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Michael Foucalt's relativist stance
DOC ((( Y(( 23* POWER, GENEALOGY AND POST-MODERNISM IN FOUCAULT
Michel Foucault's notoriously relativist (some would say "nihilist") position has elicited attacany critics. His professedly "post-
modernist" stance has produced negative reactions ranging from puzzlement to exasperation [1]. Becamodernism rejects humanist values, it would appear that Foucault must abandon the quests forete rt rfreedom. Furthermore, Foucault refused to be characterized as a structuralist, thusreecin te hereicl alternative frequently embraced by the intellectual French Left of the las tw
decades [2]. Foucault instead opts for a more humble theoretical stance than either structuralism oism grounded in absolute subjectivity. His position claims to be localized and perspectival ihu eore to a theory of historical totality or universal truth. But the critical intent ofFocalts or sem t belie this denial of access to trans-historical values. His painstaking "gneaogial"and"arheoogial"inquiries into the domains of human power, knowledge, and subjectiviy ca suceed s crtiqu onl to he etent that they uncover failings and injustices. But to idenify
injustice is to be acquainted with justice; to criticize untruth is to value truth. Hence, the
_____________________
1. See James Bernauer for several responses that find Foucault to be childish and narcissistic.r, "Michel Foucault's Ecstatic Thinking," Philosophy and Social Criticism, v. 12, Summer, 97
2. See Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneuticgo, University of Chicago Press, 1982) ch. 3.
unmasking of domination and deception, with which much of Foucault's work is concerned, must see itsntributing to a more truthful understanding and a more realized freedom than exist currently T anan s Foucault does, that he is a "specific," rather than a "global" or
totalizing intellectual, [3] whose work appeals to nothing absolute, leads to the apparent contradic one who denies the existence of truth is offering it, and one who denies the reality of theidvda sseking freedom.
When Foucault argues that knowledge, in its modern manifestation, "follows the advance of power,that the modern subject is an effect of the strategies of "discipline" and "bio-
power," [5] he risks charges of self-refutation and incoherence, for how are we to take his own theoronouncements? If Foucault is correct, then his own position is merely another effect or staeyo oe. But if his position is an unmasking of the hidden operations of power, and is for tatreso a istnc o a truth not subject to the control of power's schemes, it must be that his nalsisof he owe/knwlege elations is mistaken. For according to Foucault:
_____________________
3. Michel Foucault, "Truth and Power," in Paul Rabinow, The Foucault Reader (New York, Panthe 1984) p. 73.
4. Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish The Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan (New tage Books, 1979) and Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, v. 1, trans. Robert Hurle NwYr,Rnom House, 1978).
5. Ibid.
...truth isn't outside power, or
lacking in power: contrary to a
myth whose history and functions
would repay further study, truth
isn't the reward of free spirits,
the child of protracted solitude,
nor the privilege of those who have
succeeded in liberating themselves.
Truth is a thing of this world:
it is produced only by virtue of
multiple forms of constraint. And
it induces regular effects of power.
Each society has its own regime of
truth, its 'general politics' of
truth: that is, the types of
discourse which it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms
and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false state-
ments, the means by which each is
sanctioned; the techniques and
procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the status
of those who are charged with
saying what counts as true [6].
It appears that Foucault must either give up the relativist claim that power sets up "regimes of truh then determine the field of possible discourse, or he must settle for a theoretical positinwihamt omplicity with the power/knowledge system in which it functions, thus compromising hs riicl ostin.
It should be noted, however, that this "all or nothing" demand that Foucault employ absolute andl values, on the one hand, or none at all, on the other, is hardly a new position. To requieta ocutgive us a general theory of
_____________________
6. "Truth and Power," Rabinow Reader, p. 72-3.
the operations of power/knowledge, and that he account for his ground as the subject of a truth- fule or a revolutionary practice, lest he be charged with incoherence and denied the capaci- tyt ee rtqe, is to assume a position reminiscent of the epistemological paradox raised by Meno[7, orwhm nolegecould only be either total or impossible. Without appeal to either absolute(orat eas trns-istricl) orms and truths, critique appears impotent and unfounded. Thus, accrdin to ichal Wazer:
We are to withdraw our belief in,
say, the truth of penology and
then support...what?...At this
point, it seems to me, Foucault's
position is simply incoherent [8].
Or, as Nancy Fraser asks:
Whence, then, does Foucault's
work, his description of 'the
carceral society,' for example,
derive its critical force?...Does
he presuppose some alternative metaphysic, say, one of bodies?
Or is his critique radically anti-foundationalist and if so,
to what sort of justification
can it lay claim? [9]
_____________________
7. See Plato, Meno, trans. W.K.C. Guthrie, Collected Dialogues, ed. Hamilton and Cairns (Prniversity Press, 1961) pp. 353-385.
8. Michael Walzer, "The Politics of Michel Foucault," in Foucault A Critical Reader, ed. Hoy ( Basil Blackwell, 1986) pp. 353-385.
9. Nancy Fraser, "Foucault's Body-Language: A Post-Humanist Political Rhetoric?" Salmagundi,5, 61, p. 56.
The suggestion I would like to make is that, like Meno's paradox, criticisms along the above lino recognize the possibility of an alternative to the extremes of either nihilistic relativis rfudtoaist absolutism. This alternative position, as I hope to show, derives from Foucaults enalgialmeho, hich allows him to appeal to such humanist values as truth and freedom, withut herby laiingillgitmat access to absolutes. There is therefore a degree to which I agree ith harls Talors grap ofthe roblm:
You would think that implicit
in all this was the notion of
two goods which need rescuing,
and which the analyses help to
rescue: freedom and truth...But
Foucault seems to repudiate both.
The idea of liberating truth is a
profound illusion. There is no
truth which can be espoused, de-
fended, rescued against systems of
power. On the contrary, each such
system defines its own variant of
truth [10].
In order to make clear the rationale behind Foucault's repudiation and simultaneous use of the valuedom and truth, I will now turn to a discussion of his historical methodology. How is it tha eelg a e used as a critical tactic?
Foucault's historical method is self-consciously modeled after that used by
_____________________
10. Charles Taylor, "Foucault on Freedom and Truth," Hoy Reader, p. 70
Nietzsche--genealogy [11]. Traditional historiography sees the origin of an historical phenomenon ang a pure and pristine essence which then unfolds in a continuous manner. This concept of orgnluiyadpurity encodes the historian's belief in transcendental essences behind historical dveopen. Hitoicl nowledge, in uncovering these essences, makes clear the meaning of the preset a th invitblereslt f te operations of necessary laws. The effect of traditional historiogaphyis terefre acomfrtin legtimaion of the present, for the present appears as the culminatin of deveopmen in acordace wih thedictaes of a universal and trans-historical reason.
In contrast to the above "Platonic" view, genealogy sees in historical development only "the iro necessity shaking the dice-box of chance" [12]. Thus, genealogy, in refusing to accept metpyisa h ruth of history, searches for the errors and accidents, the lowly details and ironicreeral, hedipaites and differences at the beginnings of historical phenomena.
What is found at the historical
beginning of things is not
inviolable identity of their
origin; it is the dissension
of other things. It is disparity [13].
_____________________
11. Michel Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History," Rabinow Reader, pp. 76-100.
12. Nietzsche, Dawn, 130, quoted by Foucault in "Nietzsche," Rabinow Reader, p. 89.
13. Ibid., p. 79
We can therefore laugh at the origins of human values and practices, as we find that truth is ofof error, that we owe the concept of freedom to the ruling classes, that humanity evolved frmteae[4. The critical function performed by this attitude of irreverence towards human histoy s bvou. Th aciental nature of the present, and its irrational development out of absurd beinnngsmaks amoceryof he elf-
congratulatory view which sees the present as the fulfillment of past promises.
History is looked upon by the genealogist as the "body of a development" [15]. The concepts "E" and "Herkunft" are therefore more appropriate to genealogy than is "Ursprung," or "origin. "eknt ens "stock" or "descent," and thus refers to the unique and various factors and event ot f hih rie he"traits" or marks, the bodily peculiarities of a phenomenon. Thus, for examle,ourcurousmodrn esie t probe into and to speak about our "sexuality" descends from Catholi conessinal ractce o eliitin sexal secrets [16]. "Entstehung," which is also commonly transated s "orgin" s beter unerstod, acordin to Foucault, as "emergence," the moment of "arising [17]. Geneaogy, i analying th emergnce, mst avod the pitfall of the metaphysical historicalmethod hich ses the pesent a the tlos ofthe pas. Whatemerges for the traditional historia is a puposefulnss seekig realiztion in ts preset functin. But he relationship between a hitorical dvelopmentand the ned which t
_____________________
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
16. See History of Sexuality.
17. Foucault,"Nietzsche" Rabinow Reader p. 83.
answers is not teleological. According to Foucault, this relationship is rather the result of a "seubjugations" [18]. Thus, genealogy again de-legitimates and de-necessitates the present. h eeaino conflict and difference at the origin of fundamental human practices and beliefs cano bt el t mketh status quo appear to be radically unjustified by rational standards. The eplaatins or he merenc ofa development which we regard as valuable and necessary (e,g., the pisonsystm, te worisoe naure f ou sexual identities) in terms of accidental factors and dispaate ams poes a riticl chalengeto ou selfunderstanding. Genealogy thus speaks with a critica voicewithou appeaing totrans-istorial or bsolut values. It is quite enough that our curren humanit concetions o justic, humandignity and trth be cnfronted with their origins in absurity and he violece of waring powrs.
The emphasis which genealogy places on conflict and power is not, however, unproblematic. In facses another aspect of the question of Foucault's theoretical consistency. Foucault, in keepn ihhsdnal of access to trans-historical absolutes, professes to be a nominalist with respec t pwe [9] ls, s we have seen, genealogy refuses to accept teleological explanations for th emrgece f hstoica deeloments. However, Foucault appears to give a functionalist account ofthe ise f diciplnarypowe to ominnce at the end of the classical period [20]. This account tkes
_____________________
18. Ibid.
19. History of Sexuality, p. 93.
20. Discipline and Punish, part two.
as basic certain historical needs, among them, the need of power to expand. Discipline appears to hut over the old economies of power because it offered the greatest opportunity for the expaneo oe. hs was due to its infiltration of political and economic institutions, its "embodimen" n hemaeralhitoical processes of the time. Thus power grew by answering to needs created b oter istricl dvelpmets: the increase in population, and the growth in society's productive apablitis [2]. his istoical"conuncture" required a means to regulate the increasingly largeand mbile opulaion, nd a echnoogy fr theadjustment of this population to the change in the poductie appaatus. These eeds wre metby thenewly merging scientific "disciplines," which Foucult, th genealgist, dscribesas the physicsor anatmy," i.., the body of power [22]. Far frombeing a traightfrward exlanationfor the mergenceof discilinary pwer (i.e., that discipline ucceeded o the extnt that i was funcional forthe growt of the frces of poduction), Foucault' functionaism attribtes as muc explanatoy weight t the needsof power a to those f economy.
In fact, the two processes--the
accumulation of men and the
accumulation of capital--cannot
be separated; it would not have
been possible to solve the problem
of the accumulation of men without
the growth of an apparatus of
production capable of both sus-
_____________________
21. Ibid., p. 218.
22. Ibid., p. 220.
taining them and using them;
conversely, the techniques that
made the cumulative multiplicity
of men useful accelerated the
accumulation of capital...Each
makes the other possible and
necessary; each provides a model
for the other [23].
Thus power is, according to Foucault, irreducible to either the scientific disciplinary institutionspolitical/economic apparatuses within which it functions and through which it is exercised. oe sceie as a force in its own right, able to make use of material history, and thus attribuedwih sgnfian eplanatory role in Foucault's work.
But is this an anthropomorphization of power? How are we to understand power's apparent intentiits ability to enact schemes and "strategies," without taking power as either a non-human sujc ra rnscendental principle guiding history? This aspect of Foucault's theory is particulrl toulig o hale Taylor, who sees it as a point of incoherence [24]. According to Taylor, te ntio ofstrteges f pwerwithout a subjective intention is incoherent insofar as no account i offred hichrelaes tis boad atten of non-intentional purposefulness to the wills and intentins ofhistoical ctors Tayor beievesthat ome such account is necessary since it is historicalactorswho apear tocompos the dama ofhistor. If t is to be proposed that the conscious intenions ofhuman bings donot,
_____________________
23. Ibid., p. 221.
24. Taylor, Hoy Reader, p. 83.
counter their understanding, succeed in steering the course of historical development, an explanatio given for the way in which human intention and action is subsumed or overridden by a greate oc 2] A Taylor argues:
...purposefulness without purpose
requires a certain kind of explanation
to be intelligible. The undesigned systematicity has to be related to the purposeful action of agents in a
way that we can understand...The
reason for this requirement is that
the text of history, which we are
trying to explain, is made up of purposeful human action. Where there
are patterns in this action which are
not on purpose, we have to explain why action done under one description on purpose also bears this other, un-
designed description. We have to show
how the two descriptions relate. A strategic pattern cannot be just left hanging, unrelated to our conscious
ends and projects [26].
But Foucault appears not to accept this
_____________________
25. Taylor gives examples of the type of account he is looking for: accounts which hold that ttions of some human behavior cannot be acknowledged, or "invisible hand" accounts such as Maxs n hs ariants which see unintended consequences as a result of collective action. See Tayor Iid, p.867.
26. Ibid., p. 87
requirement, for, as Taylor points out, Foucault not only fails to offer such an account, but he "don feel the need to start looking" [27]. Furthermore, according to Taylor, it seems as thoug twudb mossible for Foucault to give an explanation in terms of current models, without givig p om fndmeta apect of his theory [28]. An explanation is necessary, according to Taylor, ut annt b gien ithut ncosistency on Foucault's part.
What I would like to suggest is that, rather than entailing an inconsistency in Foucault's genea power, this unwillingness and inability to offer the type of explanation which Taylor seekssesfr h ecessarily incomplete nature of Foucault's critical project. Foucault's genealogy o pwe i, blive aresponse to a deep inadequacy which Foucault saw in contemporary critical thory Acoringto oucult animplicational network binds together the workings of power, knowledg, an humn sujectvityat te depestlevels of human reality. One manifesta- tion of this implictiona systm canbe sen in oucaut's acountof the relationship among disciplinary power, the "dsciplies" ofthe huan scinces, nd thetype o subjetivity--the docile bodies and normalized indviduals-which his powr/knowldge regme prodces [29. Anoter such embodiment is unearthed in te symbioic connetions amng the pwer techique of he Cathoic confesional, the disciplines of mdicine, pychology,and law, nd the seual identty of themodern inividual [0]. Indeed,
_____________________
27. Ibid., p. 88.
28. Ibid., p. 89
29. See Discipline and Punish.
30. See History of Sexuality.
much of Foucault's work is a study (an "analytic") of the historical juncture at the end of the eighntury when changes occurred in these three fundamental aspects of human reality. A major cotiuino ocault's genealogy of the modern age is its bringing to light the role played by powe i sapnghuanhitoy. The self-understanding of modernism, particularly as manifested in the hmanscince, hs ssteatiall failed to recognize the irreducible nature of power, according to Fucaut. hus oder poltica thery cnceives of power on the basis of either of two models: Marxst thory, hich educe powe to te ecoomy (nd its various state and ideological apparatuses), o liberl poliical teory, hich rduces ower t right held by individual subjects, who exchange tese rigts withn the lgal/poltical sstem [3]. We ave, threfore, both an institutional, and aHobbesia soverein/rightsmodel fo understnding poer. Onereduces ower to the socio-economic sructure, he other rounds poer in humn subjectvity. Boh thus fal to captre the facts that poer is exerised rathe than possssed or exhanged, an that powe is a relaion of fores in its ow right and ot an arm o the economc apparatus[32].
Foucault's rejection of both of these models can be seen as a requirement of his critical projecderstand power either as structural/institutional or as a possession of the subject is to patcpt nateoretical discourse which belongs to the modern regime, which is precisely the targe o Fucul's__________________
31. Michel Foucault, "Two Lectures," in Power/Knowledge (New York, Pantheon, 1980) p. 88.
32. Michel Foucault, "The Subject and Power," Rabinow Reader, p. 220.
critical stance. Modern knowledge has "excluded" or ignored the possibility that power functions inbjective, but "strategic" manner. Thus to conceive of power along the lines of a Nietzschea a r"gnsic" model [33] may well be the only recourse available to one who would like to consde te osibliy ha the accepted models are inadequate to theorize power, and as such function s wapos i poer' stateic rsenal.
Foucault's genealogy of power can therefore be seen as his attempt to retrieve an exclusion whicd at the origin of the modern period. Genealogy, in tracing the power to punish to the beginigo t oen form, finds there a dramatic reversal with respect to power's visibility. Power pevoulywa eerisd n the social arena as a "spectacle" of ritual torture [34]. But the exercis ofthepowr t puishin he odern period is obscured, as it takes place in prisons and under theguis of he ned t refrm te crmina or to protect society. "Power hides itself," according to oucaut [35. Bu thisstateent sould ot betaken as an assertion of a metaphysical absolute to hich Fucaultillegiimatel appeas. Raher, i is a escription of the appearance of social/politcal reaity to he moden perspctive. From wihin theregime tructured by disciplinary power, we end not o see it Foucaul's geneaogies threfore sek to opn the clsed regime of disciplinary pwer/knowldge to a ossible iterpretaton, a posible trut about th working f power which had no yet been onsidered.____________________ 33. "wo Lecture," Power/nowledge,pp. 91-2.
34. See Discipline and Punish, part one.
35. History of Sexuality, p. 86.
Thus to demand, as Taylor does, that Foucault give a theoretical account of the operations of po would be consistent with the discourse which reduces power to the intentions of individual ujcs st iss the point that Foucault's provocative thesis about the strategic nature of powerisa el-cnsios vodance of the entire "sovereign/rights" model. Taylor's advocacy of the humaistvales f tuthandfredom as necessary presuppositions of Foucault's theses on power, does no appeciae th extnt t whih th disourse of humanism is implicated in the regime which Foucaultwantsto crtique Thu fromFoucalt's erspetive, a discursive practice basing itself on the rigts andfreedo of th indivdual i not sfficiet to callenge the operations of disciplinary power[36].
As a strategic theoretical practice, however, the localized and specific appeal to human rights mes function as criticism. Thus, for example, in an interview given shortly before his deat,Fual noed the notions of truth and rights as a means of criticizing the polemicist [37]. Acodig o ouaut:
...a whole morality is at stake, the morality that concerns the search
for the truth and the relation to
the other [38].
_____________________
36. In fact, Discipline and Punish describes how the discourse of the humanist reformers contot he emergence of disciplinary power. See part two.
37. Michel Foucault, "Polemics, Politics, and Problemizations" Rabinow Reader, pp. 381-390.
38. Ibid., p. 381.
It is therefore evident that Foucault is not a nihilist. But neither are his appeals to humanist vacations of trans-historical absolutes. Foucault believes all values to be contaminated by cmlct ihpwer. This is why Foucault has attempted to adopt a different pose. Power is seen a sraegc n rdr o attle it on new ground. However, at times we may wish to use our old weapon. rut an fredo beongto his arsenal, but their use poses the risk of co-optation. As I see t, Fucaut's eneaogicl/crtica tacic is to create space within dominant discourse for what e cals "sujecte knowedges" Bu Foucult i not advocating that perspectives of the criminal orthe inane beome th paradgmaticknowleges fo a newregime. Rather his strategy attempts to mak a spac, a diference r "intestice,"within he stanard ordr which will allow the entry and peraps the nfiltraton of wht has ben excludd. Thismanner o critiqu does not profess to know al, and theefore repdiates abolutes. ut it maitains a citical ditance by ppealing to differenes and excusions, byopening "iterstices"[39] withi which powrs may batle and domnation may b exposed.
At the beginning of this paper I made a brief reference to Meno's paradox as similar to the apparadoxical nature of Foucault's work. I would like to end with a reminder of Plato's solutio. eosprdx is actually a dilemma, for, on the condition of either of two apparently mutually xcusvean ehastvealternatives, learning is impossible. The alternatives are that we either psses ttalknolede o tht w are completely ignorant. But Plato/Socrates accepts neither view,nor in abriliantantiipaton o ____________________
39. See "Nietzsche," in Rabinow Reader.
post-modernist strategy [40]) does he deny either position. For to accept or deny either position
is to adopt a theoretical stance such that the self-refuting consequence follows. To deny ignorancefirm that one has the answer, while to deny knowledge is to contradict one's intention to spa infcnl. Each denial reinforces the terms of the predicament. But Plato's solution to thediema eaesth praigm of theoretical discourse altogether, and appeals to the realm of practic. husSocate deonsrats, ith the help of a slave, that learning is possible by actually perfomingan istane ofteacing/earnng. My final suggestion is that perhaps this is how we may take oucaut's wrk. is hitoricl stuies, s insances of theoretical-critical practice, are manifestproof hat, een in he absnce of a uniersall validground for knowledge or freedom, critical inuiry reains posible ad fruitul.
_____________________
40. For an interesting discussion of Plato's relationship to post-modernist theory see David L., "Plato's Critique of Post-Modernism," in Philosophy and Literature, vol. 11.2, 1987, pp.2211
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