than at present. For
example, an Information Visualizer that was under experimental
development at Xerox PARC offered real-time, three-dimensional,
interactive animation in color.[53] An objective of such efforts is to
provide visually easy but richly detailed ways of finding,
representing, and scanning information that might otherwise be
located in a volume hundreds of pages thick or an array of filing
cabinets. Some designers aim to eventually develop ways to watch
data "flow" over time, as might be the case with a model of an
organization, of international financial flows, or of a physical,
chemical, or bioligical process. According to Walker, the challenge
is
"to build, inside a computer, models of things that exist in the real
world. Whether you call it computer aided drafting, or solid
modeling, or computational chemistry, or desktop video, or virtual
reality, this concept is at the heart of the technological adventure of
the second half of the Twentieth Century and will form the
centerpiece of the industrial revolution of the Twenty-First."[54]
Many of these capabilities may be available in a few years, for the
power of microprocessors is expected to continue doubling every
two years, as it has done since the early 1980s. By the end of the
1990s, it should be possible to make desk-top computers that are
more powerful than today's supercomputers.[55]
Communications Networks and Conferencing Systems
The United States and other advanced societies are on the cusp of a
shift in significance--from what may be done with a computer in a
single office or organization, to what may be done as a result of
connecting a computer to communications networks, conferencing
systems, databases, and modelling and simulation systems
elsewhere within and far beyond the boundaries of that office or
organization. Vast computer communication networks and
"internets" are spreading rapidly around the United States and the
rest of the world. The best networks provide for electronic mail,
news-related discussions, group conferencing, and remote logins to
and file transfers from distant sites. These capabilities must spread
to other networks, and many of these networks should be expanded
and interconnected so that a user may communicate anything in
electronic form (text, audio, video) with almost anybody, anywhere,
anytime. Things are moving well in this direction--a "worldnet" is
beginning to exist--and except for the "anybody" part, may be
attainable not long after the turn of the century.[56]
It will take at least another decade to construct the full range of
expected public and private, local and worldwide infrastructures,
and to interconnect them where politically possible. Progress is
coming from the spread of fiber-optic cables and satellite systems
that can carry broad-bandwidth, multi-media transmissions. Fiber-
optic cables have been laid under the Atlantic and Pacific oceans,
linking North America, Europe, and Asia. Cables have also been
laid by telephone companies across the landmass of the United
States and Canada and will be laid in Mexico. Lines are beginning
to run into office buildings in the United States, and connections to
some homes, for broadcast media as well as network
communication purposes, are expected within little more than ten
years. Japan has a far more aggressive program than the United
States for thoroughly rewiring its country with fiber-optic cables.
The fiber-optic "highways" and "railroads" laid to date are not
likely to become obsolete soon. Some commercial fibers now
spanning the United States can carry transmissions at a rate of 1.7
gigabits (billion bits) per second per fiber, which is equivalent to
25 thousand voice channels per fiber. Increasing their capacity will
depend not on laying higher-quality fibers but on improving the
laser transmitters and photodetector receivers; the existing "fiber's
intrinsic information- carrying capacity is almost 1000 away from
where we are now."[57]
A key objective for many visionaries is to upgrade and expand the
most important network linking research centers and universities in
the United States, the NSFNET/INTERNET (the successor to the
ARPAnet). This is the most important computer network in the
United States; including its spread to sites abroad, it is also the
most important in the world-- some foreigners have even begun
arguing that it is a world rather than a U.S. network. The future of
the INTERNET is thus crucial to the future of the information
revolution. The issues include the upgrading of the INTERNET's
technological infrastructure, its extension beyond the high- prestige
sites that it currently serves to other schools and communities in
the United States, and its adaptation to commercial usage.
The resolution of these issues is underway. Last year, Congress
approved The High-Performance Computing Act of 1991, a bill
sponsored by Senator Albert Gore that aims to upgrade the
network's lines this decade with fiber-optics to a capacity of up to 3
gigabits per second, more than 60 times their current best carrying
capacity and 50 thousand times the ARPAnet's original
capacity.[58] The act will also improve the usage of the network by
creating on it the National Research and Education Network
(NREN). This year, Sen. Gore has introduced a follow- on bill, The
Information Infrastructure and Technology Act of 1992, to ensure
that the technology developed under last year's act is applied widely
in the areas of K-12 education, libraries, health care, and industry,
particularly manufacturing.
The INTERNET is intended to serve public, non-commercial
purposes, but it is under increasing pressure to allow purely
commercial traffic. Thus, Advanced Network & Services (ANS), a
joint venture since 1990 of the IBM, MCI Communications, and
Merit Network corporations that has a term contract to maintain the
NSFNET, has been installing new lines in some areas and
providing expanded services and new connections to it for
commercial purposes through a privately-owned subsidiary, ANS
CO+RE Systems, Inc., which was created in 1991. ANS CO+RE
and the Commercial Internet Exchange (CIX), a rival association of
seven networks that carry commercial traffic, agreed this June to
work toward permanent interconectivity as a step toward creating
what is being called the "Commercial Internet."
Satellite communications capabilities are also being dramatically
upgraded and expanded. For example, during the Gulf War the
major news media relied on suitcase-size portable satellite
telephone systems from Mobile Telesystems Inc. (MTI) that use the
IMARSAT network.[59] Moreover, parts of the U.S. military were
so short of telecommunications equipment that they resorted to
commercial suppliers.[60] This decade, Motorola aims to install a
system--Iridium--that will use 77 small, low- orbiting satellites to
enable subscribers to communicate to and from anywhere on the
planet on portable cellular telephones. Also, the Soviet Union had
planned to install a packet radio system for worldwide
communications called Gonetz (Messenger) that would use 30-36
satellites.[61]
The ultimate goal is the construction of an end-to-end Integrated
Services Digital Network (ISDN), once the governments,
industries, and other bodies involved agree on worldwide standards
and protocols. Such an agreement may occur this decade or soon
afterwards, bringing a quantum jump in electronic mailing, file
transferring, and conferencing capabilities. ISDN will enable users
to switch at will between voice telephony and data transmission; to
transmit text, audio, and video; and to engage in multimedia
conferencing over long distances, all without having to use a
modem. Today, it would take days to transmit an electronic copy of
the text of the Encyclopedia Britannica from a library to a home
(assuming a transmittable copy existed). Tomorrow, with a fiber-
optic ISDN, it will only take seconds or a few minutes, graphics
and related audio included.[62]
While the computer has received enormous attention because of its
potential to transform social relations and empower individuals, the
new communications networks are expected to have equally
profound effects in the future:
"Networking has the power to allow everyone to participate in a
worldwide marketplace--will we be able to ensure that everyone has
equal access to it? Networking makes it feasible for people in
organizations to share information freely and frequently--will we be
able to release ourselves from "chain of command" organizational
structures to take advantage of this capability? Networking will
give people access to vast libraries of historical and up-to-the-
minute written, visual, and oral information--will we be able to
develop tools to allow people to chart their own courses of learning
and discovery through so much information? Networking has the
potential to connect all the world in one global electronic
civilization--will we be able to sustain a diversity of cultures?"[63]
Data Banks and Information Utilities
Tomorrow's policymakers and analysts will need quick access to
data banks the likes of which are but a gleam in the eye today. The
number, variety, and sophistication of on-line databases is rapidly
increasing. But because of expense and other matters, only a few
people, mostly research and reference librarians, enjoy direct
access. Moreover, much of what is available is quite current; few
materials more than ten years old have been put in electronic form.
And techniques for searching through these databases remain
rudimentary, normally depending on selected key words; the user
often ends up with far more, or far less, than he or she really
wants.[64]
A cyberocracy will require that entire libraries of print materials
(books, periodicals, reports, memoranda, survey data, time-series
data, etc.) be readily available in electronic form. This will be
necessary for historical as well as current materials, in order to
broaden the available temporal horizons. And it will be necessary
not only for the materials that may be associated with particular
offices, but also for materials that may be needed from public and
private sources beyond the office confines, in order to broaden the
available spatial horizons.
Some companies have begun to market CD-ROMs (compact discs,
read- only memories) that contain encyclopedic amounts of
literature. But a more interesting and promising effort, led by the
Thinking Machines Corporation in association with the Dow
Jones, Apple Computer, and KPMG Peat Marwick corporations,
seeks to develop a nationwide data network based on Wide Area
Information Servers (WAIS) that permit a user to view diverse
information utilities as a single coherent system. It will enable
computer users to access multiple libraries simultaneously,
including the Library of Congress, and conduct searches and
retrieve entire texts. It may also enable individuals to create
personalized electronic newspapers. This use of WAIS has been
under development and testing on the INTERNET. Widespread
public access will be possible if the INTERNET is improved and
expanded along the lines of NREN, including new links to schools
and communities that are currently not connected.[65]
While the focus today is on the data base, this may not be the case
in the future. Visionary technologists foresee the possibility of
"expert systems," "intelligent agents," and "knowbots" that can
peruse vast data banks and "information utilities" according to the
specified needs of the user. They also see the possibility of "mirror
worlds" and "reality windows" that may be used to show what is
happening.[66] The technology may still be used to access facts,
but pioneer computer technologist Alan Kay goes farther:
"The retrieval systems of the future are not going to retrieve facts
but points of view. The weakness of databases is that they let you
retrieve facts, while the strength of our culture over the past several
hundred years has been our ability to take on multiple points of
view. That's what simulations allow you to do. Databases will be
replaced by active simulations that no longer contain embalmed
slices of a company at different points of time but active
simulations of the company."[67]
One way to accomplish this is expected in the form of new
computer architectures based on neural networks that will "combine
concepts of parallel architecture with those of artificial intelligence
and machine learning" and that can be programmed to simulate
"judgment" according to the user's criteria.[68]
Standards and Protocols
Today's computer chips, operating systems, software interfaces,
communications networks, and databases come in so many designs
that technical issues about "connectivity" and "interoperability"
need to be resolved before universal communications can be
achieved. International standards and protocols must be set, and
facilities must spread, so that users may connect whatever hardware
and software they prefer to all important communications networks
and data banks, not only at the office or home, but almost anywhere
in the world that they work (including airports, hotels, libraries,
and other people's offices).
Many international efforts are under way to deal with these issues.
For example, the International Standards Organization's Open
Systems Interconnection (ISO-OSI) standard has been adopted by
100 computer, communications, and software vendors concerned
about interoperability. Other steps have been taken by
organizations like the Open Software Foundation, which was
created by seven computer manufacturers, and by an umbrella
group, X/Open Company Ltd., that includes U.S. and European
manufacturers, customers, and international standards
organizations. A key stake is whether, and whose version of, the
Unix operating system may ultimately prevail as a world standard.
In the early 1990s, new chip designs for reduced-instruction-set
computing (RISC) led to one of the latest rounds of efforts to
decide common standards. The ACE (Advanced Computing
Environment) consortium represented the key effort; it formed in
1991 with 21 companies led by the Compaq Computer Corporation
and expanded to include dozens of other companies. But ACE did
not include Sun Microsystems Inc. or the Hewlett-Packard
Company, leading producers of RISC-based work stations. Nor did
it include the leading chip manufacturer, Intel, which had RISC
designs of its own. Meanwhile, two other companies not in ACE,
IBM and Apple Computer Inc., proceeded to sign a letter of intent
to cooperate with each other to develop their own RISC-based
designs. In mid 1992, after a year of shifting fortunes, ACE's plans
were foundering, its leading member, Compaq, left it, and the quest
for standards was in flux again.
These efforts to promote open systems and inter-firm cooperation
clearly mask intense rivalries for market advantages. "Standards
bodies and industrial alliances are the continuation of competition
by other means," says one commentator, paraphrasing Karl von
Clausewitz.[69]
Meanwhile, the advent of CD-ROM discs, and their attractiveness
for storing and retrieving data used by the U.S. government,
especially its intelligence agencies and military forces, is raising
another set of interoperability issues. A consultant summarizes the
challenge as "The ability to purchase any CD-ROM title and be
able to access it on any CD- ROM drive, using any microcomputer
system, operating under any operating system, using any retrieval
interface."[70] U.S. government agencies are reportedly banding
together to put pressure on industry to come up with a common
standard.
In short, much remains to be accomplished in the areas of
connectivity and interoperabilty before something like ISDN can
become a reality. But again, sometime late this decade remains a
reasonable estimate. The implications verge on the philosophical:
"Machines everywhere will be bridged together to form a pool of
intelligence and power. In the end, of course, it matters only that
the power that emerges works to the benefit of mankind. If
experience is any guide, more communication is better. The more
things are open, the more we are interconnected, the better off we
are. This is the promise of future communications."[71]
ADVENT OF CYBERSPACE
As the new technologies--the hardware and software,
communications networks, and information utilities--become
interconnected, they may form a globe-circling "cyberspace." This
term, which is from science fiction in the 1980s, still lacks a clear
definition and may not survive debate. But it is taking root as a
preferred term for envisioning the electronic stocks and flows of
information, the providers and users of that information, and the
technologies linking them as a new realm or system that has a
functioning identity as significant as an economic or political
system. The term generally refers to the whole world, but it may
also be used to refer to a corporation, university, government,
nation, region, or some other spatially limited environment.[72]
Major New Domain of Power and Property
Today, the term refers mainly to the computerized communications
networks, conferencing systems, and related databases that are
being developed, expanded, and in some cases, interconnected
rapidly in the United States and around the world. These include:
- private networks for financial data transmissions among banks and
other financial and credit institutions;
- private networks that serve global and multinational companies,
like Apple's AppleLink, IBM's VNET, the Xerox Internet, and the
networks of companies like General Electric and Dupont;
- private networks used by the media to prepare their broadcasts and
publications, such as the BASYS system used by the Cable News
Network (CNN);
- public data networks that are accessible for a fee, such as
Sprintnet (formerly Telenet, owned by U.S. Sprint), TYMNET
(owned by McDonnell Douglas), and to some extent the Moscow
Teleport (which bridges between users and networks in the United
States and the Soviet Union);
- cooperative networks--the favorites of most visionaries-- that link
universities and research centers, like the INTERNET, BITNET,
UUCP, and USENET (the latter houses hundreds of "newsgroups"
for information-sharing and discussion about diverse interests and
activities);
- subscription networks that create "virtual communities" and
provide access to databases, electronic mail, and conferencing
systems for their members, like Prodigy Services, which is a joint
venture of IBM and Sears, Roebuck & Company; the Whole Earth
'Lectronic Link (WELL), a marvellous gathering-place that emerged
from progressive movements in Northern California; and the
Institute for Global Communications (IGC), which overlaps with
the Association for Progressive Communications (APC), is the
home-base of activist networks like PeaceNet and EcoNet, and
enables Amnesty International's Urgent Action Project to issue e-
mail alerts to its supporters;
- networks that governments maintain for their purposes, ranging
from the U.S. State Department's increasingly modern systems to
local government systems like the Public Electronic Network
(PEN) in Santa Monica, California, which enables citizens to
establish special interest groups, and the "City Hall On-line"
system forthcoming in Colorado Springs, Colorado;
- community-based networks, like the Cleveland Freenet, that
provide electronic mail, topical conferencing, and databases to
serve local needs independently of the local government, and that
may provide access to the INTERNET and other community-based
networks. Some definitions of cyberspace also include other
infrastructures for electronic information and communications,
such as the telephone system, radio, television, and cable broadcast
systems, satellite communications systems, private security
systems, truck location and dispatch systems, etc.
The key definitions envision cyberspace as not only a wholly new
kind of "information infrastructure" but also as a "virtual reality."
The latter is another new term in search of definition, but it
basically means that a user may be able to access cyberspace
through hardware and software that render the impression of being
in a three-dimensional environment containing three-dimensional
representations of the people, places, objects, and data in which the
user is interested and with which he or she may proceed to
interact.[73]
Today, this new realm is in a nascent phase of construction. Much
of what exists is partitioned and compartmentalized--from home to
home, office to office, organization to organization, and nation to
nation. Nonetheless, out of sight of much public attention,
cyberspace may already be the fastest-growing, new domain of
power and property in the world. Just the networks mentioned
above--and there are many others-- embrace hundreds of thousands
of computer nodes, millions of users, and billions of dollars worth
of activities. Developing and integrating this new realm nationally
and globally may become one of the great undertakings of the turn
of the century.
"Once several national information infrastructres are in place,
countries will tie them together, much as national power grids,
airline routes and telephone circuits have been linked in the past.
The result will be a global information infrastructure that will help
the people of the world buy and sell information and information
services and share knowledge and creative energy--we hope to the
benefit of all."[74]
Issues and Analogies for the Future
Cyberspace means different things to different people, but for many
the political, economic, and other stakes already seem enormous.
Recent debates are fraught with questions about who will have
access, who will benefit, and who will control it. To what extent
should it be developed as a public utility, as a strategic resource,
and/or as an educational service? Should its development be left to
the government? To private enterprise? To what extent should it be
open to public access? Treated as private property? To what extent
should the freedoms expressed in the First Amendment apply?
These debates hark back to issues identified a decade ago in a
classic study by Ithiel de Sola Pool. U.S. law, he pointed out, has
evolved separately in each of three domains of communications:
print media, common carriers, and broadcasting. Print media have
been governed by the First Amendment. Common carriers, which
include the telephone, the telegraph, the postal system, and some
computer networks, have been governed by principles of "universal
service and fair access by the public to the facilities of the carrier,"
on equal terms without discrimination. But the domain of
broadcasting, which includes radio, television, and cable, has
resulted in a highly regulated regime; here, frequencies are
allocated, broadcasters are selected, and licenses are issued by
government agencies. Although fairness is an objective, "The
principles of common carriage and of the First Amendment have
been applied to broadcasting in only atrophied form. For
broadcasting, a politically managed system has been invented."[75]
Pool foresaw that the advent of electronic communications implied
both the creation of a new domain and a convergence of all the
domains into "one grand system."[76] The concern he raised--it
resounds in today's debates about the effects of the new
technologies and the development of cyberspace--is that the
historical trend toward political regulation will continue; the
traditions of free speech enshrined in the First Amendment may be
subverted in the future information society.
"In that future society the norms that govern information and
communications will be even more crucial than in the past.... The
onus is on us to determine whether free societies in the twenty-first
century will conduct electronic communication under the
conditions of freedom established for the domain of print through
centuries of struggle, or whether that great achievement will
become lost in a confusion about the new technologies."[77]
The outcome Pool hoped for included universal interconnectivity,
basic rights for public access, and clear standards for easy use.
Related efforts to define and debate the issues posed by the
prospect of a new infrastructure often turn to analogies, metaphors,
and models from past U.S. experience. One that merits attention is
that of the "commons." But for the most part "highway" and
"railroad" analogies have framed the debate about proposals to re-
wire the United States with fiber-optic cables and undertake NREN
and other large-scale projects. Each analogy has different
connotations. Proponents of the highway analogy generally favor
government-led development of the communications and
information infrastructure as a public asset and national resource,
while proponents of the railroad analogy want it developed as a
private enterprise by firms like IBM, MCI, and their joint venture,
ANS. The highway model is reportedly the norm in Japan, Europe,
and other parts of the world, and U.S. critics of private enterprise
worry that application of the railroad (or a toll-road) model may
lead to monopoly controls, limited and costly access, and the
exclusion of many people.[78] But a case can also be made that
privatization in the context of anti-trust law may provide better
results than government bureaucratization of the development
process.[79]
While most discussions view cyberspace as something that does not
exist and hence must be constructed--the case with the preceding
analogies--still another analogy views it as a frontier that virtually
exists and beckons for exploration, colonization, and development.
"The colonization and settlement of North America by Europeans
provides a useful model for thinking about the growth of
cyberspace. Like sixteenth century Europeans, we too have found a
New World (new to us, anyway). As cyberspace develops, we
believe that the notions of colonization and settlement will prove
more useful in describing and analyzing what is happening than the
notions of design and creation."[80]
In this view, different "cyberspace colonies" will be (indeed, they
already are being) carved out by many different kinds of actors,
many of them initially misfits and adventurers from ordinary
society. As the colonies grow, they may be expected to develop
different forms of government, citizenship, and property rights.
They may also be expected to improve their (electronic) resource
bases and transportation systems, to compete for immigrants and
settlers, and to expand their boundaries toward each other. As this
occurs, the colonies will increasingly enter into trade relations and
diplomatic negotiations with each other. Conflict and crime may
increase as the colonies face issues of whether to oppose each other
or to interconnect. In the end, if all goes well according to the
originators of this analogy, traditional American principles of
decentralization, pluralism, and tolerance may provide the bases for
the integration of a national and perhaps global cyberspace.[81]
This may sound fanciful, but it provides another, illuminating way
of reiterating a significant point: Cyberspace is an important new
domain of power and property. Its development may affect not only
individuals and organizations, but also relations between state and
society, and between their public and private sectors. Cyberspace
and cyberocracy are coming into existence at the same time, and
each will affect the development of the other.
RESTRUCTURED PERCEPTIONS OF SOCIAL SPACE AND TIME
As the information revolution alters people's consciousness of the
world around them, their perceptions of space and time are
affected. These may seem like subjects for metaphysics and the
physical sciences, not the social sciences. Indeed, the physical
sciences rest on hard- fought concepts of space, time, and
momentum. But while few social scientists use such terms, a
persuasive case may be made that "Every political theory that has
aimed at a measure of comprehensiveness has adopted some
implicit or explicit proposition about 'time,' 'space,' 'reality,' or
'energy.'"[82]
A curious, important effect of the information revolution is that
people are thinking anew about their perceptions of social time and
space and their role in shaping consciousness and behavior.[83]
Marshall McLuhan was one of the first analysts to raise this a
quarter century ago:
"Electric circuitry has overthrown the regime of "time" and "space"
and pours upon us instantly and continuously concerns of all other
men. It has reconstituted dialogue on a global scale. Its message is
Total Change, ending psychic, social, economic, and political
parochialism.... Ours is a brand-new world of allatonceness. "Time"
has ceased, "space" has vanished. We now live in a global village...a
simultaneous happening."[84]
This impressive, enthusiastic view has resounded in subsequent
discussions about the effects of the information revolution. Yet it
begs for examination. The nature of the change is more complex
and ambivalent than McLuhan says. The truth that he illuminates
ignores other truths and possibilities.
It is widely believed that the new technology is making the world
smaller. Now people may easily communicate with, form
relationships in, and acquire knowledge from distant places. But a
case may also be made that this means the world is bigger, for the
technology expands people's horizons, makes them more aware of
distant places, and enables them to see that what happens far away
may have more bearing on their lives than they previously realized.
From a global (i.e., macro) perspective the world may be smaller;
but from an individual (i.e., micro) perspective, it may just as easily
seem bigger.
It is also widely observed that the technology lies behind the
undoing of many established barriers, borders, and boundaries.
Thus, financial data transmissions now ignore national borders; the
democratic upheavals in Eastern Europe lead to the fall of the
Berlin Wall; and geographically scattered scientists, activists,
ethnic diaspora, and other groups form "epistemic communities,"
"electronic tribes," and "virtual communities" on computer
networks. But a case may also be made that the technology enables
new barriers and boundaries to be defined and erected. For
example, single-issue groups and religious factions use
computerized mailing lists to campaign against their opponents,
draw sharp dividing lines, and polarize the public. Wealthy elites
use cellular telephones, fax machines, and computers to live in
increasing splendor away from the rest of humanity. Government
and corporate leaders erect virtual walls of technology to protect
secrets and defend against terrorist attacks--while terrorists aim to
turn public opinion against such leaders by scaring them into
isolation. Some individuals and groups may use the new technology
to narrow their sources of information to pet topics, removing
themselves from exposure to broad media that have shaped national
culture and consensus for decades.
Thus the new technology is having complex, ambiguous,
ambivalent effects on people's spatial orientations. Many traditional
social, economic, and political barriers are coming down because of
it. But in other cases, the traditional barriers may be reinforced, and
new ones may be erected.
The information revolution is also changing people's time horizons.
Since McLuhan, many analysts have argued that the new
technology is enabling people to conquer time. For example,
financial transactions clear almost instantaneously around the
world now. People send faxes and electronic mail anywhere in
minutes. CNN and other television networks broadcast in real time
the sights and sounds of SCUD missiles over Israel. Government
officials move with apparent composure from one immediate crisis
to the next.
But a case may also be made that people's time horizons are being
distorted because of the new technology. In many ways, it has been
used to overload people with information about current
developments, narrow their focus, and pressure them to act quickly.
Too many things seem to be happening instantaneously and
simultaneously. Too many people seem captivated by an intensified
awareness of the immediate present and its crises, a sense of
detachment from the past, and an anticipation of an accelerating
rush into the future. Many seem to be abandoning a sense of
history and tradition. Whereas for some activities, like financial
transactions, the world has become a single fluid time zone, in
other respects people are increasingly sensitive about the gaps in
temporal progress and its pace in different parts of the world.
In other words, many people are not conquering time, not even the
present moment--they are being conquered by it. While some think
they are saving time, others feel they are being deprived of it. While
some think they are increasingly able to grasp the future, others feel
they are losing their grip on it. Partly because of technology,
information (not to mention disinformation) is flowing faster than
many people feel they can absorb, sort, make decisions, and obtain
additional information that may be needed to make the right
decision and control the outcome.
The maturation of the technology and its use may address many of
these points. Some practitioners and visionaries recognize the need
to develop computerized methods that will enable users to control
the flood of information about the present, illuminate what is most
important, introduce historical perspective, and simulate alternative
futures. The result may be to stretch the time perspective,
something quite different from the "allatonceness" that McLuhan
acclaimed.[85]
If one accepts the spatial and temporal shifts that McLuhan lauds, a
united, even happy "global village" is still not the only possible
implication. Like McLuhan, Daniel Bell has commented that
technology is resulting in "the eclipse of distance and the
foreshortening of time, almost to the fusion of the two." But in his
view, instability is a likely implication. Societies, the United States
in particular, are undergoing a "loss of insulating space" as
conditions and events in one place are quickly, demandingly
communicated to other places. Political systems are becoming more
"permeable" than ever to destabilizing events, and people are more
able to respond directly and immediately. In some societies--Bell
was worried about the United States--this may raise the likelihood
of contagious mass reactions and mobilizations, and make the
rulers strengthen centralized controls to keep that from
occurring.[86] In other words, the information revolution is an
important factor behind both the integration and the disintegration
that may be seen occurring all around the world today.
The new technology is having, and will continue to have, important
but complex, ambiguous, and ambivalent effects on people's
perceptions of space and time. These perceptions form an important
bridge between people's values and their behavior. This is relevant
to the analysis at hand, because the development of cyberspace
implies some reconstruction of political space and time.
TOWARD THE CYBERCRATIC STATE
Section 3 discussed cyberocracy as a descendant of bureaucracy
that may break the boundaries of that traditional form of
administration and management. The technical, infrastructural, and
epistemological considerations discussed in Section 4 show that
the stakes and issues are broader than the redesign of individual
offices or office areas to benefit from the new technology.
Almost by definition, cyberocracy will mean that a government has
an official cyberspace, with varying degrees of interconnection
among its parts. Cyberocracy might be defined as a form of
organization that has a well-developed cyberspace, conducts many
key activities there, and is structured as though its cyberspace were
an essential factor for the organization's presence, power, and
productivity. Technology may appear to be the driving
consideration; but how these new forms of organization and
infrastructure are developed will depend as much on sociopolitical
and other considerations.
In this future environment, government personnel may keep most
office work in electronic form, have electronic records that extend
back decades in time, and use computerized models to visualize and
assess trends and policy options. They may be on one or more
networks for electronic mail, news feeds, conferencing, and
document preparation with other officials, as well as for access to
external information utilities and networks that belong to the
government or its contractors and to which access is authorized.
A network may be confined to an office area, extend throughout a
department or agency, or span different parts of the government;
there may be many networks for different purposes and
participants, and these may be interconnected to varying degrees
through gateways of controlled access. The extent to which a
cybercrat has access to networks that reach beyond his or her office
into other parts of the government may be an important issue.
Another may be the extent to which he or she has access from the
office to public and private networks, conferencing systems, and
databases that are outside the government, maybe in a foreign
country.
Cyberocracy may raise issues about relations not only between
people and offices in particular areas, but also between different
office areas, agencies, and departments of the government, between
the public and private sectors in general, and between state and
society. It may prove to be no mere variation on bureaucracy or
technocracy; the technology implies more than improved efficiency
for old institutional designs. Cyberocracy may radically change, in
ways we do not perceive, how states and societies interact, how
governments are structured, and how offices and people within
those governments deal with each other, outside organizations, and
individual citizens.
A key issue for theory and practice may be the pros and cons of
interconnection. Technology provides a capability for
interconnecting individuals, organizations, and sectors on an
unprecedented scale. As already noted, the technology alone will
not determine how it gets used, or what the outcomes are; that will
depend on broad cultural, political, and other conditions. In some
areas, and for some states and societies, extensive interconnection
may be desirable. But elsewhere, that may be not be the case.
The first cyberocracies may appear as overlays on established
bureaucratic forms of organization and behavior, just as the new
post- industrial aspects of society overlay the still necessary
industrial and agricultural aspects. Yet such an overlay may well
begin to alter the structure and functioning of a system as a whole.
Just as we now speak of the information society as an aspect of
post-industrial society, we may someday speak of cyberocracy as an
aspect of the post-bureaucratic state.[87]
Nations where the political and cultural commitment to
bureaucratic forms is relatively low, and freedom of information
high, may have the easiest time evolving a cybercratic state. Nations
where the state is highly bureaucratized, and bureaucratic behavior
is ingrained culturally and politically, may have difficulty
developing such a state, although the new technologies may be
amply used for political control.
There will be no single type of cyberocracy. Some variations may
occur because different departments and agencies within a
government perform different tasks and have different requirements.
For example, the kind of cyberspace that the U.S. State Department
may want may be quite unlike what the Internal Revenue Service
may want. Furthermore, national variations may appear because of
differing cultural and other conditions. Thus Japan and United
States will probably develop very different types. This may take
time to become clear.
MORE QUESTIONS THAN ANSWERS
Since the 1960s, the information revolution has given rise to a host
of recurrent questions that reduce to a string of polarities and
contradictions: What will this revolution favor more: Open or
closed systems? Decentralization or centralization? Big or small
government? Federal, state, or local government? The public or the
private sector? Inclusionary or exclusionary communities?
Individuals or institutions? State or society? Privacy, or security
and surveillance? Freedom or authority? Democracy or new forms
of totalitarianism?
The literature offers exhortations and evidence in all directions, but
no definitive answers. Most of what has been thought about such
questions appeared in writings in the 1970s; and with few
exceptions, recent writings provide little additional clarification or
insight.[88] New research would help, especially if it were
conducted carefully in the knowledge that we may be in a
confusing transitional phase. Indeed, some of today's trendier
points--e.g., the information revolution empowers individuals,
favors open societies, and portends a worldwide triumph for
democracy--may not hold up as times change.
The best answer may ultimately be "all of the above" depending on
the situation and the society affected by the new technology. Open
as well as closed types of states may continue to arise. Centralized
and decentralized institutions may flourish in the same state. And
complex, hybrid patterns may occur; for example, decisionmaking
capabilities in some governments may become more centralized and
more decentralized at the same time.
In any case, these are good questions, and they are relevant to a
discussion of cyberocracy. The following sub-sections consider
some prevalent notions in the literature about how government may
be affected by the information revolution. These involve three
themes:
- the rise of new elites
- the restructuring of organizations
- relations between public and private sectors.
Section 6 then examines whether the information revolution may
favor democracy or totalitarianism.
This preliminary study can do no more than selectively examine
some general, potential implications of these themes for
cyberocracy. Some readers may feel that other important themes are
neglected, for example, the implications for relations between
different branches and levels of government, between the
government and the citizenry, and between the governments of
different countries. But in my literature survey, I have found less
written about these themes than about the three treated here. If the
concept of cyberocracy merits continued discussion, other themes
may be addressed in future work.
RISE OF NEW ELITES
For decades, analysts have expected the information revolution to
create new elites,[89] and a new stratification between the
"information-rich" (or "haves") and the "information-poor" (or
"have- nots"). Awkward terms like "knowledge elites" and
"knowledge workers" have gained currency to label the new strata
that live off the expanding information sectors.
A principal contributor to thinking about the new knowledge elites,
Daniel Bell, concluded that:
"The fear that a knowledge elite could become the technocratic
rulers of the society is quite far-fetched and expresses more an
ideological thrust by radical groups against the growing influence
of technical personnel in decision making. Nor is it likely, at least
in the foreseeable future, that the knowledge elites will become a
"cohesive class" with common class interests, on the model of the
bourgeoisie rising out of the ruins of feudalism to become the
dominant class in industrial society. The knowledge class is too
large and diffuse.... What is more likely to happen ... is that the
different situses in which the knowledge elites are located will
become the units of corporate action.... The competition for money
and influence will be between these various situses...."[90]
His points are sound, but do not lay the matter to rest, for he
defines knowledge elites in primarily technical terms. Other
analysts who take a less technical approach to the new elite
continue to detect insidious possibilities.
One of the latest warnings comes from Harvard political economist
Robert Reich, who has added the equally awkward term "symbol
analysts" to depict a growing gap between a new elite and a new
mass.
"Of course, wealthier Americans have been withdrawing into their
own neighborhoods and clubs for generations. But the new
secession is more dramatic because the highest earners now inhabit
a different economy from other Americans. The new elite is linked
by jet, modem, fax, satellite and fiber-optic cable to the great
commercial and recreational centers of the world, but it is not
particularly connected to the rest of the nation. That is because the
work this group does is becoming less tied to the activities of other
Americans. Most of their jobs consist of analyzing and
manipulating symbols--words, numbers or visual images. Among
the most prominent of these "symbol analysts" are management
consultants, lawyers, software and design engineers, research
scientists, corporate executives, financial advisers, strategic
planners, advertising executives, television and movie producers,
and other workers whose jobs titles include terms like "strategy,"
"planning," "consultant," "policy," "resources" or "engineer."[91]
Reich sees a gap growing in many cities between these symbol
analysts and the broad mass of local service workers whose jobs
depend on the symbol analysts. For him, "The stark political
challenge in the decades ahead will be to reaffirm that, even though
America is no longer a separate and distinct economy [from the rest
of the world], it is still a society whose members have abiding
obligations to one another."[92]
Reich's points are serious, but the implication that the new
infrastructure benefits mainly the rich and powerful provides a
partial picture. For example, elites in political and professional
organizations that have previously lacked influence may use the
new technology to help form coalitions with geographically distant,
like- minded elites elsewhere, including in foreign countries.[93]
Some of the heaviest users of the new comunications networks and
technologies are progressive, center-left, and socialist activists,
through entities like the Association for Progressive
Communications. Cyberspace is going to be occupied by all kinds
of people, with all kinds of ideologies and agendas, from almost all
areas of society.
It is also a mistake--one that Reich does not make--to expect that
computer whizzes who act like a priesthood and lack social
consciousness will end up running the new infrastructures of
society and government. This view lingers because of some early
analyses of computers and their implications. The development of
cyberspace will generate new elites, in consonance with other
trends in society. And the defining attributes of these elites may
include a knowledge of, and a dedication to the use of information
and communications technologies. But these technologies are ever
easier to use. As the skill requirements decline and the number of
skilled people increases, the social, political, and other attributes of
the new elites may become increasingly diverse.
Today's knowledge elites are not necessarily tomorrow's cybercrats.
Some knowledge elites, especially in universities and research
centers, may have nothing to do with cyberspace or cyberocracy.
Some cybercrats who have technical or other knowledge and skill
may also be knowledge elites. But cybercrats may also arise who
have no interest in knowledge per se, even though they are skilled
at using computers, databases, models, and networks.
Individually, there will probably be as many different types of
cybercrats as there are bureaucrats, technocrats, and other types of
officials. What may distinguish the new generation of elites is that
they will tend to define issues and problems in informational terms,
and to look for answers and solutions through their access to
cyberspace and their knowledge of how to use it to affect behavior.
The new elites may include propagandists and manipulators, as
well as people of high public integrity and democratic
consciousness.
ORGANIZATIONAL RESTRUCTURING
According to many accounts from the business world, the
information revolution is causing the flattening of organizations,
the collapse of hierarchies, increased decentralization, and
reductions in the number of middle-level managers. Technology
and management innovations are said to be undermining traditional
hierarchical and recent matrix forms of organization. Success in the
new business environment is said to depend increasingly on
organizing project-oriented "teams" and "clusters" of individuals
from different parts of a hierarchy who function semi-
autonomously until a project is completed. But while some work
and management units operate more autonomously than ever, other
units span more boundaries than ever (e.g., the case of strategic
planning). One new notion is that organizations should be
redesigned around networks instead of hierarchies, and that these
networks should be kept in flux. Another notion is that well-
managed networks of small companies may increasingly outperform
big centralized companies.[94]
Such views have prominent champions, notably Peter Drucker and
Alvin Toffler, and important shifts are occurring in management
theory and practice.[95] But it is easy for enthusiasts to overstate
them and claim that more is changing than may be the case.
Complex organizations depend on some kind of hierarchy.
Hierarchy does not end because work teams include people from
different levels and branches. The structure may be more open, the
process more fluid, and the conventions redefined; but a hierarchy
still exists, whether one is looking at management in the United
States, Japan, or another country entering a post-industrial, post-
bureaucratic phase. The fact that the world is going through a very
turbulent, in many ways revolutionary period of change means that
many kinds of hierarchies are being disrupted and overturned; but
this may be a transitory phase, until the information revolution and
a new world order result in a new set of hierarchical relationships.
Decentralization is another important trend for many states and
societies. The evolution of technology has matched the trend, for
the initial emphasis on centralized data-processing and networking
through mainframe computers, often run by managers who acted
like a priesthood, has given way to the current emphasis on
distributed data-processing and networking through small
computers linked by local area networks. But decentralization is
not the only possibility or solution in all cases.
As management scientist George Huber points out, asking whether
the new technology may increase or decrease centralization is too
general a question, and perhaps the wrong one. In some cases, the
new information technologies may enable an organization to
become even more centralized, or decentralized, than it is. Huber's
hypotheses also suggest that the computer-assisted communications
and decision-support technologies may lead to the reverse: greater
decentralization for highly centralized organizations, and greater
centralization for decentralized ones.[96] In addition, operations
researchers have shown how organizational decision support
systems (ODSSs) may enable decentralized organizations to rest on
strong, centralized bases of information.[97]
The question of whether decentralization or re-centralization will
prevail becomes even more complex if one asks how the new
technology and related management innovations may enable
organizations to become both more centralized and more
decentralized at the same time. Indeed, many analysts have noted
that the real question is how to have both. The answer may lie
partly in a concept identified by Yale computer scientist David
Gelernter. While the new technology fosters decentralization, it
may also provide greater "topsight"--a central understanding of the
big picture that enhances the management of complexity.
"If you're a software designer and you can't master and subdue
monumental complexity, you're dead: your machines don't work.
they run for a while and then sputter to a halt, or they never run at
all. Hence, 'managing complexity' must be your goal. Or, we can
describe exactly the same goal in a more positive light. We can call
it the pursuit of topsight. Topsight--an understanding of the big
picture is an essential goal of every software builder. It's also the
most precious intellectual commodity known to man."[98]
While many treatments of organizational redesign laud
decentralization, it alone is not a decisive issue--the pairing of
decentralization with topsight may be what offers the real gains.
Furthermore, the demise of middle management may be a suspect
notion. Many companies have reported reductions; in some, this
stems from installing computer networks to track information that
used to employ numerous clerks and middle managers. But this
reduction may be a transitory trend. Former AT&T Lab director
Arno Penzias suggests that middle managers may be needed more
than ever, particularly to maintain links between different working
groups in large organizations. "As I see it, these growing needs for
the services that middle managers provide are the key driving forces
behind the dramatic changes taking place in the employee mix of
information technology companies."[99]
As cyberocracy develops, will governments become flatter, less
hierarchical, more decentralized, with different kinds of middle-
level officials and offices? Some may, but many may not.
Governments may not have the organizational flexibility and
options that corporations have.
In the U.S. government, interagency working groups and task forces
have been a common phenomenon for over a decade. This has not
meant less hierarchy and middle-management, but it has meant a
more networked form of organization. At the apex, the White
House and the National Security Council are operationally stronger
as a result of their growing information and communications
capabilities; in some instances officials there have designed and
implemented some policies and operations without apprising other
parts of the government. But the latter are catching up and catching
on; more, not less, coordination and consultation should be
expected in the future. The notion of enhancing decentralization
and improving flexibility and performance through clustering small
business companies around a central company has a governmental
counterpart in the privatization of public services and procurement,
although this has not proceeded far yet.
In other words, the post-bureaucratic state may end up configured
quite differently from the traditional bureaucratic state. If so, future
studies of political rivalries and struggles in a government
redesigned for the information age will read quite differently from
contemporary studies of bureaucratic politics.
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTOR RELATIONS
The development of the new infrastructures should raise issues
about relations between the public and the private sectors. One
issue is access by officials to public and private communications
networks, conferencing systems, and data banks located outside
government circles. For now, this is barely an issue; in some
instances a limited capacity exists--for example, to get copies of
media reports, or to enable an official to communicate with an
international agency--but few officials are interested. Eventually,
however, officials at all levels may want access to external
networks to help answer questions or exchange views. For a
cyberocracy, such access would seem desirable (albeit for some
countries and governments more than others). Should an official be
able to connect to any service he needs in the public or private
sector? Or should diverse, separate networks and utilities be built
to accommodate official needs, including for privacy and security?
Such questions, rarely asked today, are bound to grow in
importance.
A second, more general issue is the effect on definitions of, and
relations between, the public and private sectors. The boundaries
are blurring between the two sectors; and at the same time, new
fusions are resulting from efforts to create public-private
partnerships to address many policy problems. According to
political scientist Theodore Lowi, writing presciently twenty years
ago about the potential political impact of the information
revolution, "the blurring and weakening of the public-private
dichotomy could be the most important political development in the
coming decades."[100] A related question--it gets asked
particularly by librarians--is whether social imperatives or
proprietary interests should govern how information gets organized,
stored, and distributed.[101]
For many observers, a major phenomenon of our times is the trend
toward the privatization and deregulation of economic activities
around the world. In many countries the private sector has been
expanded and strengthened, while the public sector has seemed to
diminish in scope if not strength. But while this trend has received
heavy attention, there are indications of an obverse parallel trend:
many political activities that were once considered private (or could
be conducted as though they were private) are increasingly public
(and publicized). For example, an election or case of corruption
that might have been treated as a private affair in some country
years ago may now be turned by the media into a world-wide event.
Computer networks installed by local communities and
governments, like Santa Monica's PEN, may enable previously
isolated individuals to make contact and organize a caucus or
political action group that nobody expected. Records of electronic
mail messages in the U.S. government, and of police computer and
radio discussions in major cities, may be released to the press in
connection with sensitive legal proceedings.
In these respects, both the private and the public sectors are being
opened up, expanded, and redefined. The more this proceeds, the
more the lines between them are blurred, and the two are fused. The
information revolution lies behind much of this.[102] In addition,
the advent of cyberspace is leading to the creation of new areas of
private and public activity. Here too, distinctions between public
and private and between commercial and non-commercial are
blurring. For example, the research-oriented NSFNET/INTERNET
is not supposed to carry commercial communications. However,
some commercial actors have long had access to it (evidently for
activities deemed non-commercial), and a Commercial Internet is
being fused to it. A few years ago, questions were not easily
answered about whether subscription systems like the WELL
(where the question was often discussed) should be allowed access
to the INTERNET; but a few months ago, the WELL joined it.
Where will this lead? Will it mean that traditional distinctions
between public and private become relics of the industrial age? At a
minimum, people may need to think less in terms of turning to
government or the private sector to solve a problem, and more in
terms of building cooperative partnerships across public and private
boundaries and across all levels of government. This seems to be
both an implication of the information revolution and a task that
cannot be achieved without its tools, given the degree of
consultation and coordination that may be required.
Beyond that, political scientist Roger Benjamin suggests not only
that the public-private distinction may be outmoded, but also that
the development of post-industrial societies will raise the
importance of "collective goods" and services that stand between
but are different from public and private goods and services,
traditionally conceived. In this view, institutional redesigns will be
needed in the United States and elsewhere to deal with the
changing nature of goods and services that people demand.[103]
Daniel Bell once pointed out that "the nation- state is becoming too
small for the big problems of life, and too big for the small
problems of life.... In short, there is a mismatch of scale."[104] But
Benjamin and others argue that scale is not the key issue; the whole
relationship between what is public and what private, and thus
between state and society, may be headed for redefinition,
domestically and internationally. Bell might well agree, for he too
has argued that information and knowledge are tantamount to
collective goods.[105]
The implications for cyberocracy are unclear and speculative. They
may mean a continuation of "big government," but they may also
mean greater interconnection, consultation, and collaboration
between the public and private sectors, if not the creation of a
whole new sector that is separate from but also mediates between
those two traditional sectors. This new sector may turn out to be
crucial for cyberocracy to work. Meanwhile, it is difficult to see
how smaller government will be the result since vast data
collection, storage, analysis, manipulation, and dissemination
capabilities may be required. Perhaps governments will need fewer
middle-managers and clerks in the future. Perhaps many data
collection and storage activities can be turned over to agencies
outside government boundaries. But personnel with new skills will
also be required. And it may be increasingly difficult to tell where
the boundaries of government stop.
FROM HIERARCHIES TO NETWORKS
A theme emerges from these considerations: The information
revolution appears to be making "networks" relatively more
important, and interesting, than "hierarchies" as a form of
organization.[106] This may have profound implications for the
cybercratic state, both for how it is organized internally and for the
kinds of external actors it must respond to.
The information revolution, in both its technological and non-
technological aspects, sets in motion forces that make life difficult
for traditional, hierarchical institutions. These forces disrupt and
erode hierarchies, diffuse and redistribute power, redraw
boundaries, broaden spatial and temporal horizons, and compel
closed systems to open up. This creates troubles especially for
large, bureaucratic, aging institutions, but the institutional form per
se is not obsolete. It remains essential, and the responsive, capable
institutions will adapt their structures and processes to the
information age. Many will evolve from traditional hierarchical to
new, flexible, network-like models of organization.[107]
Meanwhile, the network phenomenon is not only modifying an old
form--that of large hierachical institutions--but also giving rise to a
new form. The very forces that cause troubles for old institutions--
e.g.,, the erosion of hierarchy--favor the rise of multi-organizational
networks of small organizations. Indeed, the information revolution
is strengthening the importance of all forms of networks--social
networks, communications networks, etc. The network form is very
different from the hierarchical form. While institutions (large ones
in particular) are traditionally built around hierachies and aim to
act on their own, multi-organizational networks consist of (often
small) organizations or parts of institutions that have linked
together to act jointly. The new technology favors the growth of
such networks by making it possible for dispersed actors to
consult, coordinate, and operate together across greater distances,
for longer periods of time, and on the basis of more and better
information than ever before.
One implication, then, is that many government institutions may
evolve to become "networked organizations." A second implication
is that "organizational networks" may develop in between many of
those institutions, their parts or their agencies, including across
national borders. There is a third implication.
The rise of multi-organizational networks is an important trend less
in the government than in the business world. But it seems most
important in the realm of civil society. Growing numbers and
varieties of nongovernment organizations (NGOs--some of them
also called private voluntary organizations, PVOs) are forming
network-like coalitions, in many instances to strengthen their
efforts to influence the behavior of governments and businesses.
The examples include new networks among special interest, public
interest, pressure, lobbying, and/or advocacy groups. Some of the
best examples may be found among activist movements on the left
and center-left that revolve around human-rights, peace,
environmental, consumer, labor, immigration, racial, and gender-
based issues. These movements, especially those that use PeaceNet
and other communications services, increasingly blend the
organizational, social, and physical dimensions of the network
concept.
A third implication, then, is that the network phenomenon may
intensify interactions between state institutions and the
organizations that deem to represent civil society. This may raise
the requirements for the actors in a cybercratic state to have access
to information and communications infrastructures that lie outside
official structures, at the interface between state and society.
CONCLUDING COMMENT: REVALUING VALUES
Not long ago, people worried that the information revolution and
the relentless advance of technology and technocracy might mean
that their lives would be run by heartless computers, and
government would be reduced to a "Hell of Administrative
Boredom."[108] This will surely not be the case. The information
revolution has led and continues leading to intense questions about
values and to new debates about choices and conflicts among them.
Indeed, the new technology is unsettling in part because it permits
unprecedented exchanges of values, information, and propaganda,
within and between nations.[109]
Cyberocracy ultimately concerns the nature of governance. Because
of this, the concept leads directly to questions about freedom,
privacy, and security of information. The concept cannot be
developed without raising broader value-laden questions about the
nature of authority, freedom, equality, and democracy in the
information age (or whatever one prefers to name the future).
Whether and how to interconnect different parts of the government
(not to mention state and society generally) and at the same time
safeguard their autonomy cannot be answered without making value
judgements.[110]
In a sound cautionary statement, Donald Michael, a professor of
planning and public policy at the University of Michigan and a
senior analyst of information revolution issues, has summarized
this challenge:
"To my mind, more information and more information technology
pose for all levels and types of institutions the greatest challenge
facing civilization--short of avoiding nuclear holocaust. The depth
and extent of the challenge is evidenced by a summary of
consequences that accompany an information-rich world: [It] 1)
changes and redistributes the loci of power and action; 2) changes
the operational and, eventually, the symbolic meanings of
"sovereignty," interdependence and authority; 3) changes the
relevant understanding of social process from disconnected, linear,
cause/effect relationships to multiply interconnected, circular
relationships of cause-effect-cause-effect- cause....; 4) forces
priority valuing of issues that have been secondary to the focus of
governments or corporate responsibility: the planetary environment,
future generations, biological impacts; 5) undermines the
conventional definition of leadership competence; 6) requires a
portion of citizenry than can think and value accordingly."[111]
DEMOCRATIC AND TOTALITARIAN POSSIBILITIES
Will cyberocracy favor democratic or authoritarian and totalitarian
tendencies? At present the information revolution seems to
strengthen democratic forces around the world. But totalitarian
cyberocracy also remains a possibility.
A SINGLE-EDGED SWORD FAVORING DEMOCRACY?
Many analysts have been optimistic that the information revolution
should strengthen democratic tendencies. This optimism generally
has three bases. First, it is argued that the new technology--all
types and sizes, including computer hardware and software, radio
and television receivers, cellular telephones, fax machines, cassette
and video tapes, networks, etc.--is spreading into more and more
hands around the world. Thus, no regime will be able to isolate
itself or its country from the information revolution; nor will any
regime be able to centrally control the technology or the people
who use it. The "Big Brother" system of George Orwell's 1984 will
not be possible.[112]
Second, as a result of improved access to information resources, the
presumably smaller, weaker actors should be able to compete on
more equal terms with bigger, stronger actors. Power should accrue
more to individuals than to institutions.
"The universal availability of electronic libraries, with their power
to organize and select information, means that individuals can
compete with organizations and organizations can compete with the
state on more equal terms."[113]
"The power of entrepreneurs using distributed information
technology grows far faster than the power of large institutions
attempting to bring information technology to heel. Rather than
pushing decisions up through the hierarchy, the power of
microelectronics pulls them remorselessly down to the
individual."[114]
Second, the "open" societies of the world seem better suited than
the "closed" societies to take advantage of the new technologies and
respond to the challenges they pose to established concepts of
national sovereignty and governance. Moreover, information and
communications flows appear to be a powerful instrument for
compelling closed societies to open up. Thus, U.S. Secretary of
State George Shultz, writing in 1985 before the revolutions of 1989
proved the point in Eastern Europe, believed that:
"The free flow of information is inherently compatible with our
political system and values. The communist states, in contrast, fear
this information revolution perhaps more than they fear Western
military strength.... Totalitarian societies face a dilemma: either
they try to stifle these technologies and thereby fall farther behind
in the new industrial revolution, or else they permit these
technologies and see their totalitarian control inevitably eroded....
The revolution in global communications thus forces all nations to
reconsider traditional ways of thinking about national
sovereignty."[115]
If the Soviet regime risked adopting the new technologies, Shultz
and others predicted (correctly) that its leaders would have to
liberalize the Soviet economic and political systems.[116]
Recent events in Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, China,
and to a lesser extent Latin America have provided exciting
evidence for the democratizing effects of the information
revolution. So long as the aim in the West is the demise of
communist and other traditional hard- line authoritarian systems,
policymakers in the United States and Europe are well advised to
expect that the diffusion of the new technologies will speed the
collapse of closed societies and favor the spread of open ones.[117]
However, the fact that the new technology can help sweep aside old
types of closed regimes does not necessarily mean that it will also
make democratic societies more democratic, or totalitarian ones
impossible. The technology may have different implications for
post-industrial societies than it has had for industrial and less
developed societies
A DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD WITH A DARK SIDE?
A longer view of history provides little assurance that the new
technology favors democracy. Centuries ago, the coinage of money
and the invention of the printing press enabled liberal democracy to
emerge:
"With the arrival of the printing press, the dikes holding back the
flow of information broke. The great increase in the circulation of
knowledge stimulated the generation of additional knowledge in an
explosion that echoes to this day. By democratizing access to
recorded information, the printing press set in motion the spread of
literacy and education, literature and the arts, science and
technology, and commerce and industry that led to the industrial
revolution and the creation of democratic governments serving at
the will of an informed populace."[118]
The printing press was a key technology enabling the Renaissance,
the Protestant Reformation, the end of feudalism, the rise of
modern science and capitalism, and the colonial expansion of the
European empires to the New World and Asia.[119]
Yet the printing press and later technologies, like the telephone and
radio, did not prevent new and ever worse forms of autocracy from
arising. Early on, these technologies contributed to the demise of
the old monarchies and the broadening of popular participation in
politics. But later, these same technologies were turned into tools
of propaganda, surveillance, and subjugation that enabled dictators
to seize power and develop totalitarian regimes. The fascist regimes
of the 1930s and 1940s and the communist regimes of later decades
are the prime examples.
In other words, we should not dismiss the possibility that the new
technology may serve anti-democratic purposes in the future. This
does not mean that technology is value-free, neutral, or apolitical.
What technology does is widen the range of possibilities within a
particular context. As Daniel Bell has pointed out,
"the new revolution in communications makes possible both an
intense degree of centralization of power, if the society decides to
use it in that way, and large decentralization because of the
multiplicity, diversity, and cheapness of the modes of
communication."[120]
The effects depend on the context. The new technology, like the
old, may induce some cultural and political change, but it may also
enable a given system to further refine the political structures that
are most acceptable to its culture, which may not be democratic in
the Western sense.[121]
French social critic Jacques Ellul extends the argument, by
insisting that technology, far from being neutral, is fundamentally
"ambivalent." It is bound to generate harmful effects that are
inseparable from its beneficial effects:
"This is why all the dissertations on autonomy (individual and
institutional), decentralization, personalization, the growth of
liberty, the opening up to small groups, and democratization thanks
to new technologies--and these dissertations have multiplied
infinitely over the past few years--are absolutely futile and
inconsistent. For they ignore the feature which is intrinsic to the
very being of technique: its irrepressible ambivalence."[122]
Research on how the new technology may affect local government
in the United States supports the view of "communications and
information technologies as malleable political resources that are
most often designed and used in ways that follow and reinforce the
existing structure of power." Depending on the situation, especially
what kinds of leaders are in power, the new technology is "capable
of facilitating change or stability."[123] Its inherent ambivalence
makes it malleable.
In short, the existence of democracy does not assure that the new
technology will strengthen democratic tendencies and be used as a
force for good rather than evil. The new technology may be a
double-edged sword even in a democracy.
A classic but ignored set of studies sponsored by The Conference
Board provided ample, grim warnings of this possibility in 1972.
While recognizing that the new technology might help empower the
individual, the authors--notably John Crecine, Theodore Lowi, and
Donald Michael-- variously emphasized that the results could
instead include: increased susceptibility of the individual to outside
manipulation, a rise in the number and diversity of ad-hoc interest
groups and social movements, increased fragmentation and
fractionalization of society and politics, greater stratification and
centralization of society around information resources, and greater
efforts by some policymakers to control access to information and
use it to manipulate the public.[124]
Evidence for these concerns has appeared in the conduct of party
politics in the United States. Despite initial hopes that "electronic
democracy" and "teledemocracy" would increase popular
participation and government responsiveness, mainstream analysts
have continued to worry that the new technology may be used to
undermine democratic practices. Observations to this effect were
made in the early 1980s by political scientist Richard Neustadt.
"A wave of new technology will transform campaigning, political
organizing, news coverage, lobbying, and voting. Some of these
changes may make campaigning less costly and bring decision-
making closer to the people. But the greatest impact may be to
fragment our politics, narrowing people's perspectives, shifting
more power into special interest groups, and weakening the glue
that holds our system together."[125]
With the development of "narrow casting networks" tailored to
small audiences, "many people may end up knowing less." Worried
that power has been shifting from the political parties to narrow
interest groups for decades, Neustadt raised the now widespread
concern that "the new technologies will further dilute the fragile
glue of the parties and of public identification with broad
ideas."[126] Such concerns are being renewed with Ross Perot's
calls for creating an "electronic townhall."
For other analysts, the key concern is the effect on government
administration. The potential dark side is captured in studies
warning about the emergence of a "computer state" (David
Burnham), a "dossier society" (Kenneth Laudon), and a
"surveillance society" (Gary Marx) that may limit personal liberty
in the United States.[127] These studies show that the new
technology may facilitate the monitoring and surveillance of people
on the job and elsewhere, the amassing and merging of enormous
statistical data banks for profiling individuals and their activities,
and the restriction of access to "strategic" and "secret" information.
After all, the U.S. government has more data on its citizens than
any totalitarian government has on its citizens.[128]
The enactment of sound privacy and security laws should prevent
abuse. But these authors suggest that there may be a natural
tendency for powerful, enterprising actors to use the new
technology in ways that may limit if not jeopardize individual
freedom and knowledge. According to Burnham, cheap computing
power makes it easy to amass "transactional information" on
individuals--e.g., records of phone calls, credit payments, medical
and criminal histories--in huge databases, and transmit them
anywhere. Instead of empowering the individual over the
institution, these databases and networks favor "the growing power
of large public and private institutions in relation to the individual."
The result is likely to be the abuse of individual rights, and "a
gradual drift toward authoritarianism" that is subtle because of "a
lack of obvious villains" in our democratic system.[129] The
problem to guard against is not only the "abuse" of "personal
information" by public sector agencies, but also its "use" by the
private sector for marketing, investigative, and other purposes.[130]
Today's concerns revolve mainly around database capabilities. But
in the future, ubiquitous computing may raise additional concerns.
Mark Weiser of Xerox PARC warns of the possibility that
"hundreds of computers in every room, all capable of sensing
people near them and linked by high-speed networks, have the
potential to make totalitarianism up to now seem like sheerest
anarchy. Just as a workstation on a local-area network can be
programmed to intercept messages meant for others, a single rogue
tab in a room could potentially record everything that happened
there."[131]
More ominous visions by less moderate thinkers raise specters of
"technological terrorism" (Jacques Ellul) and "friendly fascism"
(Bertram Gross) being imposed with velvet gloves. Ellul's point is
subtle. In his view, the entire, optimistic, uncritical "discourse"
about the new technology, and the pervasive insistence that people
must become acclimated to it, represent a form of "terrorism which
completes the fascination of people in the West and which places
them in a situation of ... irreversible dependence and therefore
subjugation." In his analysis, a new "aristocracy" is leading people
to believe that a computerized society is inevitable, and that they
have no choice but to succumb to it.
"The ineluctable outcome is dictatorship and terrorism. I am not
saying that the governments that choose this as the flow of history
will reproduce Soviet terrorism. Not at all! But they will certainly
engage in an ideological terrorism."[132]
The irony for Ellul is that people are being led to think the
technology will enhance their freedom, when in his view it is bound
to limit their freedom.
Unlike the other critics represented here, Gross does not focus on
information technology. But its potential uses for surveillance and
control undergird many concerns he raises:
"[T]he means of control over this great mass [of technology] has
been developed to such a degree that centralized systems can keep
tabs on incredible amounts of information over long sequences of
widely dispersed and decentralized activities."[133]
Gross's work reflects standard socialist concerns that big
government and big business in the advanced capitalist countries
collude to the detriment of society. Nonetheless, his concept of
"friendly fascism" contributes to this study by suggesting that the
information revolution may, in time and in some places, give rise to
political systems and practices that purport to be democratic but are
not.
TOTALITARIANISM FAR FROM FINISHED?
Americans regard democracy (especially our own) as the highest
achievement of centuries of political evolution. Moreover, many of
us also believe that evolution favors democracy as its leading edge
and strongest contender. Both beliefs may well be valid.
Nonetheless, the long history of man's political progress--from
tribes and city-states, through theocracies, monarchies, and
empires, to the creation of modern nation-states and republics, with
their modern bureaucracies and political parties--has not yet given
rise to either democracy or totalitarianism as a final political
outcome. Democratic, authoritarian, and totalitarian tendencies
have occurred and vied for preeminence at every stage. Thus, some
monarchies provided people more individual freedom and
protection under the law than did others. And in recent decades the
United States and the Soviet Union coexisted as the democratic and
totalitarian archetypes of the modern bureaucratic state and party
system.
Moreover, across the centuries of political evolution, with each
passing stage, the span between democratic, autocratic, and
totalitarian possibilities has grown wider. There was less difference
between the milder and harsher monarchies of the middle ages than
between the capitalist and communist systems of recent years.
The development of cyberocracy may fit with this historical trend.
Cyberocracy, far from favoring democracy or totalitarianism, may
make possible still more advanced, more opposite, and farther apart
forms of both. In the United States and other countries where
democracy has deep roots, the information revolution may render
up new instruments and opportunities for ordinary citizens to
exercise their freedoms, improve their ways of life, make political
choices, and protect their personal interests. But elsewhere the
tools of cyberocracy may give a state apparatus and its rulers
powerful new means of control over their citizenry, with an official
ideology determining what information is allowed.
Perhaps the leading edge of history does favor liberal democracy.
Yet behind that edge, regimes that are anti-democratic,
authoritarian, and totalitarian have kept cropping up, especially
where a charismatic leader is able to generate public consensus in
favor of tyranny. The conditions under which such regimes arise
often include irrevocable desires to catch up to a more advanced
and powerful country, to spread one's own influence abroad, to
resist if not defeat an external enemy, to counter a threat to internal
control, to have a regime that imposes order and simplifies what
people should think and do following a period of disarray and
information overload, and simply to remain in power. Such
conditions still exist in many places today. The inequality of
socioeconomic conditions around the world, the vigor of many
national, religious, ethnic, and other rivalries, the interest of many
regimes in exploiting technology to exert their power at home and
abroad, and the vulnerability of many peoples to charismatic
leaders, all continue to make it likely that in more than a few
places, perhaps especially in the Third World, ruling elites and
their security forces will use the new information technologies for
anti-democratic purposes.
For example, events in China since the demonstrations in
Tiananmen Square confirm that exposure to the information
technology revolution is politically risky for a totalitarian regime.
But these events also show that such a regime can learn to exploit
the technology.[134] Meanwhile, an ostensibly democratic country,
Singapore, is making the most determined effort in the world at the
informatization of all parts of society.[135] But as this develops,
the specter of undemocratic controls is rising.
There is no assurance that the information revolution will favor
glasnost and democracy in the long run. The Cold War may be
over, and liberalism may be carrying the day in may places. But
totalitarianism may be far from finished. The advent of cyberocracy
may help us realize how fruitful democracy can be in countries like
the United States. Yet it may also mean that we have yet to see how
thorough totalitarianism can be. Far from favoring democracy or
totalitarianism, cyberocracy may facilitate more advanced forms of
both. It seems as likely to foster further divergence as convergence,
and divergence has been as much the historical rule as convergence.
In the past, the divergence principle was most evident between
countries. In the future, another possibility is that the principle may
increasingly apply within countries. The information revolution
may enable hybrid systems to take form that do not fit standard
distinctions between democracy and totalitarianism. In these
systems, part of the populace may be empowered to act more
democratically than ever, but other parts may be subjected to new
techniques of surveillance and control.
COMMENT ON POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE
The information revolution may also lead to new political (and
economic) philosophies and ideologies. The creation of computers,
robots, artificial intelligence, and now artificial life,[136] has led
many thinkers to ponder the philosophical, ethical, and
psychological implications for man's place in the universe, the
concept of the self, the distinction between man and machine, and
the nature of the mind, intelligence, and life itself.
"We have seen the computer begin as a mere instrument for
generating ballistic tables and grow to a force that now pervades
almost every aspect of modern society. In an important sense, it has
already transcended its status as a mere tool to be applied to
specific tasks. It has become a symbol, indeed a source, of
questions that were in earlier times asked only by theologians and
philosophers but which have now, in part because of the role
computers and computations play in the world, attained immediacy
and urgency."[137]
Writings in these philosophical areas have raised questions of
freedom and power--e.g., whether man will be the master or the
slave of the new technology, and whether it will liberate or isolate
man as a social being. But many such writings seem theoretically
abstract, and lack clear import for political and economic
philosophy. In general, scientists, philosophers, and social theorists
do not seem to know yet what to make of the information
revolution, even though some recognize it may have profound
implications.[138]
The political content of many philosophical discussions still
reflects terms of debate inherited from the industrial era and the
rise of the nation-state. It may be argued that the information
revolution will affect the philosophical bases of society, among
other concerns. But the terms are usually adaptive. Information is
viewed as a factor that may cause adjustments and modifications in
prevailing forms of philosophy and ideology, but not an entirely
new system of thinking about politics and society.
In addition, there is a substantial literature that focuses on the
effects of the new technology and the information factor on capital
and labor. But while many analyses recognize that the technology
may foster economic and social change, there has been a tendency
to view it as just another capital-intensive, labor-saving technology
in a long line of such technologies.[139] Thus pro-capitalist writers
herald the potential benefits for economic efficiency, productivity,
profit, and competition, while their critics emphasize potential
costs such as job displacement, unemployment, and the
exploitation, dehumanization, and alienation of the worker.[140] In
the 1970s and 1980s, before the tide rose against socialism, this
literature provided arguments over whether capitalism or socialism
was more likely to be strengthened by the new technology, and
which of the two systems would be more capable of maximizing the
benefits for people and society.
However, if the information revolution proves as powerful as its
key theorists and enthusiasts expect, it is bound to change the
nature of the philosophical concepts to which we are accustomed.
Today's political labels (capitalism, socialism, liberalism,
totalitarianism, democracy, autocracy) may prove wholly
inadequate.
How this may occur and what may result, I have no sure notion. But
I offer a speculation that uses some of the language of Marxism.
Cyberocracy may spell the obsolescence and transformation of
standard Marxist theses. Karl Marx may have been a visionary with
a sense of history; but he was still a man of his time, the mid-19th
century, when industrialization was just taking off. Thus he made
"capital" the key factor in his vision, and Marxism made it a central
theoretical concern of intellectuals worldwide as industrialization
gained momentum in the late 20th century.
Yet, while claiming to abolish capital as a basis of power, the
Marxist-Leninist governments of the 20th century built huge states
based on the centralization and manipulation of information.
"[S]tate monopoly on information is a very central part of the
blueprint for governance in these states, not just in wartime or
under duress, but as a routine matter. Indeed, if one takes what are
usually called the stable governments of the world, strict state
control of public information is a more sharply distinctive
characteristic setting apart Marxist-Leninist governments than
anything else commonly coded, such as economic distributions. In
practice, if not in theory, this information control is simply the
defining signature of such states."[141]
A central ideology, an enormous bureaucracy, a single party,
government-controlled propaganda and news media, powerful and
pervasive security services, privileges for high-level bureaucrats, the
suppression of intellectual dissent, no real freedom of information
and expression for common citizens, the jamming of foreign
broadcasts, restrictions on travel and communications abroad,
restrictions on the availability and use of information and
communications technologies-- what more could a totalitarian
information controller want to work with?[142]
Communist regimes were slow to join the information revolution.
In the 1950s and 1960s the old guard of the Soviet regime, led by
Joseph Stalin, objected to the emerging cybernetic theories about
information's importance, and upheld Marxist-Leninist precepts
about the importance of labor. However, ideas from East European
socialists resulted in a major debate about the role of advanced
science and technology in social and economic development. As the
debate continued in the 1970s and 1980s, a new generation of
Soviet bureaucrats and technocrats became convinced that
computerized information processing was crucial for the
development and security of the state.[143] This led the regime to
install thousands of automated management systems for economic,
administrative, and military purposes, and to train thousands of
people in their use. Importing new technology from the West was
rationalized on grounds that
Two dilemmas persisted into the 1980s. One was the difficulty of
reconciling cybernetic thinking, as developed in the decentralized
West, with Marxist-Leninism. This may be illustrated by an old
Soviet review of a Soviet book about using computers to identify a
Pareto-optimal consensus in a conflict situation. The reviewer
criticized the author for closing his eyes
"to the potential danger of using cybernetics and mathematics as
tools of economic research if mathematical-economics models are
detached from Marxist-Leninist methodology.... There is no place
in his "study" for Marxist methodology, which is replaced by the
methodology of cybernetics."[144]
The other dilemma concerned the spread of personal computers,
which began to occur under a concept known as the "collective use
of personal computers." Access remained tightly controlled. For a
system where few people had telephones, private ownership of
mimeograph machines was not allowed, and typewriters had to be
registered with the authorities, the personal computer posed a risk
to the centralized control of information and the security of
government data banks. However, partly because of military
concerns to develop a computer-literate population, education and
training programs began as a national priority (on a table-top model
called the Agat, or Agatha, modeled after the Apple II).
In short, successive Soviet regimes followed Marxist-Leninist
precepts to claim that they had abolish capital accumulation as the
basis of political power and social structure. But in the process,
they substituted another basis that Marx did not foresee and that
may represent the antithesis of his initial ideals: the accumulation
and control of information.[145]
If a Marx were to reappear in the late twentieth century, is it not
doubtful that he or she would again focus on "capital"? Would the
focus instead be on "information"? In the post-industrial age,
information may succeed capital as a central theoretical concept for
political and social philosophy. This is suggested by some of the
major writings cited in this study.[146] If true, it may bring a twist
to the old Marxist dialect.
According to Marxism, the capitalist accumulation of "surplus
labor" and labor's exploitation by "monopoly capital" account for a
society's structure and its ills and inclinations. That structure is
composed of socioeconomic "classes" that are defined by the
"relation to the means of production of capital."
But the post-industrial age may instead raise a new concern about
"surplus information" or "monopoly information" that is
concentrated, guarded, and exploited for privileged economic and
political purposes. Moreover, a society may become structured into
new kinds of classes-- dare I say, "cyber strata" and "cybernets"--
depending on one's relation to the means of production of
information. There may be lower, middle, and upper classes of
information haves and have-nots. Special cybernets may develop
inside organizations, as illustrated, for example, by who
participates in which work teams, and who may be included or
excluded from access to a particular network or data bank.[147]
Some nets may cut across organizational and jurisdictional
boundaries, fostering the rise of "transnational political
factions"[148] and virtual communities.
Marxist theorizing placed the capitalist system, its wealthy elites
and corporations, in center-stage, especially for societies where the
private sector was powerful, labor struggles were repressed, and the
public sector was small and weak. But the information age and the
growth of cyberocracy may bring bureaucratic (and post-
bureaucratic) administrative systems to center-stage as the new
villains, especially where the state and related public sectors may
try to dominate society and become the main repository and
dispenser of information shielded from public accessibility. State
bureaucracies seem as likely as private corporations to hoard
"surplus" information.
Thus, were a new Marx to appear today, he or she might well be
disturbed by statist systems based on the monopoly control of
information. The United States and other market-oriented systems
bore the brunt of anti-capitalist criticism. But in the future, leftist,
rightist, and other kinds of systems based on large, secretive,
authoritarian bureaucracies (or cyberocracies) may be the
appropriate target for information-centered criticism.
The fact that socialism and communism have been proven unfit as
routes to freedom, equality, and prosperity does not let the private
sector off the hook. According to some accounts, the major threats
to privacy now come less from government agencies than from
corporations that are compiling vast amounts of demographic,
credit, and other types of personal data that may be used for
marketing, investigative, public relations, and other purposes.[149]
CODA
The information revolution has resulted in hundreds of studies
about the new technologies and their current and potential effects.
Many studies reiterate similar speculative points (this study is no
exception). But, as critic Michael Marien noted in the 1980s,
"Unfortunately, no effort has been made to collect all of these
forecasts, assessments, speculations, and warnings to determine
what is known and not known, identify areas of agreement and
disagreement, and establish the range of proven policies that might
be pursued. Ironically, in the midst of an inchoate revolution in
communication technology, this relatively simple act of
communication between researchers and responsible policy-makers
has not occurred....The fragmentation of perspectives increasingly
found in the wider society is reflected in the subject of
communications itself, which is studied by the professions of
journalism, education, and information science (formerly library
science), and such cross-disciplinary areas as computer science,
management science, behavioral science, language and area studies,
and future studies. Adding to this intellectual tumult, researchers in
the social sciences often specialize in the economics, politics, and
sociology of information and communications. Occasional
government studies attempt to provide some overview, but little or
no effort has been made by governments, foundations, research
institutes, or leading universities to try systematically to overcome
the rampant bureaucratization of knowledge in general and thinking
about communications in particular."[150]
It remains true that the new views about "information" do not fit
well into the standard academic disciplines and research fields.
Marien's call for greater coherence indicates that it may be time for
a new academic discipline or field to emerge, as earlier times
resulted in the fields of economics and political science.
CYBEROLOGISTS, ARISE
Of the many studies of information and communications issues,
few offer grand conceptual and theoretical possibilities. A key
reference point for many computer and information scientists, the
information theory developed by Claude Shannon, focused on
distinguishing signals from noise and transmitting them efficiently
from one place to another.[151] But it is a technical theory and has
little import outside scientific and engineering circles. The works
of Marshall McLuhan, a key reference point for many social
scientists, illuminate the importance of the new communications
media for society. But his works too have limited theoretical reach.
Instead, the analyst in search of the bases for a possible new
discipline is advised to turn to thinkers who bridge the hard and
soft sciences, like Norbert Weiner, the father of cybernetics, who
called for a new discipline in the 1950s.[152] Since the 1970s,
extensive intellectual ferment has occurred around the idea that all
organized systems, including living organisms as well as societies,
depend at their core on how information is generated, transmitted,
processed, and controlled. This is leading to an "information-
processing view of human organization and society" that means,
according to social scientist James Beniger,
"the proper subject matter of the social and behavioral sciences, if
they are to complement studies of the flows of matter (input-output
economics) and energy (ecology), ought to be information: its
generation, storage, processing, and communication to effect
control."[153]
Following these leads, I suggest another term, "cyberology," to
describe the possible field of study. Its content should extend
beyond what are currently treated as information science and
management, and encompass aspects of sociology, political science,
economics, psychology, and anthropology. As Beniger indicates,
such a field should draw on systems theory, game theory, and
decision theory. It could include artificial intelligence and the new
field of artificial life.
The subject matter may seem diverse in today's terms, for it may
span topics that analysts do not normally group together. Yet this
diversity may embody as much coherence as any other academic
discipline or field of research. University and research centers
might be well advised to develop research capabilities in this
respect. Policymakers in Washington and elsewhere at home and
abroad will have an increasing need for analyses that sort out and
assess the issues raised by the spread and use of the new
technologies.
NEXT STEPS?
The author remains uncertain about how the concept of cyberocracy
should be defined, and what should be its scope. Should it refer to
an organizational successor to bureaucracy? To a new form of
government, mostly affecting the executive branch? To a new
relationship between state and society? To the proprietors and
regulators of cyberspace? All these possibilities have been
discussed or hinted in this paper, although it has concentrated on
the first two.
At the same time, the author has become increasingly certain that
new research is needed about the effects of the information
revolution on government and politics, and that the concept of
cyberocracy should be fielded for discussion despite its
imprecision. What follows is a sketch of some items for future
research that, if pursued, would help further develop this concept
and anticipate its implications.[154]
Methodology for Assessing Information and Communications
Infrastructures
There are well-developed methodologies for analyzing political and
economic systems. Moreover, an analyst who knows a lot about a
nation's economic system probably knows something about its
political system too; and vice-versa. In contrast, methodologies are
lacking for analyzing information and communications
infrastructures and systems, except in limited technical and
managerial senses.
A methodology needs to be developed for assessing institutions,
elites, governments, and international relations from a
cyberological viewpoint. Such a methodology could help the
analyst understand better a nation's economic and political systems,
and what makes them function (or not function) together. It could
help identify what information and communications infrastructures
may be needed to support, for example, policies to liberalize an
economy or political system, improve public education, foster
regional integration, and/or build networks for global cooperation.
A methodology might also serve to identify vulnerabilities that a
country may need to correct, or that may be exploited in an
adversary.
While I currently have little idea how to design a methodology, a
starting point might be to borrow from the architecture of computer
networks, and identify different "layers" that must be present for an
infrastructure to function properly.[155]
Trends in Government Technology Absorption and Organizational
Change
As noted previously, this study has not sought to ascertain the
status of the adoption of the new technologies by the U.S. and
other governments. How well are various U.S. offices, departments,
and agencies doing at installing and using computerized systems?
How are these systems, especially their networks and data bases,
affecting the policymaking process, within offices and across them?
What visions, challenges, and concerns are driving (or slowing) the
development of the nascent cyberspace(s) in government? No
reports systematically address such questions; answers must be
sought piecemeal from diverse sources, and few answers are readily
available.
It would be useful to clarify the trends and issues not only for the
U.S. government, but also for other major governments, including
in Canada, Japan, and one or two European countries. Data and
analysis are so lacking in this area that it is unclear which
governments may be doing better than others, why, and whether
this has any effect on their relative capacities for policymaking and
implementation at home and abroad.
Intragovernmental, Intergovernmental, and Transnational Relations
The governments that succeed in using the information revolution
and its associated technologies to develop advanced information
and communications infrastructures may leap ahead of other
governments in terms of their capacity to deal with current issues,
assert their presence, build cooperative networks and partnerships,
and cope with competition and conflict at home and abroad. But
where is it most important to succeed: Inside the government, to
improve internal policymaking processes? Between governments, to
build new patterns of consultation and coordination? Or should the
focus be on building new infrastructures that bridge between state
and society, and between different states and societies?
Some governments may do better in some respects than in others.
For example, even if the U.S. government were to lag behind the
Japanese at using the information revolution and its technology to
improve internal policymaking processes, the United States may do
better than Japan at using it to build cooperative relations with its
neighbors and partners. It would be useful to clarify these points,
since they may have implications for the comparative advantages of
governments vis-a- vis each other.
Support for Regional Integration: North America
As the world enters a new era, success at regional integration may
become essential for major powers to continue playing strong roles
on the global stage. Progress with regional integration will raise the
requirements for the coordination of neighbors' domestic policies
and for the establishment of new institutional mechanisms that cut
across traditional notions of national borders and sovereignty.
It would be useful to identify whether and how the creation of
advanced information and communications infrastructures may
affect the prospects for regional integration efforts in Europe,
North America, and around Japan. In another study, the author has
recommended that this be done for the United States, Canada, and
Mexico, one objective being to create conferencing networks and
databases that will facilitate elite dialogue on issues of mutual
concern across all three countries.[156]
Global Interconnection: Networks versus Nations
We are moving out of an era of global interdependence, and into an
era of global interconnection. The attention-getting trend today is
the rise of global markets (e.g., for goods, ideas). Yet the spread of
transnational and global networks (not only communications, but
also social and organizational networks) among corporations,
governments, advocacy groups and other nongovernment
organizations, international and multilateral agencies, transnational
elites, etc., may have equally profound effects on the nature of the
new order.
As these organizational networks are built, cutting across public
and private sectors and national borders and interests, influential
new sub- and supra-national actors may increasingly compete for
influence with national actors. As political and economic interests
grow in protecting and expanding the networks, the networks
themselves may increasingly take precedence over nation-states as
the driving factor in domestic and foreign affairs. The government
that gains the lead in building and shaping these organizational
networks may gain enormous comparative advantage to influence
the direction the world goes in economically, politically, and
socially.
The information revolution is a key factor behind the rise of these
global (and regional) networks of organizations and elites.
Research seems advisable to identify the relationships between the
information revolution and the rise of organizational networks, for
this may have significant implications for the domestic and foreign
policies of the United States and other countries.
New Sources and Forms of Conflict
This study has avoided conflict issues. But while the information
revolution may enhance the prospects for peaceful, democratic
progress and prosperity under some conditions, it may also enhance
the prospects for conflict under other conditions. Moreover, the
need to respond to these new forms of conflict may strengthen the
trend toward cyberocracy, although not necessarily its democratic
possibilities.
Research may be needed on questions like the following: How will
the information revolution alter the sources and forms of conflict?
What will be their "information content" (conceptually and
technically)? To what extent, and in what ways, may "more and
better information" help lead to their resolution? What may be the
implications for strategies and tactics for responding to internal and
external conflicts? Will information subversion, blockades, and
assaults be feasible? Will it be possible to exploit information and
communications networks to damage an adversary's economic or
political system without attacking it in a conventional sense? What
may be the implications for military doctrine, organization, and
strategy?[157] What should countries and governments, not to
mention non-state actors, be preparing for?
ENDNOTES
1. Harry Tennant and George H. Heilmeier, "Knowledge and
Equality: Harnessing the Tides of Information Abundance," in
Derek Leebaert (ed.), Technology 2001: The Future of Computing
and Communications, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1991, pp.
117-149, quote from p. 117.
2. Richard J. Barnet, "Defining the Moment," The New Yorker,
July 16, 1990, pp. 46-60, quote from p. 48.
3. The term cyberocracy dates from a draft that I wrote in 1978.
4. A classic pioneering work is Daniel Bell, The Coming of Post-
Industrial Society: A Venture in Social Forecasting, Basic Books,
New York, 1973 (with a new Foreword, 1976). His writings have
influenced much of my thinking in this study.
5. James R. Beniger, The Control Revolution: Technological and
Economic Origins of the Information Society, Harvard University
Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1986, pp. 2-5, provides an excellent
compilation of terms since the 1950s. The ones mentioned here are
from writings by Anthony Oettinger, Zbigniew Brzezinski, and
Yoneji Masuda, respectively.
6. There are many good discussions of this hierarchy. They include:
Harlan Cleveland, The Knowledge Executive: Leadership In An
Information Society, Truman Talley Books, E. P. Dutton, New
York, 1985, pp. 22-26; and Nicolas Jequier and Stevan Dedijer,
"Information, Knowledge, and Intelligence: An Overview," in
Stevan Dedijer and Nicolas Jequier (eds.), Intelligence for
Economic Development: An Inquiry into the Role of the
Knowledge Industy, Berg Publishers Limited, Oxford, UK, 1987,
pp. 1-23, esp. pp. 13-15.
7. It might be proper to propose the term "cybernocracy" (which I
did in a 1978 draft), but "cyber-" has become the favored form.
8. Shoshana Zuboff, In the Age of the Smart Machines: The Future
of Work and Power, Basic Books, New York, 1984, introduced the
term "informated" to make the point that the new technology can
assist workers and managers to develop a worker-friendly
informated factory, which she distinguishes from an automated
factory.
9. Daniel Bell, "Thinking Ahead," Harvard Business Review, May-
June 1979, pp. 20ff, quote from p. 26. Another useful examination
of how and why politics and economics in the information age may
differ from those in the industrial age is Anthony Smith,
"Telecommunications and the Fading of the Industrial Age," The
Political Quarterly, April- June 1983, pp. 127-136.
10. From an interview with Regis Debray, as excerpted and quoted
in Harper's Magazine, April 1986, p. 18.
11. The best volumes of basic readings are Tom Forester (ed), The
Micro Electronics Revolution: The Complete Guide to the New
Technology and Its Impact on Society, The MIT Press, Cambridge,
Mass., 1980; Forester (ed.), The Information Technology
Revolution, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1985; and Forester
(ed.), Computers in the Human Context: Information Technology,
Productivity, and People, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1989.
12. For example, a landmark study by Mark U. Porat, The
Information Economy: Definition and Measurement, U.S
Department of Commerce, Office of Telecommunications, OT
Special Publication 77-12, May 1977, U.S. GPO, Washington,
D.C. found, using 1967 figures, that "total information activity"
accounted for between a third and a half of the gross national
product (GNP) of the United States, and "information workers"
earned more than 50% of labor income in the U.S. workforce. In
1982, John Naisbitt, Megatrends: Ten New Directions
Transforming Our Lives, New York, Warner Books, 1982, reported
(p. 1) that "In 1950, only about 17 percent of us worked in
information jobs. Now more than 60 percent of us work with
information."
13. Peter Drucker, "The Changed World Economy," Foreign
Affairs, Spring 1986, pp. 768-791, quote from p. 780. He also
argues (p. 777) that "If a company, an industry or a country does
not in the next quarter century sharply increase manufacturing
production and at the same time sharply reduce the blue-collar
work force, it cannot hope to remain competitive-or even to remain
'developed.'"
14. John M. Eger, "Prospects of Global 'Information War' Poses
Biggest Threat to U.S.," Los Angeles Times, January 15, 1978, Part
VII, p. 2, quoting a statement by a French Minister of Justice.
15. From a television broadcast of "Smithsonian World," KCET
(Channel 28, Los Angeles), April 16, 1991.
16. Bell, "The World and the United States in 2013," Daedalus,
Summer 1987, pp. 1-31, esp. p. 12. Italics in original.
17. Tom Stonier, "The Impact of Microprocessors on Employment,"
in Forester (ed.), 1980, pp. 303-307, quote from p. 306.
18. Walter B. Wriston, Risk and Other Four-Letter Words, Harper
& Row Publishers, New York, 1986, pp. 134-135. In a similar
vein, the 1985 collapse of the Home State Savings Bank in Ohio
led to a comment that "the world's financial markets are intertwined
as never before. When money is literally nothing but pulsed laser
beams travelling along fiber-optic pathways, a sizeable ripple in
any part of the world will be felt almost simultaneously in every
other." Charles R. Morris, "Ohio Offers a Lesson in Banking:
There Are No Safe Havens," Los Angeles Times, March 31, 1985,
Part VII, p. 3.
19. From an interview with Peter Drucker reported in the Los
Angeles Times, April 14, 1985, Part V, p. 7.
20. Wriston, 1986, pp. 120, 125-6.
21. Zuboff, 1984, pp. 394-395.
22. Don L. Boroughs et al., "Desktop dilemma," U.S. News and
World Report, December 24, 1990, pp. 46-48.
23. Ibid., p. 48.
24. Ibid., p. 48. Forester, "Editor's Introduction: Making Sense of
IT," in Forester, 1989, pp. 1-15, and several other pieces in his
volume also address what he terms "the productivity puzzle."
25. Tennant and Heilmeier, and Johnson, Jr., in Leebaert (ed.),
1990, passim.
26. While Buroughs et al., 1990 vaguely referred to this possibility,
I am more indebted to postings by Elin W. Smith in computer-
mediated conference discussions on the Whole Earth 'Lectronic
Link (WELL), Sausalito, Calif., during 1991.
27. Geza Feketekuty and Jonathan D. Aronson, "Meeting the
Challenges of the World Information Economy," The World
Economy, 3/1984, vol. 7, #1, pp. 63-86, quote from p. 63.
28. See George Shultz, "A New International Era: The American
Perspective," Address before the Pilgrims of Great Britain, London,
December 10, 1985, Department of State Bulletin, February 1986,
pp. 24- 28; and Shultz, "The Shape, Scope, and Consequences of
the Age of Information," Address before the Stanford University
Alumni Association's first International Conference, Paris, March
21, 1986, Department of State Bulletin, May 1986, pp. 40-43.
Shultz, "New Realities and New Ways of Thinking," Foreign
Affairs, Spring 1985, pp. 705-721.
29. Shultz, February 1986, p. 28.
30. Wriston, "Technology and Sovereignty," Foreign Affairs,
Winter 1988/1989, pp. 63-75; David Webster, "Direct Broadcast
Satellites: Proximity, Sovereignty, and National Identity," Foreign
Affairs, Summer 1984, pp. 1161-1174; and Willis Ware, Security,
Privacy, and National Vulnerability, RAND, Santa Monica, Calif.,
April 1981, P-6628.
31. Dedijer and Jequier (eds.), 1987, is one of the exceptions.
32. From J. Peter Grace, Burning Money--The Waste of Your Tax
Dollars, MacMillan Publishing Co., New York, 1984, as excerpted
in "'Information Gap' Loss Put At $78.6 Billion," St.Louis Post-
Dispatch, November 22, 1984, p. 1B.
33. Grace, "Bringing Efficiency to Government," Leaders, a Special
Tenth Anniversary Edition: The World in the Next Ten Years-The
Information Decade, John Diebold as Guest Editor, January-March
1987, p. 70. Among other things, the commission recommended
that an Information Management Office be created in the Executive
Office of the President.
34. This came to Congressional attention because of reporting
requirements of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, which
required the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to review
information technology systems proposed by government agencies,
and was overseen by the OMB's Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs.
35. John Purnell, "Agencies having nightmares developing
computer systems," Washington Times, June 13, 1989, p. B-5.
36. Ronald H. Hinckley, "National Security in the Information
Age," The Washington Quarterly, Spring 1986, pp. 125-140.
37. I. M. Destler, Leslie H. Gelb, and Anthony Lake, Our Own
Worst Enemy: The Unmaking of American Foreign Policy, Simon
and Schuster, New York, 1984, p. 247.
38. Stephen E. Frantzich, Computers in Congress: The Politics of
Information, Sage Publications, Beverly Hills, Calif., 1982, p. 91.
Also see Frantzich, "Communications and Congress," in Gerald
Benjamin (ed.), The Communications Revolution in Politics,
Proceedings of The Academy of Political Science, Vol. 34, No. 4,
1982, pp. 88-101.
39. Stanley J. Heginbotham, "Foreign Policy Information for
Congress: Patterns of Fragmentation and Advocacy," The
Washington Quarterly, Summer 1987, pp. 149-162, esp. p. 154.
40. Frantzich, 1982, p. 234.
41. Lee Sproull and Sara Kiesler, Connections: New Ways of
Working in the Networked Organization, The MIT Press,
Cambridge, Mass., 1991, pp. 15-16. Also see Sproull and Kiesler,
"Computers, Networks and Work," Scientific American, September
1991, pp. 116-123.
42. Elizabeth L. Eisenstein, "Some Conjectures about the Impact of
Printing on Western Society and Thought: A Preliminary Report,"
Journal of Modern History, March 1968, pp. 1-56, quote from p 8.
43. Gilder, 1989, p. 55, paraphrasing Peter Drucker.
44. H. A. Innis, Empire and Communications, Oxford University
Press, London, 1950, discusses the communications methods that
lay behind the organization and administration of the ancient
Egyptian, Babylonian, Greek, and Roman empires. Yet Philip E.
Converse, "Power and the Monopoly of Information," American
Political Science Review, March 1985, pp. 1-9, finds (pp. 3-4) that
"the whole construct of information seems largely a twentieth-
century notion.... It is scarcely isolated as an entity until studies of
propaganda began in our century." Karl W. Deutch, The Nerves of
Government: Models of Political Communication and Control, The
Free Press of Glencoe, New York, 1963, emphasized information
in political analysis before the technology revolution began.
45. Alvin Toffler, Future Shock, Random House Inc., New York,
1970, deserves credit for being one of the first works to foresee that
the information revolution would have a major impact on
bureaucracy. His concept of what lay beyond bureaucracy, which he
termed "ad- hocracy," has much in common with my concept of
cyberocracy.
46. Beniger, 1986, pp. 19, 20, and passim. This impressive work
identifies bureaucracy as a technology of control, and shows how it
integrated office technologies, like telephones and typewriters, for
processing and distributing information.
47. The term "technocracy" was coined in 1919 and popularized in
the mid 1930s. See Bell, "Notes on the Post-Industrial Society (I),"
The Public Interest, Winter 1967, pp. 24-35, passim.
48. Smith, "Technology, Identity, and the Information Machine,"
Daedalus, Summer 1986, pp. 155-169.
49. On the importance of design issues, see Donald A. Norman,
The Design of Everyday Things, Doubleday/Currency, New York,
1989 (previously published as The Psychology of Everyday Things,
Basic Books Inc., New York, 1988).
50. John Walker, President of Autodesk, Inc., "Remarks for the
Windows Press Conference," March 10, 1992.
51. Mark Weiser, "The Computer of the 21st Century," Scientific
American, September 1991, pp. 94-104.
52. Classic treatments include Edward R. Tufte, The Visual
Display of Quantitative Information, Graphics Press, Cheshire, CT,
1983, and Tufte, Envisioning Information, Graphics Press,
Cheshire, CT, 1990, Also, Richard Mark Friedhof, Visualization
(The Second Computer Revolution), Harry N. Abrams Inc., New
York, 1989.
53. Mark A. Clarkson, "An Easier Interface," BYTE, February
1991, pp. 277-282.
54. Walker, 1992.
55. Cover story on "PCs: What the Future Holds," Business Week,
August 12, 1991, esp. p. 59.
56. John S. Quarterman, The Matrix: Computer Networks and
Conferencing Systems Worldwide, Digital Press, Digital
Equipment Corporation, 1990. "All of the networks and
conferencing systems that are interconnected for mail transfer form
a worldwide metanetwork, the Matrix, which is the subject of this
book." (p. 125) Peter J. Denning, "Worldnet," American Scientist,
September-October 1989, pp. 432-434. William R. Johnson, Jr.,
"Anything, Anywhere, Anytime: The Future of Networking," in
Leebaert (ed.), 1991, pp. 150-175.
57. Robert W. Lucky, "In a Very Short Time: What Is Coming Next
in Telecommunications," in Leebaert (ed.), p. 348. Other analysts
put the current carrying capacity much lower, e.g., 100 million bits
per second.
58. Roger Karraker, "Highways of the Mind," Whole Earth Review,
#70, Spring 1991, pp. 4-9.
59. Mike Antoniak, "The Electronic Front," Mobile Office, June
1991, pp. 36-43, esp. p. 43.
60. Peter Grier, "The Data Weapon," Government Executive, June
1992, pp. 20ff.
61. I do not know what has happened with this plan since the
break-up of the Soviet Union.
62. Frederick Williams, The New Telecommunications:
Infrastructure for the Information Age, The Free Press, New York,
1991, provides a good overview. Most ISDN initiatives involve
waiting for fiber-optic cables, but Mitch Kapor and other leaders of
the Electronic Frontier Foundation propose using new compression
techniques across the current copper-wire cables to create a
"Personal ISDN" system to benefit large masses of the population
in the near future. For one write-up, see John Perry Barlow, "The
Great Work, Communications of the ACM, January 1992, pp.25-
30.
63. Johnson, Jr., in Leebaert (ed.), p. 168.
64. Examples of widely used databases, especially for searching
through periodical literature, include Dialogue Information
Service's DIALOG system and Mead Data Central's NEXIS system.
65. John Markoff, "For the PC User, Vast Libraries," The New
York Times, July 3, 1991, pp. C1, C3.
66. See David Gelernter, Mirror Worlds, or the Day Software Puts
the Universe in a Shoebox...How It Will Happen and What It Will
Mean, New York: Oxford University Press, 1991. I am indebted to
Bob Anderson for pointing out the notion of "reality windows"
whereby one may be able to view through cameras spread here and
there.
67. Bob Ryan, "Dynabook Revisited with Alan Kay," Byte,
February 1991, p. 207.
68. Denos C. Gazis, "Brief Time, Long March: The Forward Drive
of Computer Technology," in Leebaert (ed.), 1991, pp. 41-76, esp.
p. 69.
69. From a cover story, "Computer Confusion: A Jumble of
Competing, Conflicting Standards Is Chilling the Market,"
Business Week, June 10, 1991, p. 76.
70. Eben Shapiro, "CD's Store the Data, But Sifting's a Chore," The
New York Times, August 4, 1991, F-9.
71. Lucky in Leebaert (ed.), 1991, p. 366.
72. The term is generally credited to a seminal "cyberpunk" novel
by William Gibson, Neuromancer, Ace Books, 1984. Its unusual
influence extends to professional works like Quarterman, 1990,
whose title, The Matrix, is from the novel; Michael Benedikt (ed.),
Cyberspace: First Steps, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1991;
and to conferences like "Civilizing Cyberspace: Minding the
Matrix," sponsored by Computer Professionals for Social
Responsibility, at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
Washington, D.C., June 26-27, 1991. A newsletter Virtual Reality
Report (Meckler Corp.) keeps track of definitions of "cyberspace"
and a related term, "virtual reality." Other terms that get used
include "noosphere," "infosphere," and "technosphere," which
appear in the writings of Teilhard de Chardin, Kenneth Boulding,
and Alvin Toffler. These all have broader meanings than the
"Matrix" and "worldnet" (footnote 6); the Matrix, as the network of
networks, is presumably where cyberspace will be constructed.
73. Howard Rheingold, Virtual Reality, Summit Books, Simon &
Schuster Inc., New York, 1991, is the latest, best introduction. He
is writing a new book on "virtual communities." For a preview, see
Rheingold, "A Slice of Life in My Virtual Community," June 1992,
draft, available on the WELL. An earlier volume by Rheingold,
Tools for Thought: The People and Ideas Behind the Next
Computer Revolution, Simon & Schuster Inc., New York, 1985,
was also quite good.
74. Michael L. Dertouzos, "Communications, Computers and
Networks," Scientific American, September 1991, pp. 62-69, quote
from p. 69.
75. Ithiel de Sola Pool, Technologies of Freedom, The Belknap
Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1983, quotes
from p. 2.
76. Pool, 1983, p. 28.
77. Pool, 1983, p. 10. His points resound throughout Brand, 1987.
78. arraker, Spring 1991, pp. 4-9.
79. Letter to the editor by James Bowery, Whole Earth Review,
#71, Summer 1991, p. 133.
80. Chip Morningstar and F. Randall Farmer, "Cyberspace
Colonies," The Second International Conference on Cyberspace:
Collected Abstracts, Group for the Study of Virtual Systems,
Center for Cultural Studies, University of California, Santa Cruz,
April 19-20, 1991, pp. 110-111.
81. From my notes on the talk by Morningstar and Farmer,
"Cyberspace Colonies," Second International Conference on
Cyberspace, University of California, Santa Cruz, April 20, 1991.
While I think that the metaphor is illuminating, some listeners were
disturbed that it might imply the exploitation and subjugation of
minorities.
82. Sheldon F. Wolin, Politics and Vision: Continuity and
Innovation in Western Political Thought, Little, Brown and
Company, Boston, 1960, pp. 15-16. His statement continues as
follows: "Although most of these are the traditional categories of
meta-physicians, the political theorist does not state his
propositions or formulate his concepts in the same manner as a
metaphysician. The concern of the theorist has not been with space
and time as categories referring to the world of natural phenomena,
but to the world of political phenomena; that is to the world of
political nature. If he cared to be precise and explicit in these
matters, he would write of 'political' space, 'political' time, and so
forth. Admittedly, few if any writers have employed this form of
terminology. Rather, the political theorist has used synonyms;
instead of political space he may have written about the city, the
state, or the nation; instead of time, he may have referred to history
or tradition; instead of energy, he may have spoken about power."
83. There is a growing literature about the new technology's effects
on social space and time orientations. Bell, "Teletext and
Technology: New Networks of Knowledge and Information in Post-
Industrial Society," Encounter, April 1977, pp. 9-29, esp. p. 26ff.,
summarizes points he made in the 1960s and 1970s. Among recent
studies, Pool, Technologies Without Boundaries: On
Telecommunications in a Global Age, edited posthumously by Eli
M. Noam, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1990,
praises the technology for "crumbling the walls of distance." Jeremy
Rifkin, Time Wars: The Primary Conflict in Human History, A
Touchstone Book, Simon & Schuster Inc., New York, 1989, argues
that the technology has negative effects on people's use of time and
their relationship to the world.
84. Marshall McLuhan, Quentin Fiore, and Jerome Agel, The
Medium Is the Massage, Random House, Inc., New York, 1967, pp.
16, 63.
85. In saying this, I am going against the grain of other forecasts
(e.g., Rifkin, 1989) that computerization will continue to obliterate
people's sense of the past.
86. Bell, April 1977, pp. 26-27. Also, Bell, Spring 1967, pp. 108-
109. Although time and space perceptions are not explicitly
mentioned, Theodore Lowi, "Government and Politics: Blurring of
Sector Lines; Rise of New Elites--From One Vantage Point," in
Information Technology: Some Critical Implications for Decision
Makers, The Conference Board, New York, 1972, pp. 131-148, and
a similar, reprinted 1975 article by Lowi, "The Political Impact of
Information Technology," in Forester (ed.), 1980, pp. 453-472,
identify many of the same implications as Bell.
87. I do not know where the term "post-bureaucratic" comes from,
but Toffler, Powershift: Knowledge, Wealth, and Violence at the
Edge of the 21st Century, Bantam Books, New York, 1990, pp.
166, 182ff. uses it.
88. One of the exceptions is Zuboff, 1984.
89. Bell's writings note this. Also see Lowi, in The Conference
Board, 1972, Lowi, in Forester (ed.), 1980, and Donald Michael,
"The Individual: Enriched or Impoverished? Master or Servant?," in
The Conference Board, 1972, pp. 37-59. Peter F. Drucker, The
New Realities: In Government and Politics, In Economics and
Business, In Society and World View, Harper and Row, Publishers,
New York, 1989, pp. 180-186 and passim, provides a recent
analysis.
90. Bell, "The Social Framework of the Information Society," in
Forester (ed.), 1980, pp. 500-549, quote from p. 543.
91. Robert Reich, "Secession of the Successful," The New York
Times Magazine, January 20, 1991, pp. 16-17, 42-45, quote from p.
42. For elaboration, see Reich, The Work of Nations: Preparing
Ourselves for 21st-Century Capitalism, Alfed A. Knopf, Inc., New
York , 1991.
92. Reich, January 20, 1991, p. 45. Also, see Zuboff, 1984, on
management-labor differences.
93. Carl H. Builder, The Future of Nuclear Deterrence, RAND,
Santa Monica, Calif., P-7702, February 1991, foresees the
formation of "transnational factions" and "transnational
communities" of scientists who may help press for peace. The
formation of "epistemic communities" of scientists and activists
located in different countries has become a subject of analysis in
the scholarly journal International Organization.
94. My familiarity with these themes benefitted from computer-
mediated discussions in "EnviroBioInfoWholeEarth Organizational
Structures," Topic 468, the Information Conference, on the WELL,
Sausalito, Calif., during July-August 1991. Postings by Mitsuharu
Hadeishi and Steven Rosell werre particularly useful to me.
Writings by Tom Peters were referred to during the discussion.
Also, numerous articles in the Harvard Business Review over the
past five to ten years address these themes.
95. Toffler, 1970, 1990. Drucker, 1989, and Drucker, "The Coming
of the New Organization," Harvard Business Review, January-
February 1988, reprinted in Revolution in Real Time: Managing
Information Technology in the 1990s, A Harvard Business Review
Book, 1990, pp. 3-15. Lynda M. Applegate, James I. Cash, Jr., and
D. Quinn Mills, "Information Technology and Tomorrow's
Business Manager," Harvard Business Review, November-
December 1988, reprinted in Revolution in Real Time, 1990, pp.
33-48. Bell, Spring 1967, p. 114, and Lowi, in The Conference
Board, 1972, p. 144, and Lowi, in Forester (ed.), 1980, p. 464, also
foresaw that traditional bureaucratic forms would give way to new
models, but they were more circumspect and less optimistic than
other analysts.
96. George P. Huber, "A Theory of the Effects of Advanced
Information Technologies on Organizational Design, Intelligence,
and Decision Making," Academy of Management Review, Vol. 15,
No. 1, 1990, pp. 47-71, esp. p. 57.
97. Warren E. Walker, Organizational Decision Support Systems:
Centralized Support for Decentrallized Organizations, P-7749,
RAND, Santa Monica, Calif., 1991.
98. Gelernter, David, Mirror Worlds, or the Day Software Puts the
Universe in a Shoebox...How It Will Happen and What It Will
Mean, Oxford University Press, New York, 1991, p.52.
99. Arno Penzias, Information and Ideas: Managing in a High-Tech
World, A Touchstone Book, Simon & Schuster Inc., New York,
1990, p. 191.
100. Lowi, in The Conference Board, 1972, p. 148.
101. Anita Schiller, "Shifting Boundaries in Information," Library
Journal, April 1, 1981, pp. 705-709.
102. The blurring of public-private boundaries, and of the
boundaries between domestic and foreign policy, has also been
pointed out often in the literature on transnational interdependence
since the 1970s. That literature recognizes the information
revolution as one of the factors explaining the growth of global
interdependence.
103. Roger Benjamin, The Limits of Politics: Collective Goods and
Political Change in Postindustrial Societies, The University of
Chicago Press, Chicago, 1980. Benjamin, "Some Public Policy
Implications of the Information Revolution," in Meheroo
Jussawalla, Tadayuki Okuma,Toshihiro Araki (eds.), Information
Technology and Global Interdependence, East- West Center and
The Japan Institute of International Affairs, Greenwood Press,
Westport, Connecticut, 1989, pp.47-53.
104. Bell, Summer 1987, p. 14.
105. Bell, in Forester (ed.), 1980, p. 512. Benjamin and Bell cite
economists as sources for their thinking, including Kenneth Arrow.
106. This may mean that transaction-cost analysis--the approach to
organizational economics that germinates with Ronald Coase and
culminates in the writings of Oliver Williamson--should be
modified, so that the concept of networks is added to its traditional
emphasis on the concepts of markets and hierarchies.
107. The literature on these points is vast. Important new additions
include: Thomas W. Malone and John F. Rockart, "Computers,
Networks and the Corporation," Scientific American, September
1991, pp. 128-136; and Lee Sproull and Sara Keisler, "Computers,
Networks and Work," Scientific American, September 1991, pp.
116-123. Also see work by Tora Bikson, notably Tora K. Bikson et
al., Networked Information Technology and the Transition to
Retirement: A Field Experiment, R-3690- MF, RAND, Santa
Monica, CA, 1991.
108. The phrase in quotation marks is from Lowi's writings.
109. Webster, Summer 1984, p. 1162.
110. The excellent book by Stewart Brand, The Media Lab:
Inventing the Future at MIT, Penguin Books, New York, 1988, p.
263, notes that the machines may serve the goal of humanism if
they enhance both people's connectedness and their autonomy.
111. Michael, "Too Much of a Good Thing? Dilemmas of an
Information Society," Vital Speeches of the Day, November 1,
1983, pp. 38-42, quote from p. 41.
112. Most readers forget that Big Brother was not all-seeing. Only
about 10 percent of the people were monitored at any time.
113. James Ducker, "Electronic information-impact of the
database," Futures, April 1985, pp. 164-169, quote from p. 167,
who adds (p. 167) that "A similar argument holds good for the
developing countries seeking to compete economically and
politically with the developed nations, and with the multinational
companies...." Myrna Oliver, "Fast, Efficient Computers: Electronic
Legal Eagles," Los Angeles Times, April 19, 1985, pp. 1, 27,
reports that computerized services enable small law firms to do
research that was previously feasible only for large law firms.
114. George Gilder, Microcosm: The Quantum Revolution in
Economics and Technology, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1989,
p. 346.
115. George Shultz, "New Realities and New Ways of Thinking,"
Foreign Affairs, Spring 1985, pp. 705-721, quote from p. 716.
116. Tom Stonier, "The Microelectronic Revolution, Soviet
Political Structure, and The Future of East/West Relations," The
Political Quarterly, April-June 1983, pp.137-151.
117. Steven C. Bankes and Carl H. Builder, The Etiology of
European Change, RAND, Santa Monica, Calif., P-7693,
December 1990. Donald Wilhelm, Global Communications and
Political Power, Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, 1990.
118. Roger E. Levien, "The Civilizing Currency: Documents and
Their Revolutionary Technologies," in Leebaert (ed.), 1991, p. 210.
119. The classic studies are Elizabeth L. Eisenstein, "Some
Conjectures about the Impact of Printing on Western Society and
Thought: A Preliminary Report," Journal of Modern History,
March 1968, pp. 1-56, and the resulting book, Eisenstein, The
Printing Press as an Agent of Change, 2 vols., Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, England, 1979. On the expansion of
empires, see Innis, 1950.
120. Bell, May-June 1979, p. 36.
121. The revolutionary change from the Shah to the Ayatollah
Khomeini in Iran is an example where too much information of a
modernizing nature may have helped induce a reaction and a return
to a traditional Islamic preference to exclude outside information.
Yet it should also be noted that in his quest for power, Khomeini
took advantage of the information revolution by using smuggled
cassette tapes to spread his message among the Iranian people.
122. Jacques Ellul, The Technological Bluff, William B. Eerdmans
Publishing Company, Grand Rapids, Michigan, 1990, p.76.
123. William H. Dutton, "The Political Implications of
Communication Technology: Challenge to Power?" draft,
September 1988, prepared for a chapter in Report from Namur:
Landscapes for an Information Technology, forthcoming. His point
is based on Kenneth L. Kraemer and William H. Dutton, "The
Interests Served by Technological Reform: The Case of
Computing," Administration and Society, May 1979, pp. 80-106.
Kenneth Laudon also termed information technology a "malleable"
tool in Laudon, Computers and Bureaucratic Reform: The Political
Functions of Urban Information Systems, John Wiley, New York,
1974, p. 311. Also see Dutton, "Technology and the Federal
System," in Benjamin (ed.), 1982, pp. 109-130. Kraemer, "Strategic
Computing and Administrative Reform," in Charles Dunlop and
Rob Kling, Computerization and Controversy: Value Conflicts and
Social Choices, Academic Press, Inc., Boston, 1991, pp. 167-180,
finds (p. 167) that "information technology has tended to reinforce
existing organizational arrangements and power distributions in
organizations."
124. Lowi, in The Conference Board, 1972; Michael, in The
Conference Board, 1972; and John P. Crecine and Ronald D.
Brunner, "Government and Politics: A Fragmented Society, Hard to
Govern Politically-From Another Vantage Point," in The
Conference Board, 1972, pp. 149-181.
125. Richard N. Neustadt, "Electronic Politics," in Forester (ed.),
1985, pp. 561-568, quote from p. 561.
126. Neustadt, in Forester (ed.), 1985, pp. 564, 567. Groups that he
felt had most exploited the new media included the churches.
127. David Burnham, The Rise of the Computer State, Random
House, New York, 1983, esp. Chapter 3. Kenneth C. Laudon,
Dossier Society: Value Changes in the Design of National
Information Systems, CORPS (Computing, organizations, Policy,
and Society) Series, Columbia University Press, New York, 1986.
Bell, May-June 1979, p. 32, also warned about these points.
128. Heard on television program "Smithsonian World," KCET
(Channel 28, Los Angeles), April 16, 1991.
129. Burnham, 1983, quotes from pp. 9, 234.
130. Willis Ware of RAND writes extensively about this. For
example, see Willis H. Ware, "Contemporary Privacy Issues,"
Presented at the National Conference on Integrating Values in
Computing, New Haven, CT, August 1991. Recent specific issues
include the demise of "MarketPlace: Household," an initiative of
the Lotus Development Corporation to sell CD-ROMs full of
household information, and the start-up of "Information America,"
a little-known enterprise that can cull through all kinds of on-line
records about individuals and organizations.
131. Weiser, September 1991, p. 104, but he also says that "A well-
implemented version of ubiquitous computing could even afford
better privacy protection than exists today."
132. Ellul, 1990, pp. 384-385, 386-387.
133. Bertram Gross, Friendly Fascism: The New Face of Power in
America, South End Press, Boston, 1980, p. 51.
134. Ronfeldt, "China and the Doubled-Edged Sword of
Information Technology," in Ronfeldt, Three Dark Pieces, RAND,
Santa Monica, Calif., P-7607, January 1990, pp. 5-8.
135. Vijay Gurbaxani et al., "Government as the Driving Force
Toward the Information Society: National Computer Policy in
Singapore," The Information Society, Vol. 7, 1990, pp. 155-185.
136. Steven Levy, Artificial Life: The Quest for a New Creation,
Pantheon Books, New York, 1992, looks worth recommending.
137. Joe Weizenbaum, "Where Are We Going?: Questions for
Simon," in Forester (ed.), 1980, pp. 434-438, quote from p. 438.
138. I base this on my scanning of various writings in Forester
(ed.), 1980, 1985, and 1989, passim.
139. For example, Herbert A. Simon, "What Computers Mean for
Man and Society," in Forester (ed.), 1980, pp. 419-433.
140. Critiques include Fred Block and Larry Hirschhorn, "New
Productive Forces and the Contradictions of Contemporary
Capitalism: A Post-Industrial Perspective," History and Society, #7,
May-June 1979, pp. 363-395; and Tony Solomonides and Les
Levidow (eds.), Compulsive Technology: Computers As Culture,
Radical Science Series, #18, Free Association Books, London,
1985.
141. Converse, March 1985, p. 8.
142. Not just Marxist-Leninist regimes but all totalitarian regimes,
rightist and leftist, show similar patterns of information control.
The examples include Francois "Papa Doc" Duvalier's regime in
Haiti, and Fidel Castro's regime in Cuba. A related aspect was the
attempt in the 1972s and 1980s by some Communist and Third
World nations to establish through UNESCO a "new world
information order." Its protagonists proposed international
standards and a licensing system for journalists that would have
subordinated news agencies to government dictates. They also
proposed to have UNESCO finance improvements in the
communications facilities of liberation movements.
143. Though I lack data, a similar concern to make use of the new
information technologies may explain why Cuba had an Institute
for Cybernetic Socialism in the 1980s.
144. From "Book on Economics Hit as Neo-Malthusian," The
Current Digest of the Soviet Press, vol. 30, No. 14, May 3, 1978, p.
6. Another Soviet writer, I. Bestuchew-Lada, The World in the
Year 2,000, Dreisam- Verlag, Freiburg, West Germany, 1984, p.
109, expressed a different view: "Can an electronic machine think
like a human being? The question itself reflects the ridiculous
arrogance so typical for the representatives of the species Homo
Sapiens. Contemporary man honestly thinks that his thinking is
thorough, logical and original. It does not even occur to him how
stereotyped, confused and primitive his thinking is with few
exceptions. If the computer could feel hurt, it would take offense at
such a question. The machine can not only think like a human
being; it can think much more thoroughly, logically, and
originally." (translation from German)
145. Marxism-Leninism was not the only reason. Culture and
tradition have disposed Russian rulers since long before the
Russian Revolution to seal their nation against foreign influence
and impose strong press and other informational controls over the
local population.
146. See the discussion about information and capital in Section II,
and the citations to works by Bell, Drucker, Toffler, and Wriston.
More to the point, international communication theorist Howard
Frederick says that "If Karl Marx were alive today, he would not
write Das Kapital, but 'Die Information.'" Howard Frederick, Global
Communication and International Relations, Brooks/Cole
Publishing Company, Pacific Grove, Calif., 1993 forthcoming, p.
208.
147. My point about cybernets may be related to Bell's point
(Section 5) about situses of knowledge elites. Cybernets may be
interconnected situses.
148. The term is from Builder.
149. Ware, 1991.
150. Michael Marien, "Some Questions for the Information
Society," in Forester (ed.), 1985, pp. 651, 657-8. He also claims (p.
657) that the lack of communication among researchers and
policymakers is "largely due to our obsolete industrial era colleges
and universities, which encourage attention to small and
'manageable' questions, technical questions that result in 'hard'
answers, and questions that conform to the configurations of the
established disciplines and professions."
151. Gilder, 1989, provides an engaging survey of the ideas of
Shannon and numerous other scientists who contributed to the
development of the computer and related technologies. I have not
read Shannon's writings and take my remarks from comments in
various sources.
152. Norbert Wiener, The Human Use of Human Beings:
Cybernetics and Society, Houghton Mifflin, Riverside, Boston,
1950. Also, Wiener, Cybernetics: or Control and Communication
in the Animal and the Machine, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.,
1948 (2nd ed. 1961).
153. Beniger, 1990, p. 38, and generally, Chapters 1-3. He argues
that all organized systems, including living organisms as well as
societies, depend at their core on information processing and its
control.
154. For another agenda, see Steve Bankes and Carl Builder et al.,
"Seizing the Moment: Harnessing the Information Technologies,"
The Information Society, vol. 8, no. 1, 1992, pp. 1-59.
155. Bankes has proposed a similar idea. Dedijer and Jequier
(eds.), 1987--a little noted book that deserves attention--contains
many useful points about the possible relationships between a
society's information infrastructure and its political, economic, and
social development.
156. See the author's proposal, "CONAMI: A Council on North
American Information," Appendix B to Bankes and Builder, 1992,
pp. 31- 34.
157. See John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, Cyberwar Is Coming!,
P- 7795, RAND, Santa Monica, Calif., 1992.
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