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The Penatgon's War On Drugs: The Ultimate Bad Trip

by CDI


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The Defense Monitor, Center for Defense Information, March 1992

Defense Monitor in Brief

--> The effectiveness of military antidrug efforts has not been confirmed.

--> Congress continues to increase funding every year for state National Guard antidrug activities--up about 400 percent since FY 1989.

--> Congress forced a reluctant Pentagon to take on an antidrug mission it did not want in 1988. Now the Pentagon finds it an expedient justification for budget proposals.

--> The 1989 invasion of Panama by U.S. forces resulted in only a temporary reduction in drug traffic and money laundering there.

--> There is no evidence to date that U.S. military activities in South American countries have diminished the introduction of drugs to the United States.

--> Military assistance to South American countries for antidrug programs strengthens the overall influence of the military in those countries.

* * *

The Pentagon's greatest fear is to be without an enemy. That was the situation it faced during the late 1980s as the ``evil empire'' began to crumble. In order to justify its existence and budget requests a new villain had to be found quickly.

At the urging of the Reagan and Bush Administrations, along with most members of Congress, drug trafficking has been designated the newest national security threat. The Soviet commissars have been replaced by Colombian drug lords. According to the Bush Administration the 1989 U.S. invasion of Panama was justified, in large part, because Manuel Noriega had been indicted for drug trafficking. To eliminate such traffic the Pentagon became the ultimate antidrug ``Robocop.''

In fact, antidrug activity has become the routinely invoked justification for almost all military programs and budget proposals. The U.S. Navy even lauds its Trident nuclear missile submarine for its value as a drug trafficking deterrent.

Yet such action flies in the face of both tradition and common sense. Using the Department of Defense as law enforcement's ``800 lb. gorilla'' threatens the longheld policy of keeping the military out of domestic affairs. As then-Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger wrote in 1985, ``Reliance on military forces to accomplish civilian tasks is detrimental to both military readiness and the democratic process.''

Impossible Quest

Using the military to fight societal ills is to embark on a mission impossible. The problem of drug use in the United States is not new. For centuries people have regularly experimented with legal drugs such as alcohol and tobacco as well as illegal drugs. As long as there is a demand for drugs there will be a supply. Using military forces, whose primary mission is to kill people and destroy things, will not change this.

What it will do, however, is divert resources from the truly critical need: reducing domestic demand. It also threatens to strengthen anti-democratic military forces in such countries as Bolivia, Peru, and Colombia.

Furthermore, drug trafficking is a global problem. Building up a massive U.S. antidrug force flies in the face of President Bush's call for a ``new world order'' which should seek to solve international problems through a revitalized United Nations and strengthened multinational agencies.

Actually, growing reliance on the military is a tacit admission of failure in antidrug efforts to date. As Lt. Gen. Stephen Olmstead, a former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for drug policy and enforcement says, ``In describing our current antidrug abuse efforts I often hear the word `war.' I have a few years of experience in war, and I don't think we're in a war. War, defined by Clausewitz at least, is a total commitment of a nation. I currently do not find that. What I find is: `Let's make the Army the scapegoat. We don't know what the answer is to the drug problem, so let's assign it to the Army and let them try and solve it.'''

A report by the congressional Office of Technology Assessment finds that ``[t]here is no clear correlation between the level of expenditures or effort devoted to interdiction and the long-term availability of illegally imported drugs in the domestic market. However, given the profitability of drug smuggling, a worldwide glut of drugs, and the view that the United States is the favored market for drugs, interdiction alone will probably never result in more than a short-term or relatively small reduction in drug availability.''

Wrong Target

In large part, committing the military to drug interdiction activities is based on a false premise. It is that the solution to the American drug abuse problem lies in the hands of foreign nations that produce the most important illegal drugs. While the executive and legislative branches may argue over how much money to devote to ``production control,'' unfortunately public officials raise critical questions about the wisdom or effectiveness of it as a basic strategy.

As Donald Mabry, a scholar at Mississippi State University, testified before Congress, ``For almost a century American antidrug policy has blamed foreigners for the American drug disease, thus preserving the myth that Americans are naturally good but corrupted by evil foreigners.'' Actually, the United States is the largest market for South American cocaine, sells the chemicals necessary to produce it and the firearms with which the major cartels arm themselves.

The failure of a strategy which focuses on limiting supply is inherent in the structure of the problem. Producer countries jointly lack either the motivation or the means to reduce total production. For the Andean countries in South America, cocaine is merely the latest manifestation of their dependence on producing export commodities for foreign consumption. Furthermore, even a vastly more effective interdiction program will make little difference with respect to such drugs as cocaine and, to a lesser extent, heroin. This is because the price of cocaine does not really rise until it is inside the United States.

The peasants who grow coca-leaf do not make any great profit. Growers sell a metric ton of leaf to middlemen for about $600. One ton produces about seven kilograms of finished cocaine. The price, when it leaves Colombia is probably something between $5,000 and $7,000 a kilo. Cocaine sells in Miami for about $15,000 a kilo. The effective retail price is on the order of $200,000 to $250,000 when it is broken down in one gram units. One can seize an enormous amount of cocaine that costs between $5,000 and $15,000 per kilo without making any major difference to the $250,000 street price. Thus, the grower gets only .0003 percent of the eventual street value of his crop.

As Peter Reuter, a senior economist with the Rand Corp., testified before Congress, ``The only thing that interdiction can do is raise the price. It can't, at this stage, given the maturity of the cocaine business, affect the amount that enters this country. There's too much leaf capacity; there's too much production capacity. There are too many experienced adaptive smugglers. . . . Interdiction simply works on a part of the system, at least with respect to cocaine, that is incapable of accounting for a large share of the cost of cocaine, given the risks that are faced by dealers within the United States.''

Expedient Policies

Governmental concern about drug use is frequently subordinated to other foreign policy concerns. When the United States supported Afghan guerrillas who were fighting the 1979 Soviet occupation of their country it was also supporting the opium growers who produced a flood of heroin that poured into this country. Similarly, during the 1980s the rise in cocaine exports to the U.S. from Colombia coincided with U.S. support for the contra guerrillas seeking to overthrow the Sandinista government of Nicaragua.

The Medellin cartel of Colombia used contra supply channels to smuggle cocaine into the United States. As Sen. John Kerry (D- Mass.) said during an extensive investigation in 1988, ``Certain elements of our government have perceived that there were higher national security priorities, thereby frustrating legitimate law enforcement efforts in the war against drugs.''

Past Anti-Drug Efforts

The Pentagon has been involved in drug interdiction efforts since at least 1971. Its assistance prior to 1981, however, was sporadic, uncoordinated and very limited. In 1981, Congress modified the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878, explicitly allowing the military to support antidrug efforts. Prior to that, anyone who attempted to use the military for law enforcement, unless specifically authorized by Congress or the Constitution, was liable to a fine or imprisonment. The new legislation permitted the Pentagon to assist by providing information, equipment, facilities, training and advisory services.

On April 8, 1986, President Reagan signed National Security Decision Directive 221 on narcotics and national security which, among other things, called for an expanded role for U.S. military forces in supporting counter-narcotics efforts.

Between mid-July and early December 1986 U.S. military personnel went to Bolivia to support Operation Blast Furnace. Working with Bolivian police, U.S. Army helicopters and military personnel sought to destroy coca-paste processing laboratories. It was the first U.S. military anti-drug operation in the Andes. Long-term effects of the operation, however, were negligible since drug activities returned to previous levels soon after the operation ended.

The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 called for a substantial increase in military aid to those countries involved in U.S. antinarcotics programs, waiving a 1974 ban on aid to foreign police.

New Mission

In September 1988 Congress passed legislation, as part of the FY 1989 National Defense Authorization Act, which marked the Pentagon's formal emergence as an antidrug warrior. DoD was required to undertake three statutory missions. These were: serving as the single lead agency of the federal government for the detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into the United States; integrating U.S. command, control, communications and intelligence (C3I) systems dedicated to the interdiction of illegal drugs into an effective communications network, and providing an improved interdiction and enforcement role for the National Guard.

Shortly thereafter the U.S. Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel issued an opinion stating that U.S. military personnel can apprehend accused drug traffickers abroad--a power they do not have in the United States. Even more ominous is the fact that the U.S. military can act without host country consent.

When the U.S. invaded Panama on December 20, 1989, President Bush released a memo stating, ``In the course of carrying out the military operation in Panama which I have directed, I hereby direct and authorize the units and members of the Armed Forces of the United States to apprehend General Manuel Noriega and any other persons in Panama currently under indictment in the United States for drug-related offenses.

``I further direct that any persons apprehended pursuant to this directive are to be turned over to civil law enforcement officials of the United States as soon as practicable. I also authorize and direct members of the Armed Forces of the United States to detain and arrest any persons apprehended pursuant to this directive if, in their judgment, such action is necessary.''

Narco-Bureaucracies

Even before Congress passed supporting legislation, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney sent a message to the various unified commanders in chief that reducing the flow of drugs to the U.S. was a high priority national security mission. The U.S. is the only country that assigns its military the mission of worldwide intervention. To that end it has established unified commands. These are geographically-defined commands that are made up of two or more military services.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff were assigned responsibility for developing the necessary plans. Specifically, the Atlantic, Pacific, Southern Commands, and the Forces Command a year later, as well as the U.S. element of the North American Aerospace Defense (NORAD) Command, were assigned the counterdrug mission. The commands implemented the guidelines differently. The Atlantic, Pacific and Forces Commands established Joint Task Forces (JTFs) to conduct their operations. At SOUTHCOM and NORAD the new mission was integrated into existing structures.

Besides the major unified commands and their subordinate task forces there are a host of other military agencies involved in antidrug efforts. The Defense Communications Agency is the single Pentagon agency responsible for implementing the Drug Enforcement Telecommunications Plan. It identifies specific secure telephone, radio and satellite communications equipment needed to interconnect voice, data and record communications among DoD and law enforcement agencies (LEAs). As part of its mission to provide secure antidrug communications systems the Pentagon has created a computerized Anti-Drug Network (ADNET). This allows LEAs to share information and access various databases.

The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency is working on numerous projects in cooperation with LEAs. These include developing audio recording devices to aid in surveillance, researching chemical detection devices to help locate drug processing laboratories and detect drugs in transit, and using artificial intelligence systems to detect money laundering and aid in the analysis of surveillance and tracking data. Some systems are already in prototype stage and have been provided for field test and evaluation.

Researchers at the Los Alamos National Laboratory, whose primary mission has always been to design nuclear weapons, have made many proposals for developing high-tech weapons to combat drug trafficking. Many of the military's own research centers are trying to develop sensors, night vision, and surveillance equipment. Private contractors, sensing new opportunities, are also submitting proposals to develop and manufacture equipment.

Numerous other Pentagon agencies are heavily involved in antidrug efforts. The Defense Intelligence Agency has established a Counternarcotics Intelligence Support Office. The Defense Security Assistance Agency coordinates the distribution of military weapons,equipment, and training to foreign militaries. The Defense Mapping Agency has been busy developing maps of drug producing areas. DoD has assigned intelligence analysts to the Drug Enforcement Administration's intelligence center to organize and computerize its intelligence files.

There is a fine line between legitimate intelligence gathering and violation of basic civil liberties. Military actions to intercept communications and examine financial records because they are allegedly drug related are an increasing threat to the privacy of American citizens.

Home Front Warriors

One growth area for Pentagon narco-warriors has been the involvement of the National Guard. Their involvement began back in the 1970s when the Army National Guard was called out to support police in eradicating marijuana grown in Hawaii. The Guard, unlike the active forces, has no restrictions under the Posse Comitatus Act when acting in a non-federal status. They are not, however, immune from liability arising from violation of constitutional rights.

The Guard forces have generally responded enthusiastically to this mission. In fact the Pentagon's National Guard Bureau had to restrain the Oregon National Guard from sending military police out in civilian clothes to help Portland police with drug busts and surveillance. Gov. James Blanchard (D-MI) called for using Guard troops to bulldoze crack houses in Detroit.

In accordance with the 1988 Congressional legislation the National Guard Bureau established a national-level structure in its Office of Military Support to coordinate drug enforcement operations. As part of the process of obtaining funding for their anti-drug missions all U.S. states and territories had to submit a plan describing their proposed activities for approval in the Pentagon. Using the Freedom of Information Act the Center for Defense Information obtained copies of all the plans for FY89.

A review of these plans show a huge expansion of the Guard's anti- drug efforts. Some activities described in the plans include detection and monitoring of drug smuggling through aerial surveillance, radar surveillance, aerial photography and other imagery, long-range reconnaissance, and assistance in searching containers. Others are expanded training of law enforcement personnel, transportation of LEA personnel, equipment and seized substances, and increased loans of military equipment. Guard authorities are not above exaggerating the problem in order to obtain support for their plans. For example, the Kansas National Guard plan stated, ``More Americans are killed by drugs every 24 months than were killed in battle in Viet Nam. This figure is estimated as 60,000 fatalities.'' In truth, according to the National Institute on Drug Abuse the total number of drug abuse deaths in 1988 and 1989 was 14,016.

Guard units work in various areas. In 1990 Guard units in 21 states were working with the U.S. Customs Service to inspect commercial cargo entering the United States via sea, air, and land. Eleven states were working with the Border Patrol and the Customs Air Service to identify and track illegal ground and air drug traffic. In 1990 the National Guard established the National Interagency Counternarcotics Institute in San Luis Obispo, CA, in order to enhance cooperation between the Guard and federal, state, and local agencies.

Although not used as extensively as the Guard, Reserve Forces have also increased their antidrug activities. Marine Corps Reserves have assisted both the Border Patrol and Customs Services. The Naval Air Reserve flies surveillance missions while Naval Reserve ships also participate.

Questionable Effectiveness

While the Guard has certainly benefitted from the drug war, seeing its antidrug funding rising from $40 million in FY89 to $154 million in FY92, it is unclear how effective they have been. A DoD Inspector General's report released in July 1991 found that Guard components ``had not fully identified their counternarcotics workload; sought feedback from the Law Enforcement Agencies (LEA's) on the Guard counternarcotics operations; measured the effectiveness of the support provided; or conducted long-term planning, programming and budgeting for counternarcotics operations.'' It also found that the California National Guard did not justify the requirement for the National Interagency Counternarcotics Institute. The FY93 request, however, increases the National Guard share of the DoD antidrug budget to $171 million.

Other Pentagon antidrug units have also come in for criticism. Another Inspector General report found that ``JTF-5 duplicates counternarcotics capabilities'' at other Pacific Command activities and creates unnecessary operational overhead. Furthermore, its location in California does not allow it to provide optimum support to the law enforcement community.

In late 1991 the Pentagon Inspector General issued a comprehensive report on Pentagon support to U.S. drug interdiction efforts. It found that DoD's counterdrug program has not been adequately coordinated with the law enforcement agencies at all levels to achieve maximum effectiveness. The DoD intelligence structure is not ideally designed to provide maximum support to the LEAs and measures have not been instituted that adequately measure the effectiveness of DoD's counterdrug support contributions.

Even the first major military anti-drug action, the invasion of Panama, had no lasting effect. The State Department's 1991 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report found that ``large seizures during 1990 indicated that traffickers continue to use Panamanian sea, land, and airspace to tranship illegal narcotics-- especially cocaine--destined for the U.S. and elsewhere.'' A 1991 GAO report found that ``drug trafficking may be increasing and that Panama continues to be a haven for money laundering.''

The Pentagon itself is reportedly having some second thoughts about its role. According to one recent report it rejected a proposal by the White House Office of Drug Control Policy that would have created a unified military authority to coordinate most U.S. counternarcotics operations in Latin America. This rejection reportedly reflected a Pentagon wariness about becoming too closely tied to a no-win cause.

Andean Strategy

Just like the old cliche that the best defense is a good offense the Pentagon operates on the assumption that the best way to interdict drugs is to do so in the country where they originate. To that end President Bush directed that a 5-year $2.2 Billion counternarcotics effort begin in FY 1990 to augment law enforcement, military, and economic programs in Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru. These three countries, located in the Andes mountains region of South America, produce all the cocaine consumed in the United States.

Although the State Department and the Drug Enforcement Agency have been operating in South America for many years a large increase in U.S. military involvement began in 1989. That year a candidate in Colombia's presidential election was murdered by drug traffickers. Subsequently Colombia started a crackdown against the organized cartels. The U.S. responded by sending $65 million worth of surplus military equipment to the Colombian military.

In late 1989 the United States planned to station an aircraft carrier battle group off the coast of Colombia until it received protests. In January 1990, at a summit in Cartagena, Colombia, the U.S., Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia reached an understanding to allow their military forces to be used to combat drug trafficking.

The Andean strategy occupies center stage in the Administration's international drug control policy. Like its predecessors it assumes the U.S. has the right to intervene in the internal affairs of Latin American nations. Although about half the aid disbursed under the strategy is for economic assistance the strategy itself marks a sharp shift toward a military approach. Contrary to past policy, the U.S. now views Andean militaries as essential to the antidrug mission. This policy, in effect, supports internal security missions for these militaries, the sort of mission which U.S. troops are prohibited from conducting under the Posse Comitatus Act in the U.S. To that end the Administration plans to provide $675 million in military aid to Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru during FY 1990 to 1994 - 75 percent of the military aid provided to all of Central America from FY 1985-89. Many of these Latin American militaries have been found guilty of gross human rights violations. In order to counter public and congressional unease about aiding such forces many U.S. officials have invoked the specter of an alliance between drug traffickers and guerrillas.

As U.S. Special Forces commander John Waghelstein wrote in 1987, ``...the United States is faced with one aspect of insurgency in Latin America that offers the greatest threat but one which may provide us with a weapon with which to regain the moral high ground we have appeared to have lost. There is an alliance between some drug traffickers and some insurgents... A melding in the American public's mind and in Congress of this connection would lead to the necessary support to counter the guerrilla/narcotics terrorists in this hemisphere.''

The problem with this theory is that it is a distortion of reality. A careful examination of Pentagon documents leaves no doubt that the Pentagon views its antidrug mission as just another form of so- called ``low intensity conflict'' which can only be fought by using counter-insurgency strategy and tactics. Thus U.S. policy now targets drug traffickers as new enemies but specifically includes old enemies--guerrilla groups alleged to have inseparable links to the traffickers. This is the justification for providing Andean militaries with weaponry and training to improve domestic counter- insurgency campaigns which remain their top priority.

Colombia

In Colombia drug traffickers, as a result of their business, have become wealthy landowners and businessmen. Given their economic interests they have adopted conservative viewpoints and oppose advocates of economic and social change. Consequently, the cartel's paramilitary forces and death squads attack insurgents far more often than they cooperate with them.

In Colombia the military has been fighting insurgent groups for almost 30 years. Antidrug activity is not a priority for them. In fact, the $65 million military aid package provided in 1989 was heavily tilted toward conventional military equipment. The armed forces received about 77 percent of the total package while the Colombian National Police received only 16 percent. This pattern is very disturbing since the police are responsible for 80 to 90 percent of all drug seizures.

Peru

The State Department's annual human rights report for 1991 stated ``There continued to be credible reports of summary executions, disappearances, arbitrary detention, torture and rape by the military and police.'' The human rights situation in Peru is so bad that Congress in 1991 had put a hold on a $35 million military aid package while it reviewed the situation. Recently U.S. antidrug operations stopped when a U.S. helicopter was shot down in January. It was on an antidrug mission in Peru's Upper Huallaga Valley, where more than half the world's supply of coca is grown.

Bolivia

The U.S. has pressed Bolivia to use its army for antidrug purposes. This makes even less sense than it does in Colombia and Peru. The Bolivian Army was deeply involved in drug trafficking during the 1980-81 ``narco-dictatorship'' of Gen. Luis Garcia Meza. Nevertheless, in 1991 U.S. special forces arrived to begin training almost 10 percent of the Bolivian Army in antidrug operations.

Wrong Strategy

U.S. military involvement in anti-drug efforts is an inappropriate mission. It is the demand by U.S. citizens which fuels drug trafficking. When the demand drops drug traffic will dry up. As it now stands the military is engaged in an endless and futile effort. It is gearing up to intervene in Third World countries when the real solution is to provide expanded education, prevention, and treatment programs. Drug use in America is ultimately a health and police issue, not a military one. Involving the military diverts scarce money from the necessary demand-side programs. It also threatens to undermine the wise policy of keeping the U.S. military out of the law enforcement business.

* * *

Conclusions

--> The military has been ordered to conduct a war that cannot be won: the objectives are not clear, the enemy difficult to identify and engage, and progress cannot be measured.

--> Use of U.S. military forces to cut off drug trafficking is one more step in making the U.S. the ``world's policeman.''

--> In many cases U.S. antidrug efforts directly strengthen military establishments guilty of human rights abuses.

--> Use of military forces in counterdrug operations reverses the longstanding policy of not allowing military participation in domestic law enforcement.

 
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