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Battlefield of the Future: Air Theory for the 21st
by John A. Warden
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Battlefield of the Future
Chapter 4
Air Theory for the Twenty-first Century
Col John A. Warden III, USAF
War in the twenty-first century will be significantly different for
the United States from anything encountered before the Gulf War.
American wars will be increasingly precise; imprecision will be too
expensive physically and politically to condone. Our political
leaders and our citizenry will insist that we hit only what we are
shooting at and that we shoot the right thing. Increased use of
precision weapons will mean far less dependence on the multitudes
of people or machines needed in the past to make up for inaccuracy
in weapons. Precision will come to suggest not only that a weapon
strike exactly where it is aimed, but also that the weapons be
precise in destroying or affecting only what is supposed to be
affected. Standoff and indirect-fire precision weapons will become
available to many others, which will make massing of large
numbers in the open suicidal and the safety of deploying sea-based
or land-based aircraft close to a combat area problematic.
We might hope that more accurate weapons would drive potential
enemy leaders to be less enamored of achieving their political
objectives with force; if we are very lucky, perhaps the world will
move in this direction. Of at least equal likelihood, however, states
and other entities will turn to other forms of warfare-such as
attacks on enemy strategic centers of gravity. These attacks may be
via missiles, space, or unconventional means, but all will recognize
that they must achieve their objective before the United States
chooses to involve itself. This, in turn, will increase the premium
on American ability to move within hours to any point on the globe
without reliance on en route bases.
The advent of nonlethal weapons technology will expand our
options over the full spectrum of war. These new weapons will find
application against communications, artillery, bridges, and internal
combustion engines, to name but a few potential targets. And of
greatest interest, they will accomplish their ends without
dependence on big explosions that destroy more property than
necessary and that cause unplanned human casualties. Can these
weapons replace traditional lethal tools? In theory they can, as long
as we accept the idea that war is fought to make the enemy do your
will. What we will surely find, however, is that these weapons give
us operational concepts and opportunities well beyond what would
be possible if we merely substitute them for conventional weapons.
The United States can achieve virtually all military objectives
without recourse to weapons of mass destruction. Conversely, other
states, unable to afford the hyperwar arsenal now the exclusive
property of the United States, will at least experiment with them.
The challenge for America is to decide if it wants to negate these
weapons without replying or preempting in kind. Accompanying
this question is the question of nuclear deterrence in a significantly
changed world. Although deterrence will certainly be greatly
different from our cold war conception of it, does it lose its utility
in all situations? How should US nuclear forces be maintained?
This entire matter deserves serious thought, soon.
Information will become a prominent, if not predominant, part of
war to the extent that whole wars may well revolve around seizing
or manipulating the enemy's datasphere.1 Furthermore, it may be
important in some instances to furnish the enemy with accurate
information. This concept is discussed later in this chapter.
The world is currently experiencing what may be the most
revolutionary period in all of human existence with major
revolutions taking place simultaneously in geopolitics, production,
technology, and military affairs. The pace of change is accelerating
and shows no sign of letting up. If we are to succeed in protecting
our interests in this environment, we must spend more time than
ever in our past thinking about war and developing new
employment concepts. Attrition warfare belongs to another age, and
the days when wars could be won by sheer bravery and
perseverance are gone. Victory will go to those who think through
the problem and capitalize on every tool available-regardless of
its source. Let us begin laying the intellectual framework for future
air operations.
All military operations, including air operations, should be
consonant with the prevailing political and physical environ- ment.
In World War II the United States and her Allies imposed
widespread destruction and civilian casualties on Japan and
Germany; prior to the Gulf War, a new political climate meant that
a proposal to impose similar damage on Iraq would have met
overwhelming opposition from American and coalition political
leaders. As late as the Vietnam War the general inaccuracy of
weapons required large numbers of men to expose themselves to
hostile fire in order to launch enough weapons to have some effect
on the enemy; now, the new physical reality of accurate weapons
means that few men need be or should be exposed.
Military operations must be conducted so as to give reasonable
probability of accomplishing desired political goals at an
acceptable price. Indeed, before one can develop or adopt a concept
of operations, an understanding of war and political objectives is
imperative.
For war to make any sense, it must be conducted for some reason.
The reason may not be very good or seem to make much sense, but
with remarkably few exceptions, most rulers who have gone to war
have done so with the objective of achieving something-perhaps
additional territory, a halt to offensive enemy operations, avenging
an insult, or forcing a religious conversion. Very few have gone to
war to amuse themselves with no concern for the outcome or desire
for anything other than the opportunity to have a good donnybrook.
This is not to say, however, that all those who have gone to war
have done so with a clear idea of their objective and what it would
take to achieve it. Indeed, failure to define ends and means clearly
has led to innumerable disasters for attacker and attacked alike.
First rule: if you are going to war, know why you are going.
Corollary to the first rule: have some understanding of what your
enemy wants out of the war and the price each of you is willing to
pay. Remember: war is not quintessentially about fighting and
killing; rather, it is about getting something that the opponent is
not inclined to hand over. Still another way to express this idea is
this: war is all about making your enemy do something you want
him to do when he doesn't want to do it-and then preventing him
from taking an alternative approach which you would also find
unacceptable.
There are a variety of ways to make an enemy do what you want
him to do. In simple terms, however, there are but three: make it too
expensive for the enemy to resist, with "expensive" understood in
political, economic, and military terms; physically prevent an
enemy from doing something by imposing strategic or operational
paralysis on him; or destroy him absolutely.
The last of these options is rare in history, difficult to execute,
fraught with moral concerns, and normally not very useful because
of all the unintended consequences it engenders. We will pass over
it and concentrate on the first two.
When we talk about making something so costly for an enemy that
he decides to accept our position, we are talking about something
very difficult to define or predict precisely. After all, human
organizations typically react in an infinite number of ways to
similar stimuli. The difficulty of defining or predicting, however,
does not suggest that it is a hopeless task. Imprecise, yes; hopeless,
no.
We all know from our experience that we regularly make decisions
whether or not to do something. We don't go on a trip if it costs
more money than we are ready to pay; we don't go mountain
climbing if we fear the cost of falling; and we don't drive above the
speed limit if the probability of a ticket seems high, and so on.
Enemies, whether they be states, criminal organizations, or
individuals, all do the same thing; they almost always act or don't
act based on some kind of cost-benefit ratio. The enemy may not
assess a situation the way we do, and we may disagree with his
assessment, but assessments are part and parcel of every decision.
From an airpower standpoint, it is our job to determine what price
(negative or positive) it will take to induce an enemy to accept our
conditions. To do so, however, we need to understand how our
enemies are organized. One might object that understanding how
our enemies are organized is an impossible task, especially if we
don't know in advance who they are. Fortunately, this is not the
case; as we shall see, every life-based system is organized about the
same way. Only the details vary.
Whether we are talking about an industrialized state, a drug cartel,
or an electric company, every organization follows the same
organizational scheme. This is very important to us as military
planners because it allows us to develop general concepts not
dependent on a specific enemy. Likewise, as we understand how
our enemies are organized, we can easily move on to the concept of
centers of gravity. Understanding centers of gravity then allows us
to make reasonable guesses as to how to create costs which may
lead the enemy to accept our demands. If the enemy does not
respond to imposed costs, then this same understanding of
organization and centers of gravity shows us how to impose
operational or strategic paralysis on our enemy so he becomes
incapable of opposing us. Let's start with the basics of organization
(table 1).
Table 1
SYSTEM ATTRIBUTES
BodyState Drug CartelElectric
CompanyLeaderBrain
-eyes
-nervesGovernment
-communication
-securityLeader
-communication
-securityCentral ControlOrganic EssentialFood/oxygen
-conversion via
vital organsEnergy
(electricity, oil,
food), moneyCoca source
plus conversionInput (heat,
hydro)
Output
(electricity)InfrastructureVessels, bones
musclesRoads, airfields,
factoriesRoads, airways
sea lanesTransmission
linesPopulationCellsPeopleGrowers,
distributors,
processorsWorkersFighting
MechanismLeukocytesMilitary, police,
firemenStreet soldiersRepairmen
As can be seen from the preceding table, a wide variety of systems
ranging from an individual to an electric company are organized
with remarkable similarity. This organizing scheme is sufficiently
widespread to make it an acceptable starting place for working out
most military or business problems. It helps us put into effect
injunctions from ancient Greek and Chinese alike to "know thyself"
and "thine enemy." In addition to simplifying the "knowing"
process, this organizational scheme gives us an easy way to
categorize information, which we must do if we are to make real
decisions. For practical purposes, the world contains an infinite
amount of information which by definition cannot be totally
correlated. Filters of some sort are a necessity; this systems
approach provides an easy way to categorize information and to
understand the relative importance of any particular bit.
Our primary interest is not in building a theory of organiza- ion;
rather, it is to derive an understanding of what we might need to
impose an intolerable cost or strategic or operational paralysis on
an enemy. To grasp the essence of this problem, it helps to
rearrange our table in the form of five rings (fig. 2).
Rearranging the tabular information into the five rings diagram
gives us several key insights. First, it shows us that we are dealing
with an interdependent system. That is, each ring has a relationship
with all of the others and all play some role. Seeing the enemy as a
system gives us enormous advantages over those who see him
merely as an army or air force, or worse yet, as some quantity of
tanks or airplanes or ships or drug pushers without ever
understanding what it is that allows these tanks or ships to operate
and for what purpose.
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Second, it gives us some idea of the relative importance of each
entity contained within a given ring. For example, the head of a
drug cartel (the leadership ring) has the power to change the cartel
considerably whereas the street soldier (in the fielded military
forces ring) assigned the job of protecting a pusher in a back alley
can have virtually no effect on the cartel as a whole.
Third, it portrays rather graphically an ancient truth about war: our
objective is always to convince the enemy to do what we want him
to do. The person or entity with the power to agree to change is the
leader in the middle. Thus, directly or indirectly, all of our energies
in war should be focused on changing the mind of the leadership.
Fourth, our rings clearly show that the military is a shield or spear
for the whole system, not the essence of the system. Given a choice,
even in something so simple as personal combat, we certainly
wouldn't make destruction of our enemy's shield our end game.
Contrary to Clausewitz, destruction of the enemy military is not the
essence of war; the essence of war is convincing the enemy to
accept your position, and fighting his military forces is at best a
means to an end and at worst a total waste of time and energy.
Fifth, and last, the rings give us the concept of working from the
inside to the outside as opposed to the converse. Understanding
this concept is essential to taking a strategic rather than a tactical
approach to winning wars.
In using the rings to develop war ideas, it is imperative to start with
the largest identifiable system. That is, if the immediate problem is
reversing the effects of an invasion, one would start the analysis
with the largest possible look at the system description of the
invading country. An example: when the Iraqis invaded Kuwait,
Gen Norman Schwarzkopf quickly grasped the idea that his
problem was first with Iraq as a state and only secondarily with
Iraq's military forces within Kuwait itself. At some point, however,
we wanted to understand details about Iraq's army in Kuwait. Not
surprisingly, we found that it was organized on the five-ring
principle and insofar as our objective with respect to that army was
something other than pure destruction, five-ring analysis gave us a
good picture of what to strike. Had we so desired, we could have
continued our analysis down to the level of an individual soldier
because he is organized about the same way as is his country. From
a diagraming standpoint, then, we start out with the big picture of
the strategic entity.2
When we want more information, we pull out subsystems like
electrical power under system essentials and show it as a five-ring
system. We may have to make several more five-ring models to
show successively lower electrical subsystems. We continue the
process until we have sufficient understanding and information to
act. Note that with this approach, we have little need for the infinite
amount of information theoretically available on a strategic entity
like a state. Instead, we can identify very quickly what we don't
know and concentrate our information search on relevant data.
For the mathematically inclined, it will be clear that we are
describing a process of differentiation as opposed to integra- tion.
In a complex world, a top-down, differentiation approach is a
necessity. Important to note, however, is that virtually all our
military training (and business training) starts us at the lowest
possible level and asks us to work our way up. Thus, we learn a
tactical approach to the world. However, when we want to think not
about fighting wars but about winning them, we must take a
strategic and operational-or top-down- approach if we are to
succeed.
So far, we have not talked explicitly about centers of gravity, but
we have derived them by showing how we and our enemies are
organized. Centers of gravity are primarily organizational concepts.
Which ones are most important becomes clear when we decide
what effect we want to produce on the enemy in order to induce
him to accept our position. Which ones to attack becomes a matter
of our capability.
Let us review key concepts discussed to this point. First, the object
of war is to induce the enemy to do your bidding. Second, it is the
leadership of the enemy that decides to ac- commodate you. Third,
engagement of the enemy military may be a means to an end, but
the engagement is never an end in itself and should be avoided
under most circumstances. Fourth, every life-form-based system is
organized similarly: a leadership function to direct it, a system-
essential function to convert energy from one form to another, an
infrastructure to tie it all together, a population to make it function,
and a defense system to protect it from attack. Fifth, the enemy is a
system, not an independent mass of tanks, aircraft, or dope pushers.
And sixth, the five rings provide a good method for categorizing
information and identifying centers of gravity.
We said earlier that our goal in war would generally be to make the
cost-political, economic, and military-to the enemy higher than he
was willing to pay or to impose strategic or operational paralysis on
him so that he would become incapable of acting. Now, with an
understanding of how enemies are organized, we can begin the
process of determining how to accomplish either or both with
airpower tools.
The object of war is to convince the enemy leadership to do what
you want it to do. The enemy leadership acts on some cost/risk
basis, but we can't know precisely what it might be. We can,
however, make some reasonable guesses based on system and
organization theory. To do this, put yourself in the center of the
five rings as the leader of a strategic entity like a drug cartel or
state. You have certain rather basic goals that normally will take
precedence over others. First, you want to survive personally (this
is not to say you won't die for your system, but you probably see
yourself and the system as being closely tied together). For you to
survive personally (in most instances) the system you lead must
survive in something reasonably close to its present form.
Let us say that you are the leader of a drug cartel and an enemy
threatens you credibly with the following (to which you cannot
respond): your bank accounts will be zeroed, your communications
with the world outside your mountain retreat will be severed, your
cocaine processing facility will be destroyed, and your house will
be converted to rubble. To avoid these nasty things, all you have to
do is agree to stop selling cocaine in one country. What do you do?
If you are remotely rational, you agree immediately. Failure to do
so means your system effectively ceases to exist, which leaves you
personally in a precarious position and unable even to retire in
splendor because you can't get at the billions you had socked away
in a country with strict privacy in banking laws.
Suppose that only some of these dire events were threatened or
deemed likely. In this case, you might choose to negotiate. Perhaps
you would agree to sell less cocaine in the target country. Perhaps
you would agree to a moratorium on sales. Your enemy might or
might not accept these counterproposals; it would depend largely
on how much he was willing to spend to create a cost for you. In
our ideal world we like to think we don't negotiate with drug
dealers or tyrants like Saddam Hussein. In the real world we do so
all the time. Very rarely are we willing to invest the time and effort
required to achieve maximal results.
Our discussion of costs has so far been oriented at a strategic level.
Does it also apply at an operational level-the level at which
military forces are actually employed? The answer is an absolute
yes. Military commanders, with the exception of a few really stupid
ones, have always weighed costs as they were planning or
conducting an operation. Let's take a hypothetical look at George
Patton and the Third Army in World War II.
George Patton was an aggressive commander who believed that
speed of advance was key to success. Obviously, then, the Third
Army needed to move quickly as a system-not just the tanks, but
the whole system that supported them at the front. From the
German side, if moving fast was good from George Patton's
perspective, it was bad from theirs. Now, let us do a quick five-ring
analysis of the Third Army from just the cost standpoint. (We will
return to it later when we discuss operational paralysis.)
Let us suppose that something catastrophic happened to Third
Army's fuel supply in mid-September of 1944. Let us assume that
someone tells General Patton at a staff meeting that all fuel
deliveries to his Army will cease in two days. His choices are
basically two: slow down or stop the movement of his army so that
it can assume a reasonable defensive position, or tell everyone to
plunge ahead as far as possible until they run out of gas. Since the
latter is likely to leave the majority of the army in an untenable and
unplanned position and is unlikely to achieve anything final, Patton
opts for the former because he has assessed the cost of continuing
as too high for the possible results.
Realize also that unbeknownst to the commanding general, every
subordinate commander and soldier will start acting on information
about an impending fuel shortage as soon as he hears about it. The
effect is obvious; by the time the formal order to halt comes down,
forward movement already would have ceased and hoarding of
remaining fuel supplies would have become widespread. The
principle is simple: at all levels, leaders make decisions based on a
cost/benefit analysis.
Before moving on to discuss imposition of strategic and operational
paralysis, we need to make two more points on the subject of cost.
The first is that the enemy leader may not recognize how much
attacks on him are costing at the time of attack and in the future.
This almost certainly was the case with Saddam Hussein, who
simply failed to comprehend for several weeks what the strategic air
attacks against him were doing to his future. Had he understood, he
might have sued for peace the first morning of the war. His lack of
understanding flowed from ignorance of the effect of modern air
attack3 and from lack of information. The coalition attack in the
first minutes had so disrupted communications at strategic levels
that it was very difficult to receive and process damage reports.4
A similar event may have taken place in Japan in late 1944 and into
1945. Japanese army leaders persisted in their desire to continue
the war even though their homeland was collapsing around them as
a result of strategic air and sea attacks. They apparently lacked the
in-depth understanding of war and their country to appreciate what
was really happening. Like Saddam a half-century later, the
Japanese were stuck in a paradigm that said that the only important
operations in war were the clashes of armies. In the Japanese case
part of the problem may have stemmed from the Bushido code of
personal bravery that tended to assume that success in war would
be a function of agglomerating many tactical successes. The
concepts of strategic and operational war were simply not there.
Two lessons flow from these examples: you may have to educate
the enemy on the effect your operations are likely to have. You may
also have to give him accurate information on the extent of his
losses-and the long-term and short-term effects likely to flow
from them.
As we have seen, we cannot depend on the his making the
concessions we ask because of a realistic cost/benefit analysis. In
the event we cannot educate and inform him properly, we must be
ready to consider imposition of strategic and operational paralysis.
Fortunately, the effort we put into understanding how enemies are
organized and how to impose costs leads us directly into the
concepts and mechanisms of paralysis.
The idea of paralysis is quite simple. If the enemy is seen as a
system, we need to identify those parts of the system which we can
affect in such a way as to prevent the system from doing something
we don't want it to do. The best place to start is normally at the
center for if we can prevent the system's leadership from gathering,
processing, and using information we don't want him to have, we
have effectively paralyzed the system at a strategic level.
Let us go back to the drug cartel example we earlier discussed.
Suppose that the suppliers and pushers hear nothing from
headquarters for some period of time. Their finances begin to dry
up, nobody protects them from competitors, and their stocks
dwindle quickly. What do they do? They begin to look for other
cartels to deal with or for other lines of work. In a short period of
time, but not instantly, the paralysis imposed at the strategic level
of the cartel destroys the organization's ability to sell the drugs its
opposition didn't want it to sell-all while the overwhelming
majority of the individuals in the organization are unharmed and
not even directly threatened.
The obvious place to induce strategic system paralysis is at the
leadership, or brain, level. What happens, however, if the brain
cannot be located or attacked? Although the leadership function
always provides the most lucrative place to induce paralysis, it is
not the only possibility. Suppose that we can't reach the drug lord,
but we can reach and destroy one of his system essentials, such as
his financial net? We are likely to have created a different level of
paralysis. The organization may still be able to function, and it will
certainly search furiously to repair or replace its financial net. If it
doesn't succeed, however, this paralysis in one part of the strategic
system is likely to cause much of the rest to atrophy and become
ineffective. After all, the majority of the organization's suppliers
and workers must eat and must pay for services rendered. If they are
not getting regular pay, they are going to be forced again to find
alternatives outside the organization that can no longer provide
them with a system essential.
At a big-state level, one can imagine a similar outcome if the state
loses a system essential like electricity. Imagine the effect on the
United States if all of its electricity stops functioning.
Let us return to our George Patton and Third Army example to look
at operational paralysis. Patton depended on speed for success, but
not unfocused speed. He needed to know where he was going, what
his troops were going to encounter, where to send the fuel and
ammunition, and where to shift land and air forces as required.
Suppose the Germans had succeeded in blinding Patton by
depriving him of his ability to gather and disseminate information.
Under these conditions, Third Army would have been effectively
paralyzed insofar as its ability to conduct rapid offensives simply
because offensives on the ground at any speed are extraordinarily
complex and require huge amounts of good information.
If the Germans were unable to blind Patton, what else could they
have done to induce operational paralysis? Again, going from the
center of the rings toward the outside suggests we should look next
in the system-essential (or supply) ring for an answer. Most
assuredly, Patton's speed depended on fuel for his tanks and
trucks-no fuel, no speed. Thus, elimination of fuel, perhaps by
interdicting the Red Ball Express, induces the desired form of
operational paralysis and converts Third Army into something
different. Before its fuel was cut off, Third Army was a fast moving,
dangerous threat to the Germans; after the fuel stops, it becomes a
slow, slogging beast signifi- cantly different in nature and threat.
So far we have discussed effects we might want to produce on the
enemy: untenable costs or paralysis at one or more levels. Next, we
must look at how we go about doing it. Before proceeding,
however, it is useful to note that we have used quite a few pages
talking about air theory and have yet to discuss bombs, missiles, or
bullets. The reason is simple; well before it makes any sense to talk
about mechanics, it is imperative to decide what effect you want to
produce on the enemy. Making this decision is the toughest
intellectual challenge; once the desired effect is decided, figuring
out how to attain it is much easier if for no other reason than we
practice the necessary tactical events every day, whereas we rarely
(far too rarely) think about strategic and operational problems. Let
us propose a very simple rule for how to go about producing the
effect: do it very fast.
It may seem facetious to reduce the "how" to such a simple rule,
and, indeed, we will now make it a little more complex by talking
about parallel attack. Nevertheless, the essence of success in future
war will certainly be to make everything happen you want to
happen in a very short period of time-instantly if possible. Why?
And what is parallel war?
Parallel war brings so many parts of the enemy system under near-
simultaneous attack that the system simply cannot react to defend
or to repair itself. It is like the death of a thousand cuts; any
individual cut is unlikely to be serious. A hundred, however, start
to slow a body considerably, and a thousand are fatal because the
body cannot deal with that many assaults on it. Our best example of
parallel war to date is the strategic attack on Iraq in the Gulf War.
Within a matter of minutes the coalition, attacked over a hundred
key targets across Iraq's entire strategic depth. In an instant,
important functions in all of Iraq stopped working very well. Phone
service fell precipitously, lights went out, air defense centers
stopped controlling subordinate units, and key leadership offices
and personnel were destroyed. To put Iraq's dilemma in
perspective, the coalition struck three times as many targets in Iraq
in the first 24 hours as Eighth Air Force hit in Germany in all of
1943!
The bombing offensive against Germany (until the very end) was a
serial operation, as virtually all military operations have been since
the dawn of history. Operations have been serial because
communications made concentration of men imperative, the
inaccuracy of weapons meant that a great number had to be
employed to have an effect, and the difficulty of movement
essentially restricted operations to one or two locations. In
addition, military operations have mostly been conducted against
the enemy's military, not against his entire strategic or operational
system. All this meant that war was a matter of action and reaction,
of culminating points, of regrouping, of reforming. Essentially, war
was an effort by one side to break through a defensive line with
serial attacks or it was an attempt to prevent breakthrough.
In any event the majority of the enemy system lay in relative safety
through most of a conflict with the fighting and damage confined
largely to the front itself. Even when aerial bombardment began to
reach strategic depths, the bombardment tended to be serial (again
because of inaccurate weapons and the need to concentrate
attacking forces so they could penetrate an aerial defensive line).
This meant that the enemy could gather his defenders in one or two
places and that he could concentrate the entire system's repair
assets on the one or two places which may have suffered some
damage. Not so in Iraq.
In Iraq, a country about the same size as prewar Germany, so many
key facilities suffered so much damage so quickly that it was
simply not possible to make strategically meaningful repair. Nor
was it possible or very useful to concentrate defenses; successful
defense of one target merely meant that one out of over a hundred
didn't get hit at that particular time. As in the thousand cuts
analogy, it just doesn't matter very much if some of the cuts are
deflected. It is important to note that Iraq was a very tough country
strategically. Iraq had spent an enormous amount of money and
energy on giving itself lots of protection and redundancy and its
efforts would have paid off well if it had been attacked serially as it
had every right to anticipate it would. In other words, the parallel
attack against Iraq was against what may well have been the country
best prepared in all the world for attack. If it worked there, it will
probably work elsewhere.
Executing parallel attack is a subject for another essay or even a
book. Suffice it to say here that those things brought under attack
must be carefully selected to achieve the desired effect.
We have now provided the groundwork for a theory of air power to
use into the twenty-first century. To summarize: understand the
political and technological environment; identify political
objectives; determine how you want to induce the enemy to do your
will (imposed cost, paralysis, or destruction); use the five-ring
systems analysis to get sufficient information on the enemy to make
possible identification of appropriate centers of gravity; and attack
the right targets in parallel as quickly as possible. To make all this
a little more understandable, it is useful to finish by mentioning the
Gulf War's key strategic and operational lessons, which look as
though they will be useful for the next quarter-century or more.
We can identify 10 concepts that summarize the revolution of the
Gulf War and that must be taken into account as we develop new
force levels and strategy:
1.The importance of strategic attack and the fragility of states at the
strategic level of war 2.Fatal consequences of losing strategic air
superiority 3.The overwhelming effects of parallel warfare 4.The
value of precision weapons 5.The fragility of surface forces at the
operational level of war 6.Fatal consequence of losing operational
air superiority 7.The redefinition of mass and surprise by stealth
and precision 8.The viability of "air occupation" 9.The dominance
of airpower 10.The importance of information at the strategic and
operational levels
Let us look at each of these briefly.
1. The importance of strategic attack and the fragility of states at
the strategic level of war. Countries are inverted pyramids that rest
precariously on their strategic innards-their leadership,
communications, key production, infrastructure, and population. If
a country is paralyzed strategically, it is defeated and cannot
sustain its fielded forces though they be fully intact.
2. Fatal consequences of losing strategic air superiority. When a
state loses its ability to protect itself from air attack, it is at the
mercy of its enemy, and only the enemy's compassion or
exhaustion can save it. The first reason for government is to protect
the citizenry and its property. When a state can no longer do so, it
has lost its reason for being. When a state loses strategic air
superiority and has no reasonable hope of regaining it quickly, it
should sue for peace as quickly as possible. From an offensive
standpoint, winning strategic air superiority is the number one
priority of the commander; once that is accomplished, everything
else is a just a matter of time.
3. The overwhelming effects of parallel warfare. Strategic
organizations, including states, have a small number of vital targets
at the strategic level-in the neighborhood of a few hundred with
an average of perhaps 10 aimpoints per vital target. These targets
tend to be small, very expensive, have few backups, and are hard to
repair. If a significant percentage of them are struck in parallel, the
damage becomes insuperable. Contrast parallel attack with serial
attack where only one or two targets come under attack in a given
day (or longer). The enemy can alleviate the effects of serial attack
by dispersal over time, increasing the defenses of targets that are
likely to be attacked, concentrating his resources to repair damage
to single targets, and conducting counteroffensives. Parallel attack
deprives him of the ability to respond effectively, and the greater
the percentage of targets hit in a single blow, the more nearly
impossible is response.
4. The value of precision weapons. Precision weapons allow the
economical destruction of virtually all targets-especially strategic
and operational targets that are difficult to move or conceal. They
change the nature of war from one of probability to one of
certainty. Wars for millennia have been probability events in which
each side launched huge quantities of projectiles (and men) at one
another in the hope that enough of the projectiles (and men) would
kill enough of the other side to induce retreat or surrender.
Probability warfare was chancy at best. It was unpredictable, full of
surprises, hard to quantify, and governed by accident. Precision
weapons have changed all that. In the Gulf War, we knew with near
certainty that a single weapon would destroy its target. War moved
into the predictable. With precision weapons, even logistics
become simple; destruction of the Iraqis at the strategic,
operational, and tactical levels required that about 12,000
aimpoints be hit. Thus, no longer is it necessary to move a near-
infinite quantity of munitions so that some tiny percentage might
hit something important. Since the Iraqi army was the largest
fielded since the Chinese in the Korean War and since we know
that all countries look about the same at the strategic and
operational levels, we can forecast in advance how many precision
weapons will be needed to defeat an enemy-assuming of course
that we are confident about getting the weapons to their targets.
5. The fragility of surface forces at the operational level of war.
Supporting significant numbers of surface forces (air, land, or sea)
is a tough administrative problem even in peacetime. Success
depends upon efficient distribution of information, fuel, food, and
ammunition. By necessity, efficient distribution depends on an
inverted pyramid of distribution. Supplies of all operational
commodities must be accumulated in one or two locations, then
parceled out to two or four locations, and so on until they
eventually reach the user. The nodes in the system are exceptionally
vulnerable to precision attack. As an example, consider what the
effect would have been of a single air raid a day-even with
nonprecision weapons-on the WWII Red Ball Express or on the
buildup behind VII and XVIII Corps in the Gulf War. The Red Ball
Express became internally unsustainable, and the VII and XVIII
Corps buildups severely strained the resources of the entire US
Army-even in the absence of any enemy attacks. Logistics and
administration dominate surface warfare, and neither is easy to
defend. In the past these activities took place so far behind the lines
that they were reasonably secure. Such is no longer the case-
which brings into serious question any form of warfare that
requires huge logistics and administrative buildup.
6. Fatal consequence of losing operational air superiority.
Functioning at the operational level is difficult even without enemy
interference. If the enemy attains operational air superiority (and
exploits it)5 and can roam at will above indispensable operational
functions like supply, communications, and movement, success is
not possible. As with the loss of strategic air superiority, loss of
operational air superiority spells doom and should prompt quick
measures to retreat-which is likely to be very costly-or to
arrange for surrender terms.
7. The redefinition of mass and surprise by stealth and precision.
For the first time in the history of warfare, a single entity can
produce its own mass and surprise. It is this single entity that
makes parallel warfare possible. Surprise has always been one of
the most important factors in war-perhaps even the single most
important, because it could make up for large deficiencies in
numbers. Surprise was always difficult to achieve because it
conflicted with the concepts of mass and concentration. In order to
have enough forces available to hurl enough projectiles to win the
probability contest, a commander had to assemble and move large
numbers. Of course, assembling and moving large forces in secret
was quite difficult, even in the days before aerial reconnaissance,
so the odds on surprising the enemy were small indeed. Stealth and
precision have solved both sides of the problem; by definition,
stealth achieves surprise, and precision means that a single weapon
accomplishes what thousands were unlikely to accomplish in the
past.
8. The viability of "air occupation." Countries conform to the will
of their enemies when the penalty for not conforming exceeds the
cost of conforming. Cost can be imposed on a state by paralyzing
or destroying its strategic and operational base or by actual
occupation of enemy territory. In the past, occupation (in the rare
instances when it was needed or possible) was accomplished by
ground forces-because there was no good substitute. Today, the
concept of "air occupation" is a reality and in many cases it will
suffice. The Iraqis conformed with UN demands as much as or more
than the French did with German demands when occupied by
millions of Germans. Ground occupation, however, is indicated
when the intent is to colonize or otherwise appropriate the enemy's
homeland.
9. The dominance of airpower. Airpower (fixed wing, helicopter,
cruise missile, satellite), if not checked, will destroy an enemy's
strategic and operational target bases-which are very vulnerable
and very difficult to make less vulnerable. It can also destroy most
tactical targets if necessary.
10. The importance of information at the strategic and operational
levels. In the Gulf War, the coalition deprived Iraq of most of its
ability to gather and use information. At the same time, the
coalition managed its own information requirements acceptably,
even though it was organized in the same way Frederick the Great
had organized himself. Clear for the future is the requirement to
redesign our organizations so they are built to exploit modern
information-handling equipment. This also means flattening
organizations, eliminating most middle management, pushing
decision making to very low levels, and forming worldwide neural
networks to capitalize on the ability of units in and out of the direct
conflict area.
The information lesson from the Gulf was negative; the coalition
succeeded in breaking Iraq's ability to process information but
failed to fill the void by providing Iraqis an alternate source of
information.6 This failure made Saddam's job much easier and
greatly reduced the chance of his overthrow. Capturing and
exploiting the datasphere may well be the most important effort in
many future wars.
Beyond these Gulf War lessons, which have applicability well into
the future, it behooves the air planner to think of one other area:
what can be done with airpower that in the past we knew could
only be done with ground or sea power or couldn't be done at all?
The question must be addressed for several reasons: airpower has
the ability to reach a conflict area faster and cheaper than other
forms of power; employment of air power typically puts far fewer
people at risk than any other form (in the Gulf War, there were
rarely more than a few hundred airmen in the air as opposed to the
tens of thousands of soldiers and sailors in the direct combat
areas); and it may provide the only way for the United States to
participate at acceptable political risk (use of airpower does not
require physical presence on the ground). Let us look at just one
example.
Suppose a large city is under the control of roving gangs of
soldiers, and it is American policy to restore some degree of order
to the city. Normally, we would think that could only be done by
putting our own soldiers on the ground. But what if policymakers
are unwilling to accept the political and physical risks attendant to
doing so? Do we do nothing, or do we look for innovative
solutions?
If we define the problem as one of preventing groups of soldiers
from wandering around a city, we may be able to solve it from the
air. Can we not put a combination of AC-130s and helicopters in
the air equipped with searchlights, loudspeakers, rubber bullets,
entangling chemical nets, and other paraphernalia? When groups
are spotted, they first receive a warning to disperse. If they don't
they find themselves under attack by nonlethal, but unpleasant,
weapons. If these don't work, lethal force is at hand. It may be very
difficult to prevent an individual from skulking around a city or
even robbing an occasional bank. Single individuals, however,
constitute a relatively small tactical problem since they are unlikely
to be able to cause wide-scale disruption as can multiple groups.
The latter problem is serious but manageable; the former is a police
matter.
By the same token, we know that we will be called on to conduct
humanitarian and peacemaking operations. If we think about food
delivery as the same as bomb delivery and understand that with
food, as with bombs, our responsibility is to distribute it to the
right people, we should be able to do as well with food as we do
with bombs. To do so, however, will require putting as much effort
into developing precision food-delivery techniques as we put into
developing precision bomb or cluster-bomb capabilities. The
problem is the same and is theoretically susceptible to an airpower
solution if we are willing to think outside the lines. And indeed,
thinking outside the lines will be a necessity if airpower is to
prosper and to play a key role in defending American interests well
into the next century.
Indeed, there is a new world building around us and the revolutions
in politics, business, and war have happened and we must deal with
them, not ignore them. Of course, it is human nature to stay with
the old ways of doing business even when the external world has
made the old ways obsolete or even dangerous. So many examples
come so easily to mind: the heavy knights at Agincourt refusing to
believe that they were being destroyed by peasants with bows; the
French in World War I exulting the doctrine of "cold steel" against
the machine gun and barbed wire as the flower of a generation
perished; and the steel and auto makers of the United States
convinced that their foreign competitors were inept even as their
market positions plummeted. Accepting the changes made manifest
in the Gulf War will be equally difficult for the United States but
by no means impossible, if we all resolve to think.
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Notes
1.A term introduced by Don Simmons in Hyperion (New York:
Bantam Books, 1990). 2.A strategic entity is any self-contained
system that has the general ability to set its own goals and the
wherewithal to carry them out. A state is normally a strategic entity
as is a drug cartel or a guerrilla organization. 3.Saddam made the
following statement shortly after his successful invasion of Kuwait.
"The United States depends on its Air Force and everyone knows
that no one ever won a war from the air." Thus, his preconceived
notion (shared by many military officers around the world) made it
difficult for him to analyze what was happening to him. 4.As an
aside, the planners had recognized that Saddam would not be able
to gather information, so they had intended to provide him accurate
reports of all attacks by using psychological warfare assets. For a
number of reasons, the planners were unable to make this happen;
as a result, Saddam lacked information that the coalition really
wanted him to have. 5.Some would argue that the mujahideen in
Afghanistan lost operational air superiority and yet still prevailed.
The latter is true; the former is not, because the Stinger antiaircraft
missiles forced the Soviets to operate at an altitude that deprived
them of the ability to hit anything. The Soviets simply did not have
the precision weaponry and detection capability the United States
had in the Gulf War. 6.The coalition provided Iraqi soldiers at the
front great quantities of information and did so effectively; the
same thing did not happen at the strategic level inside Iraq for a
variety of not very good reasons.
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those
of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic
environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official
position of the US Government, Department of Defense, the United
States Air Force or the Air University.
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