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Battlefield of the Future: The Biological Weapon
by Terry N. Mayer
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Battlefield of the Future
Chapter 8
The Biological Weapon: A Poor Nation's Weapon of Mass Destruction
Lt Col Terry N. Mayer, USAF
Prologue-4 January
This is a CNN special report. This just in. The Center for Disease
Control has just declared that an epidemic is widespread in Miami,
Florida. Doctors have not yet diagnosed the specific cause of the
rampant disease, but the illness initially resembles a chest cold that
progresses into pneumonia-like symptoms. It then progresses
rapidly into fever and shortness of breath. What is especially
peculiar about this epidemic is that all the patients who have sought
medical attention attended the Orange Bowl football game on New
Year's Day. Authorities have asked that anyone who went to that
game seek medical care if cold-like symptoms appear. Stay tuned to
CNN for further developments on this story. Elsewhere in the news
...
The Biological Warfare Context
This is a notional, yet frightening illustration of what the first signs
of a biological warfare (BW) attack might sound like. This scenario
is a plausible example of an attack a terrorist or deranged person
might conduct using off-the-shelf technology and readily available
biological warfare agents. The "concept of operations" in this
attack consisted of using several insect bombs (the kind where you
push the button, it starts spraying, and you leave the house for two
hours) and modifying them by filling the canister with anthrax
bacteria bought through a mail order specimen company in the
United States. If that doesn't sound credible, please note that
Saddam Hussein bought his original anthrax culture from a mail
order house in the United States and had it shipped overnight
mail!1 This is just a sample of many plausible scenarios that could
employ biological warfare agents in a terrorist or combat operation.
The spring 1995 chemical warfare attack in the subways of Tokyo
is a glaring example of just how susceptible modern society is to
this kind of insidious attack. It does not take a great deal of
imagination to conceive of other situations and vulnerabilities that
would make very lucrative targets for a biological weapons strike. If
an attacker has access to the target area, a simple mechanism to
aerosolize a substance, and a basic biology laboratory, the
prerequisites are complete. This is not a high-tech arena that
requires specialized equipment or core material as do nuclear
weapons; this is basic college biology coupled with motivation.
While the use of this weapon has not been prevalent in recent
years, the threat is real, the United States' vulnerability is clear, and
the ability to counter the biological weapon is almost nil.
A study of biological warfare raises some fundamental questions:
Just what is biological warfare? What is the history of biological
warfare and how important is it today? What biological warfare
agents are available for use today? What is the biological warfare
threat? How capable are we of coping with the threat? What
policy should the United States follow to close the gap between the
threat and the capability?
The purpose of this article is to raise the awareness level about a
very real and probable threat that has not been dealt with
effectively. The author hopes to bring the issue to the front burner
for study and to apply resources to resolving the tough problems.
While the paper identifies where precious resources should be
focused, it does not profess to have all the answers to the very
difficult biological warfare dilemma.
First, what is biological warfare in layman's terms? From a military
perspective, it is the intentional use of diseases to affect an
adversary's military force, population, crops, or livestock.
Certainly, a terrorist biological campaign could target those same
kinds of objectives, depending on the perceived purpose of the
terrorist. There are two basic categories of biological warfare
agents. Microorganisms are living organic germs, such as anthrax
(bacillus anthrax). Second, toxins are the byproducts of living
organisms, or effectively natural poisons, such as botulism
(botulinum toxin) which is a byproduct of growing the
microorganism clostridium botulinum.2 These are only two
examples of biological warfare agents, although these are especially
prevalent and virulent examples. There are many other natural and
man-made agents that have been used throughout history.
Historical Perspective
Biological warfare is not a twentieth century development; it has
been an effective combat weapon for centuries. As early as 1346
A.D., Tartars held the walled city of Kaffa under siege and
catapulted plague-infested bodies into the city.3 Were the Tartars
successful in using disease as a means to break the siege? Yes. Not
only did illness cause Kaffa to capitulate, but some medical
historians speculate this event resulted in the bubonic plague
epidemic that spread across medieval Europe between 1347 and
1351, killing 25 million people.4
Three hundred years later, during the French and Indian War, the
English offered blankets to Indians holding Fort Carillon. The
English suspected the Indians were loyal to the French and exposed
the blankets to the smallpox virus before their apparent altruistic
overture. The Indians began to fall ill, and after an epidemic spread
through the fort, the English attacked, defeating the incapacitated
force. The British gained control of Fort Carillon and renamed it
Fort Ticonderoga.5
Throughout history, many examples may be found illustrating the
use of natural diseases in war to place an adversary in a position of
disadvantage. For example, dumping bodies into water supplies has
been fairly common for centuries. Two thousand years ago, Romans
fouled many of their enemies' water sources by throwing the
corpses of dead animals into the wells.6 During the American Civil
War, Confederate soldiers shot horses and other farm animals in
ponds in an effort to contaminate the water supply of the Union
forces.7
While there was some evidence of biological warfare in World War
I8 , the interwar years saw a new interest in the use of disease as a
weapon. Paradoxically, probably the two most active programs
started as a result of an international initiative to ban biological
warfare agents. Both Japan and the United Kingdom recognized
that since biological warfare was horrifying enough to outlaw, it
probably would make an effective weapon. Both countries had very
robust programs as early as 1932 and 1934, respectively.9
There is evidence that Japan tested biological warfare agents on
prisoners of war and that they actually used them on the population
of China.10 To spread the plague, they dropped flea-infested debris
over 11 cities in mainland China. The result was a bubonic plague
epidemic in China and Manchuria.11 While these attacks caused
casualties, the weapons did not function reliably and ultimately
resulted in very little strategic impact that affected the war.12
When the Britain learned of the Japanese biological warfare
program, they put significantly more emphasis toward developing
their own BW capability. Most of their testing was conducted on
an island called Gruinard off the northwest coast of Scotland. They
concentrated their development and testing efforts on the lethal
effects of anthrax. Scientists used sheep as victims to evaluate the
effectiveness of the disease, and they infected literally thousands of
animals. As a result of the huge amount of anthrax agent dispersed
on the island and the large number of sheep infected, the British
could not effectively decontaminate the island after they stopped
the testing program. Consequently, Gruinard is still considered
contaminated and is off limits, demonstrating the persistence of
anthrax as a biological weapon.13
The British soon combined their biological weapons development
efforts with Canada and the United States. Even though there were
Allied operational plans to employ biological weapons during
World War II, there is no evidence to indicate they were actually
used on a large scale. There is, however, strong evidence that
Reinhard Heydrich, chief of the Nazi security service, was
assassinated with a grenade that had been contaminated with
biological warfare agents (typhoid fever).14
Biological Warfare in the Cold War
After World War II and during the Korean War, the focus, at least
from the United States perspective, was on building a BW
retaliatory capability. The US developed an anticrop bomb and
delivered it to the Air Force in 1951. It could have been used to
attack North Korean rice fields, reducing a significant source of
nutrition for the population.15 North Korea accused the United
States of using biological agents during the Korean War; the
United States denied the accusation, and there was no substantive
proof offered in the open literature.16
Following the Korean War, the United States invigorated the
biological warfare program in 1956 after Marshal Zhukov
announced to the Soviet Congress that chemical and biological
warfare weapons would be used as weapons of mass destruction in
future wars. This was a dramatic shift in Soviet policy and the cold
war philosophy.17 The fundamental concept of United States
biological warfare operations changed as a result.
During the Korean War, the biological capability was maintained
primarily for retaliation in the event an adversary employed a
biological agent against United States or allied forces. The
prevailing philosophy was that the threat of retaliation in kind
would deter the use of these kinds of weapons. After the new
Soviet pronouncement, the United States concept changed to
employment upon executive order by the president of the United
States.18 Effectively, this mimicked the Soviet position, implying
that the United States might use biological weapons in situations
other than straightforward retaliation. This change in policy
boosted the biological warfare research effort in the United States.
The bulk of the research was conducted at Fort Detrick in
Maryland. It was during this "boost phase" that United States
vulnerability was clearly demonstrated with simulated covert
biological warfare attacks on at least three cities subway systems.
Surrogate biological agents were introduced into the air vents of the
underground systems. Samples were then taken to determine how
widespread the dissemination would be. The results demonstrated
that large numbers of the populace would be exposed to infectious
doses under such an attack.19 This experiment supported a similar
test that took place in 1950 when an aerosol cloud of a simulated
biological agent was sprayed off the coast of San Francisco. The
test results showed that nearly 100 percent of the population had
inhaled potentially lethal doses.20
In 1969, President Nixon changed the United States policy on
biological warfare. During a visit to Fort Detrick, he announced
that the United States was terminating research on biological
warfare and was unilaterally disarming any capability to conduct
offensive biological warfare. By 1972, the United States biological
weapons stockpile was completely destroyed.21 This gesture by the
United States was the catalyst for the world community to embrace
the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC). A total of
118 countries (including the USSR and Iraq) signed up to abide by
the BWC, which directs that the signatories will "never in any
circumstances develop, produce, stockpile, or otherwise acquire or
retain any biological weapons."22
During this time, the Second Indochina War was raging. However,
there is no clear evidence that biological warfare agents were used
in this conflict. Agent Orange, a herbicide, was a chemical-based
agent that saw wide use, but biological weapons per se were not
used.23 While the United States biological warfare program was
flourishing and even after our unilateral biological warfare
disarmament, there is evidence that the Soviet program was
thriving, although they had signed the BWC in 1972. In the late
1970s and early 1980s, there were reports that the Soviets used
biological weapons in Laos, Kampuchea, and Afghanistan. While
widely reported as a program called "Yellow Rain," these
allegations were never proven.24
In 1978, Georgi Markov, a popular writer and Bulgarian exile, was
walking to the BBC in London where he broadcast to his homeland
from Radio Free Europe. As he was walking, he suddenly felt a
sharp pain in his leg. Turning around, he confronted a man picking
up an umbrella. The man apologized and went on his way. Markov
took ill that night and died several days later. The autopsy found a
small metal pellet coated with ricin, a biological toxic substance
derived from the castor oil plant.25
Another incident occurred in April 1979 when a loud explosion
was reported from a research compound in Sverdlovsk, USSR. Over
the next few days, reports of an outbreak of anthrax surfaced. The
United States claimed that the outbreak was the result of an
accident in a biological warfare production plant. The USSR
vehemently denied the accusations, claiming it was caused by
tainted black market meat and poor hygiene among the population.
In the media and technical literature before 1992, many Western
journalists and scientists argued that the facts supported the Soviet
claims.26
However, in 1992, Russian President Boris Yeltsin admitted that
the Sverdlovsk incident was actually a biological warfare accident
involving anthrax.27 Thereafter, President Yeltsin signed a decree
that recommitted Russia to the Biological and Toxin Weapons
Convention. But in 1994, three defectors revealed an ongoing
Russian biological warfare program that concentrates on a
"superplague" for which, reportedly, the West has no antidote.
President Yeltsin claimed he didn't know about any biological
warfare programs. The defectors verified his claim and inferred that
the military is running the program without Yeltsin's knowledge or
consent.28
Biological Terrorism
In 1984, the French authorities made a startling discovery that
demonstrates how vulnerable the world is to biological terrorism.
The Paris Police raided a residence suspected of being a safe house
for the German Red Army Faction. As they conducted their search,
they found documents that revealed a strong working knowledge of
lethal biological agents. As the police continued the search to the
bathroom, they came across a bathtub containing many flasks filled
with what turned out to be Clostridium Botulinum, the
microorganism that produces botulism, one of the most lethal
biological substances known to man.29
On 20 March 1995, the Tokyo subway system was attacked with
chemical warfare agents by, allegedly, a cult called the Aum Shinri
Kyo, or the Supreme Truth. This incident killed at least 11 people
and injured as least 5,500 others.30 Five different subway cars
were struck simultaneously by individuals leaving canisters
dispersing a Nazi-developed nerve agent called Sarin.31 This is an
exceptionally significant event because it strikes at the core of
society with furtive lethal gases, exposing glaring vulnerabilities
and fomenting terror among the population. As one victim of the
subway attack said, "We're just innocent, ordinary people. It
frightens me to think how vulnerable we are."32
On the 28th of March, Tokyo police also found large quantities of
the biological warfare agent Clostridium Botulinum during one of
several raids on Aum Shinri Kyo facilities.33 This discovery clearly
demonstrates that a terrorist organization had the resolve, the
biological agent, and the wherewithal to conduct a horrendous
biological attack against an unprotected population. As Time
magazine said, ". . . garden-variety madness had got access to
weapons of terror."34
BW and the 1991 Gulf War
These recent world biological warfare events have been alarming,
but what really brought the biological warfare issue into the
spotlight of the public's eye was the experience in Desert Storm,
the Persian Gulf War. By the time of the Iraqi invasion into Kuwait,
it was widely acknowledged that Iraq had a biological warfare
program, concentrated on very toxic botulinum toxin and very
resilient anthrax.35 This assessment was derived from a
compilation of several sources and indicators, the most dramatic
being an Iraqi defector who was a microbiologist. He told a British
newspaper correspondent that as early as 1983 Iraqi scientists were
developing and testing biological warfare agents:
There were many strains, botulism, salmonella, and anthrax.
Friends told me they had found a way to make anthrax even more
toxic. I know they experimented on sheep with Clostridium
Botulinum type C (the source of botulinum toxin).36
The defector said he personally had done research and solved
difficult technical problems relating to the weaponization and
deployment of biological warfare agents.37 This has since been
confirmed officially by a representative of Saddam Hussein's
present government. On 2 August 1990, when Iraqi army invaded
Kuwait, the Iraqis had spent close to $100 million on their
offensive biological warfare program and had a significant
stockpile of biological warfare agents.38
Saddam Hussein announced "loud and clear" that this war would
be the "mother of all wars," implying a no-holds-barred
engagement.39 This was the first time since World War II that the
United States had faced a military adversary with a highly probable
biological warfare capability and the resolve to use it.40
The United States was challenged not only with how to protect the
military forces but how to preempt the use of Saddam's biological
warfare arsenal. Plans for force protection included protective
equipment and vaccinations against probable biological warfare
threats.41 In addition, planners were challenged to determine a
mechanism to destroy the biological warfare stockpiles before
Saddam could deploy them. Dropping a precision-guided bomb on
the suspected storage bunkers would have been easy enough. The
real challenge was destroying the viability or utility of the
biological weapons without spreading the agents and causing
massive collateral damage in terms of human lives. The military was
simply not prepared for this eventuality.
Several tests were conducted over a very short time to try to find the
right kind of enhanced munitions or bomb that would render the
biological warfare agent unusable to the Iraqis and not release
lethal agents into the atmosphere. The crash program was not
fruitful. However, in the effort, computer modeling showed that the
design of the suspected biological weapons storage bunkers offered
a bombing approach that might inhibit the release of the agents. In
the eleventh hour, this concept detailing specific fusing, type of
bomb, and angle of attack was telephoned to the Central Command
CENTCOM planners in Riyadh.42 All suspected bunkers were
attacked, and there was no confirmed collateral damage as a result
of released biological agent. There was, however, one unconfirmed
news report of several incidents of illness and death in Iraqi guards
after the coalition bombed a biological warfare facility in
Baghdad.43
In the end, it appears that Saddam Hussein did not use biological
weapons during Desert Storm. While the Iraqi rationale may never
be known for certain, it is likely that they were deterred by public
signals like the one Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney announced
during a news conference on 23 December 1990.44 . . . Cheney
said that "were Saddam Hussein foolish enough to use weapons of
mass destruction, the US response would be absolutely
overwhelming and it would be devastating."45
In an even more direct and unambiguous message, a 5 January 1991
letter President George Bush said to Saddam Hussein: "The United
States will not tolerate the use of chemical or biological weapons...
The American people would demand the strongest possible
response. You and your country will pay a terrible price if you
order unconscionable acts of this sort."46
After the cease fire, Iraq officialsadmitted having a biological
warfare program that they said had only progressed to the research
stage. Inspectors found evidence of a robust biological warfare
production capability, but could not specifically link it to the
biological warfare program.
However, there was overwhelming circumstantial evidence that an
offensive biological warfare production and weaponization program
did exist.47 Like the Soviet Union, Iraq had previously signed the
BWC. The bad news is that United Nations inspectors were not
able to locate Saddam's biological stockpile.48 Saddam's
representatives have since admitted to the United Nations
inspectors that they had a sizable cache of anthrax and botulism
agents, but they claim to have destroyed it to avoid having germs
spread over the Iraqi countryside by allied bombing attacks.
Having witnessed the bold Iraqi deceptive effort regarding their
nuclear research program, the world has every reason to believe that
Saddam Hussein still has a large amount of biological warfare
agents at his disposal today.49 On 24 February 1993, former CIA
Director James Woolsey told the Senate Govern- mental Affairs
Committee: "Iraq's biological weapons capability is perhaps of
greatest immediate concern. Baghdad had an advanced program
before Desert Storm, and neither war nor inspections have seriously
degraded this capability. The dual-use nature of biological weapon
equipment and techniques makes this the easiest program to
hide."50
The Biological Warfare Threat
With the public expos of active Russian and Iraqi biological
warfare programs, the threat of these weapons looms large on the
horizon. There are official, open-source estimates that between 10
and 20 countries either have, want, or are thinking about starting a
biological weapons capability.51 However, there is more to the
threat than just countries that have the capability. What types of
agents are a threat and how will they mature given new technology?
And, does the insidious nature of biological agents pose a threat?
BW Nation States
Some of the countries suspected in open sources of having or
wanting a biological warfare program include Russia, Syria, Iraq,
Iran, Libya, North Korea, Israel, Egypt, Cuba, Taiwan, China,
Romania, Bulgaria, Pakistan, India, and South Africa.52 There are
real concerns with this list. First, some of these nations have been
associated in the past with state-supported terrorism. This fact
raises the probability of a biological warfare terrorist attack.
Second, many of these countries reside in regions of historical
instability or emerging instability. And third, with the economic
distress in the former Soviet Union, there is a possibility that its
biological warfare weapons experts will look for more prosperous
employment by building biological warfare programs elsewhere for
the highest bidder. Fortunately, as of early 1994, the CIA had no
indication that this biological warfare brain drain is occurring.53
Biological Warfare Technology
The degree of sophistication of each country's research program
will determine how advanced biological agents will be. Even the
most rudimentary program will likely have lethal agents that have
been a threat for some time. Botulism and anthrax (mentioned
earlier) are high-probability candidates that are difficult to reckon
with. In addition, the revolution in biotechnology may produce
other agents that are even more toxic and resilient. Without getting
into the technical aspects, relatively minor molecular adjustments
may produce a more toxic, fast acting, and stable biological
agent.54
There is also a possibility that genetic engineering may produce a
weapon that is unique and can only be protected against with a
unique vaccine.55 These two examples of potential developments
in biological warfare will give this weapon a great deal more utility,
especially on the battlefield. A more stable agent that produces an
accelerated reaction would provide the tactical commander with a
viable tactical weapon.
Additionally, if the commander could deploy biological agents
against an enemy while friendly troops remained invulnerable, the
biological option would become much more attractive as a
battlefield weapon. There is also some speculation that a toxic
agent could be produced that would target only a specific genetic
makeup, giving an attacker the capability to discriminate among
age, gender, racial or behavior groups as target sets.56 Following
the Tokyo subway attack, it has come to light that the Aum Shinri
Kyo had recently ordered sophisticated molecular design software.
The purpose of this type of software is to reengineer the molecular
structure of chemicals or microorganisms to make them stronger or
more dangerous.57 Could it be that this fanatic cult was planning
to use this software to genetically reengineer their biological or
chemical agents?
Stealthy BW
Now the really sobering part-biological warfare agents are very
difficult, if not impossible, to detect while they are in the research,
production, transit, or employment phases. Normal biological
warfare research facilities resemble completely legitimate
biotechnical and medical research facilities. The same production
facilities that can produce biological warfare agents may also
produce wine and beer, dried milk, food, and agricultural
products.58 The challenge this presents is in distinguishing
legitimate production plants from illicit ones.
It becomes nearly impossible to identify the locations and facilities
that are actually producing biological warfare weapons. This needs
to be done, obviously, in order to confidently highlight a violation
of the BWC, or, if necessary, should all peaceful remedies fail,
preemptively strike a biological weapons production or storage
facility.
In addition, biological warfare agents are virtually undetectable
while they are in transit. In other words, if a terrorist wanted to
carry the biological agent into the United States in a carry-on bag
or checked luggage, there is no mechanism using routine customs,
immigration, drug scan, or bomb search procedures to identify the
agent. The only way to find it would be a physical search by a very
well trained and very lucky searcher.59 Similarly, the threat on the
battlefield is almost as insidious, with very little present detection
capability.
Desert Storm represents a recent experience in which the United
States needed the ability to detect biological warfare agents to give
early warning for protective measures. With few exceptions, the
capability was not there. The limited capability that was deployed
was the result of a crash program to produce a biological detector-
it was an experiment.60 It seems logical that the inability to detect
and thereby protect the civilian population or military force would
significantly add to the viability of biological weapons as a terrorist
or tactical battlefield threat.
Shortfalls
In addition to the detection shortfall, the United States is unable to
effectively protect the military forces (medically and nonmedically),
conduct an effective preemptive counteroffensive strike, or protect
the population against a terrorist attack. Given the wide spectrum of
kinds of agents that make up the biological warfare threat, medical
prophylactic measures (primarily vaccinations) are inadequate, and
it appears they will be so at least for the near-term.61 Personal
protection in a biological warfare environment currently depends
on protective clothing- the chemical warfare suit. In Desert Storm,
the chemical warfare suit was adequate if fitted properly (a frequent
problem) but unsuitable if worn for long durations or while in hot
weather.62
Desert Storm also highlighted the shortfall in the ability to strike a
biological warfare storage facility with confidence that massive
numbers of innocent civilians would not be killed (collateral
damage) as a result.63 The United States is impotent to prevent a
biological warfare terrorist attack against the population unless
there is specific intelligence to forewarn of the attack.64
Additionally, following a biological warfare attack, there are many
agents that medicine can't treat today.65
Given this discouraging information, the scenario described in the
prologue seems even more plausible. Other "concepts of
operations" are not hard to imagine. Nearly every grocery or drug
store sells small aerosol deodorizers that periodically spray a
fragrant mist. If an adversary wanted to neutralize the military
brainstem of the United States, they might refill these deodorizers
with a biological agent and clandestinely place one in each
restroom in the Pentagon. After a few days, the entire population of
the Department of Defense headquarters would be incapacitated,
causing mass confusion and widespread terror.
In a combat environment, conventional dispersal with bombs,
artillery, or even a spraying device on an aircraft (like a crop duster)
would not be nearly as effective as a more surreptitious attack that
would infect people before they donned protective clothing. An
infiltration by special operations forces or undercover operatives to
place aerosol canisters similar to insect bombs or deodorizers might
cripple a force before it knew it was attacked. Like the Indians at
Fort Ticonderoga, the force would fall ill and many would die. The
force's ability to conduct effective combat operations would
certainly be negated. By the time doctors diagnosed the disease and
determined the right antidote, if there were one, the war could have
been lost.
Consider the implications if the Aum Shinri Kyo had used
botulinum toxin or Anthrax instead of the Sarin chemical agent in
their attack on the subway system in Tokyo. The death count and
the magnitude of the terror would have been higher by orders of
magnitude. There may have been as high as a 90 percent fatality
rate instead of 0.2 percent actually experienced-that could be
nearly 5,000 dead innocent civilians! And considering that the
volume of Sarin to saturate a given area is approximately equivalent
to 10,000 times the amount of botulinum toxin needed to cause the
same effect, the attack could have been vastly more devastating.66
In another recent real-world incident, consider how much more
effective the terrorist bombing of the New York World Trade
Center would have been if they had placed a fire extinguisher filled
with a biological agent at the bottom of each stairwell and rigged
them to begin spraying just as the bomb ignited. In the ensuing
panic, thousands of occupants of the building escaped down the
stairs. No one would consider a fire extinguisher out of the
ordinary in a crisis situation after the bombing. As a result,
potentially every occupant in the World Trade Center could have
been infected.
If the intent of the terrorists had been to demonstrate how
vulnerable the population of the United States is, the addition of
biological agents to the conventional attack would really have
terrified leaders and other citizens in the United States.
These incidents of potential biological terrorism must raise concern
and questions about civilized society's ability (or more accurately,
inability) to deal with such an eventuality. As we enter the twenty-
first century, we may well be facing weapons of mass destruction
used, not on the battlefield by warriors but among dense population
centers by deranged non-nation states-a sobering prospective.
Clearly, more has to be done to overcome this dramatic
vulnerability-and soon.
Resolution
Biological terrorism is a challenge for the diplomatic, technical,
military, medical, and intelligence communities, but the political
arena may hold the biggest stick to deter biological warfare
aggression. The BWC is the international vehicle to prevent
biological proliferation. Unfortunately, it does not provide for
verification or punitive measures.67 With the blatant violations of
Russia and Iraq, much tougher verification protocols and stronger
teeth must be built into the BWC. This is especially challenging
given that the dual-use technology that produces biological agents
gives the biological warfare producer an almost built-in plausible
deniability.
The technical community has the greatest and most urgent
challenge to develop effective detectors, both on the battlefield and
in biological agent detectors similar to metal detectors. This effort
should be a top priority. There should also be technological
exploration, in concert with the intelligence community, for means
to detect clandestine biological production facilities. The state-of-
the-art must be pushed to find some means to detect a production
facility with certainty, no matter the size. Both human intelligence
and the national technical means must be greatly improved.
The military challenge is to train and equip to respond to a detected
biological threats. To respond on the battlefield, militaries must
develop effective, comfortable, and long-wearing protective
clothing to replace the existing ensemble. A self-contained, air
conditioned unit would be ideal. The military must also be capable
of responding to a more strategic biological warfare threat-the
production facilities and stored munitions. Planners must work
with the technology community to develop a capability to bomb a
biological warfare target and destroy the viability of the agents
before they can be brought to bear on friendly forces and without
causing unacceptable levels of collateral damage. For obvious
political reasons, such precision-guided munitions should, also, be
kept non-nuclear. The military also should hone its special
operations, direct action skills for the biological (as well as
chemical and nuclear) mission. The special operation option may
be a more plausible alternative, depending on the scenario.
The medical community should continue to work on biological
warfare vaccinations that are broad-based, safe, and in sufficient
quantities to inoculate those people most susceptible to biological
warfare attacks. This daunting task will be even more challenging
given the controversy about the vaccines administered during
Desert Storm and their suspected connection with the Gulf War
Syndrome.68 Doctors should also strive to improve the post-attack
treatment in terms of rapid diagnosis, effective medical treatment,
and a responsive surge capability to administer to large numbers of
biological warfare-exposed patients.
The intelligence community must be strengthened and sensitized in
its efforts to gather data on the biological warfare threat. More
resources should be directed toward identifying biological warfare
threats by human and national technical means. This is especially
important to deter terrorism in the interim until human intelligence
and national technical means can provide more definitive answers
about who are the haves and have nots.
Finally, United States and allied political leadership should
articulate a clear retaliatory policy against the use of any weapon of
mass destruction. This was an effective deterrent on both sides
during the cold war, and it appears to have deterred Saddam
Hussein during Desert Storm. Perhaps even more importantly, this
policy must be supported by unrelenting resolve to actually carry
out the retaliation.
Since countering BW is an issue that crosses many government
agency borders, the direction of the effort should come from a
multi-agency steering group. This steering group initially should
include principals or primary deputies from the Office of the White
House, Department of Defense, Federal Emergency Management
Agency, Public Health Service, Central Intelligence Agency, and
Department of Justice. Well- versed technical and operational
advisors will be essential to steer the effort.
Many of these agencies already have ongoing programs, but there is
little senior-level cohesion to these fragmented endeavors.
Additionally, some of these efforts have demonstrated blatant
parochialism. A multi-agency steering group would overcome these
stovepipe attitudes and efforts, placing emphasis on national
interests and prioritizing accordingly.
Conclusions
Biological warfare has been a threat for decades if not centuries.
Yet the United States is ill-prepared to defend against or counter
it-why? One view is that "the United States has a tendency to
wish the problem would go away because it seems too unsavory and
too difficult to handle."69 Another skeptic says, "We don't need it
[BW defense] because we have a treaty."70 It seems the real issue
is the apparent imbalance between demonstrated threat versus
resources expended to meet that biological warfare threat.
In the case of biological warfare, the fixes are technically difficult
and they will not be low-cost. Weigh this against a threat that has
not yet fully manifested itself. It almost seems logical that decision
makers would be reluctant to spend scarce resources against a
heretofore invisible threat. However, the United States is moving
toward a more aggressive counter-BW program. In February 1995,
the White House published a national security strategy that said:
U.S. forces must be prepared to deter, prevent and defend against
their use. The United States will retain the capacity to retaliate
against those who might contemplate the use of weapons of mass
destruction, so that the costs of such use will be seen as
outweighing the gains. However, to minimize the impact of
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction on our interests, we
will need the capability not only to deter their use against either
ourselves or our allies and friends, but also, where necessary and
feasible, to prevent it. We are placing a high priority on improving
our ability to locate, identify, and disable arsenals of weapons of
mass destruction, production and storage facilities for such
weapons, and their delivery systems. To minimize the vulnerability
of our forces abroad to weapons of mass destruction, we are placing
a high priority on improving our ability to locate, identify and
disable arsenals of weapons of mass destruction, production and
storage facilities for such weapons, and their delivery systems.71
This is a step in the right direction, but it needs to be a giant step.
The biological warfare threat looms. The United States must have
the capability to detect, preempt, and protect before someone
strikes us or our allies with a poor man's nuke.
Epilogue-9 January
This is a CNN special report live from the Anthrax Task Force
Center Miami. This morning, the fatality count was 16,437. This
grim figure was just given to us by doctors here. Unfortunately,
they say the number is going to increase dramatically because so
many patients are close to death right now. Doctors are working
frantically to save as many as possible, but they are running out of
antibiotics and facing massive overcrowding. The halls are crowded
with gurneys, and relatives are being asked to wait outside unless
their loved one is critical. And there are many of those.
The Anthrax Task Force was quickly assembled on the sixth of
January after doctors across the nation diagnosed the horrible
epidemic as pulmonary anthrax. The Federal Emergency
Management Agency heads the team that consists of representatives
from the FBI, the Center for Disease Control, the Armed Forces
Military Intelligence Center, and the US Army Research Institute of
Infectious Diseases, to name just a few. They are warning anyone
who attended the Orange Bowl on New Year's Day to seek medical
attention immediately. If you are experiencing cold-like symptoms,
you are probably infected. Do not hesitate, or it will be fatal. The
FBI reports that this appears to be a deliberate act of mass murder.
But that is all they have been able to determine. They are offering a
ten million dollar reward for any information about this horrendous
crime. ?
This is all from Miami. Back to CNN News Headquarters.
Notes
1. Montgomery (Alabama) Advertiser, November 24, 1994, sec. B.
2.Kathleen C. Bailey, ed., Director's Series on Proliferation
(Springfield, Va.: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, May
23, 1994), 2.
3.Robert Harris and Jeremy Paxman, A Higher Form of Killing
(New York: Hill and Wang, 1982), 74.
4.Ibid., 9.
5.Bailey, 9-10, and Harris and Paxman, 74.
6.Charles Piller and Keith R. Yamamoto, Gene Wars, Military
Control Over the New Genetic Technologies (New York: Beech
Tree Books, 1988), 29.
7.Ernest T. Takafuji, M.D., M.P.H., Col, US Army, "Biological
Weapons and Modern Warfare" (Fort McNair, Washington, D.C.,
The Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National Defense
University 1991), 4. 8.Bailey, 10.
9.Harris and Paxman, 75-81.
10.Sheldon H. Harris, Factories of Death, Japanese Biological
Warfare 1932-45 and the American Cover-up (New York:
Routledge, 1994), 113-131.
11.Bailey, 10-11, and Harris and Paxman, 75-83.
12.Jonathan B. Tucker, "The Future of Biological Warfare," in
Thomas Wander and Eric H. Arnett, eds., The Proliferation of
Advanced Weaponry (Washington, D.C.: AAAS, 1993), 16.
13.Harris, Factories of Death, 68-74.
14.Ibid., 88-93.
15.Bailey, 15.
16.Harris, Factories of Death, 162-63.
17.United States Army, U.S. Army Activity in the U.S. Biological
Warfare Programs, vol. 2 (Washington, D.C.: US Government
Printing Office, 1977), 29.
18.Bailey, 16, and Harris, Factories of Death, 164.
19.Ibid, 17.
20.Tucker, 18.
21.Bailey, 19, and Jeanne McDermott, The Killing Winds, The
Menace of Biological Warfare (New York: Arbor House, 1987),
30-32.
22.Harris, Factories of Death, 171-72, and Tucker, 6-7.
23.McDermott, 189-90.
24.Leonard A. Cole, Clouds of Secrecy, The Army's Germ Warfare
Tests over Populated Areas (Landam, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield,
1988), 107-19, and Stephen Rose, "The Coming Explosion of
Silent Weapons," Naval War College Review, 42, (Summer 1989):
26-27.
25.Bailey, 11; Harris, Factories of Death, 197-98; and McDermott,
156.
26.Cole, 131; Harris, Factories of Death, 220-22; and McDermott,
37-44.
27.Bailey, 12
28."Report: Russia making `Superplague Germs," The Honolulu
Advertiser, 28 March 1994.
29.Joseph D. Douglas, America the Vulnerable: The Threat of
Chemical/Biological Warfare, The New Shape of Terrorism and
Conflict (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1987), 29.
30.Montgomery Advertiser, 8 April 1995.
31.David Van Biema, "Prophet of Poison," Time, 3 April 1995, 28.
32.Ibid., 29. 33.Mari Yamaguchi, "Japanese Cult Had Bacteria
Useful for Germ Warfare" San Francisco Chronicle, 29 March
1995.
34.Van Biema, 28.
35.United States Department of Defense (DOD), Office of the
Secretary of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, Final
Report to Congress (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing
Office, April 1992), 15.
36.Jonathan B. Tucker, "Lessons of Iraq's Biological Warfare
Programme" Arms Control, December 1993, 237.
37.Ibid.
38.Ibid., 240.
39.DOD, 639.
40.Tucker, 2.
41.Bailey, 27.
42.This is based on the author's experience as chief of the team
chartered with finding the solution to attacking biological warfare
storage and production facilities.
43."Biological Plan Bombed," London: Reuters Wire Service, 3
February 1991.
44.John M. Broder and David Lamb. "Some Allies Won't Join
Offensive, Cheney Says." Los Angeles Times, 24 December 1990.
45.DOD, 639-40.
46.President George Bush, "Crisis in the Gulf," US State
Department Dispatch, II, 2, (14 January 1991): 25.
47.Tucker, 250-59.
48.Bailey, 26-27; and Rose, 11-12.
49.Defense Nuclear Agency, Biological Weapons Proliferation (Ft.
Detrick, Md.: US Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious
Diseases, April 1994), 49.
50.Tucker, 259.
51.Defense Nuclear Agency, 46.
52.Ibid.
53.Ibid., 50.
54.Rose, 29.
55.Tucker, 12.
56.John F. Guilmartin Jr., and Sir Michael Howard, Two Historians
in Technology and War (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: US Army War
College, 20 July 1994), 33.
57.Prodigy Services Company. Software Returned to U.S. Firms, 3
April 1995.
58.Defense Nuclear Agency, 50.
59.Rose, 35-46.
60.Ibid., 82.
61.Bailey, 67-76.
62.DOD, 639-46.
63.Rose, 85.
64.Ibid., 35-46.
65.Bailey, 62-63.
66.Ibid., 40-41.
67.Ibid., 85-90.
68.USA Today, December 8, 1994.
69.Rose, 20.
70.Bailey, 35.
71.The White House, A National Security Strategy of Engagement
and Enlargement (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
February 1995), 14.
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those
of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic
environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official
position of the US Government, Department of Defense, the United
States Air Force or the Air University.
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