Battlefield of the Future: The Revolution in Military Affairs
by Jeffrey McKitrick
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Battlefield of the Future
Chapter 3
The Revolution in Military Affairs
Jeffrey McKitrick
James Blackwell
Fred Littlepage
George Kraus
Richard Blanchfield
Dale Hill*
*Robert Kim, Mark Jacobson, John Moyle, and Steven Kenney also assisted in the preparation of this chapter
According to Andrew Marshall, director of the Office of Net
Assessments in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, "a
Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) is a major change in the
nature of warfare brought about by the innovative application of
new technologies which, combined with dramatic changes in
military doctrine and operational and organizational concepts,
fundamentally alters the character and conduct of military
operations." Such an RMA is now occurring, and those who
understand it and take advantage of it will enjoy a decisive
advantage on future battlefields.
Military theorists around the world have long noted the historical
discontinuities in the conduct of warfare caused by the advent of
new technologies and weapon systems. The Soviets called these
discontinuities "military-technical revolutions." Recently, analysts
in the United States have started calling them RMAs. This change
in terminology was meant to capture the nontechnical dimensions
of military organizations and operations, the sum of which provide
a large part of overall military capabilities.
The nature of these discontinuities is such that warfare after the
"revolution" is unlike what went on before in profound and
significant ways. Throughout history, there have been a number of
such revolutions. Gunpowder produced an early military revolution
in the Western World, transforming both land and naval warfare.
During the mid-nineteenth century, industrialization revolutionized
warfare through railroads, the telegraph, the steam engine, rifled
guns, and ironclad ships. More recently, the mechanization of
warfare during the interwar period led to the development of
blitzkrieg, carrier aviation, amphibious warfare, and strategic
bombing.
In some cases, the changes in technology associated with these
revolutions changed not only transportation, communication, and
warfare but also entire societies as well. During the transportation
revolution, for example, railroads altered the economies of nations
and allowed them to move military forces farther and faster and
sustained them longer. Moreover, these societal changes created
new sets of operational and strategic targets. We currently
characterize these kinds of revolutions as "social-military
revolutions."
To date, the bulk of the intellectual and physical development
associated with the current RMA has focused on new systems and
technologies. What is needed now is a more careful analysis of the
new operational concepts and new organizations that might best
help us realize the full potential of these new systems and
technologies. To reach that level of analysis, we need to start with
an appreciation of the historical and geostrategic contexts in which
the RMA may unfold.
What motivated past changes in the conduct of warfare? Who might
our future competitors be? What will be their political and military
objectives? How might they choose to organize and equip militarily
to achieve those objectives? How might the conduct of warfare
change? The answers to these questions will assist us in identifying
new RMA warfare areas and, in turn, help identify what new
military capabilities the United States will need.
Before proceeding, however, we must issue a word of caution.
Although we think that we now stand at the start of a long period in
which we may face a RMA, we cannot be certain about when the
transition period might start, how long it might last, what new
competitors might arise, when they will arise, or what new warfare
areas might be developed, not to mention a host of other key
questions. In short, we do not have an absolute grasp of the scope,
pace, and implications of this possible RMA.
We can make useful observations even at this early stage. During
and immediately after the First World War, forward-thinking
military officers such as Col J.F.C. Fuller of the British army and
Maj Earl Ellis of the US Marine Corps outlined the basic features
of armored warfare and amphibious warfare. They defined these
concepts decades before the necessary systems existed and at a time
when the political circumstances of the next war were uncertain.
More recently, science fiction writers have been exploring future
war-fighting capabilities. The novels Starship Troopers by Robert
Heinlein (1957) and Ender's Game by Orson Scott Card (1977)
alluded to military systems that today equate to artificial
intelligence and virtual reality. These future systems appeared to be
pure fantasy at the time, but yesterday's fiction has, in many
instances, become today's reality. It should be instructive to those
of us engaged in looking to the twenty-first century that military
officers and authors were able to look into the future and picture
types of warfare that became real or today are becoming real.
Achieving analytic progress requires discussion of these issues with
as much definition and certainty as possible in order to give
analysts something concrete to critique and, thereby, improve. It is
our hope that such discussion will facilitate identifying new ideas
and animate a discovery process that includes war games and
simulations over the course of the next three to five years. It is in
this spirit of discovery that we offer the following portrayal of the
unfolding revolution in military affairs.
Lessons of Past RMAs
RMAs have risen from various sources, with many--but not all--of
them technological. Societal change contributed to a military
revolution during the wars of the French Revolution and the
Napoleonic era, in which the leve en masse allowed for the
creation of larger, national armies.
In the technologically based military revolutions of this century,
different scientific fields have provided the enabling factor. For
example, chemistry and early physics drove many of the critical
advances during World War I. In this war of gunpowder, the rate at
which weapons fired and the ranges that the projectiles traveled
decided the fate of many battles.
Advanced physics drove the next RMA, which extended from the
mastery of flight to improved radios and the introduction of radar
through the creation of nuclear weapons at the end of World War
II.
The current RMA has as its source what has been called new
physical principles. These principles focus on technologies such as
lasers and particle beams. Current trends indicate that the next
revolution in military affairs may have a biological source. Some
manifestations of these biological advances may include
biosensors, bioelectronics, nanotechnologies, distributed systems,
neural networks, and performance-enhancing drugs.
New technologies and systems significantly influence the RMA,
although the resulting RMA could take one of a number of forms.
The interwar innovations of armored warfare by the German army,
amphibious warfare by the US Marine Corps, carrier warfare by the
US Navy, and strategic bombing by the US Army Air Forces have
been characterized as "combined- system RMAs." Their
revolutionary nature derived from a collection of military systems
put together in new ways to achieve a revolutionary effect.
A different type of RMA is the "single-system RMA." An example
is the nuclear revolution of the 1940s and 1950s, in which a single
technology, nuclear fission/ fusion, drove the revolution. Another
example of a single-system RMA is the gunpowder revolution, in
which gunpowder transformed land and naval warfare through the
use of siege guns, field artillery, infantry firearms, and naval
artillery.
Evidence suggests that the revolution unfolding today is neither a
combined-system nor a single-system RMA but an integrated-
system RMA. The outlook is for the rapid evolution of new
technologies eventually leading to the development of several
advanced military systems.
These systems, when joined with their accompanying operational
and organizational concepts, will become integrated systems. In
contrast to developments during the interwar period, this system-of-
systems approach will aim to take advantage of the cumulative
effect of employing each of the new capabilities at the same time.
In World War II, each new form of warfare took place in its own
operating medium--armored warfare on land battlefields, strategic
bombing in the air over homelands, carrier warfare at sea, and
amphibious warfare at the intersection of land and sea--and only
occasionally interacted with the others. In the current RMA, the
integrated employment of all the new systems will be essential to
take advantage of their true value.
Nevertheless, this forecast does not exclude the possibility of a
single-system RMA. To avoid strategic surprise, we must continue
to think about breakthroughs in critical areas such as information
technology, biogenetics, and others. Unforeseen advances in these
areas could bring about a sudden, significant, and solely owned
military advantage to the country that achieves a breakthrough.
The same holds true for a combined system RMA. Furthermore,
there is also the possibility that the information revolution may
result in far-reaching societal changes, putting us on the path of a
social-military revolution. Such a revolution holds profound, but
somewhat different, implications for the changing nature of
warfare.
It is important to remember that technologies and systems enable
but do not cause military revolutions. Past military revolutions have
been driven by requirements that have motivated military
organizations to innovate in order to overcome the limitations of
existing practice. Such strategic, operational, and tactical
requirements determined whether technologies were adopted and
how they were employed. Without them, stagnation can prevail,
even in states possessing technologies with revolutionary
implications.
An example of this principle is the gunpowder revolution of the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. In Europe, gunpowder
weapons fundamentally changed the conduct of all areas of
warfare--maneuver warfare, siege warfare, and naval warfare--on
account of the constant competition between rival states of roughly
equal military power. Imperial China developed gunpowder and
firearms a century before Europe possessed them, but stagnated in
all areas. China fell behind in the gunpowder revolution largely
because of its vast population, which allowed it to overcome any
land or sea threats through sheer weight of numbers.
In contrast, the smaller states of Asia made significant innovations
in response to pressing military requirements. In sixteenth century
Japan, where rival warlords strove for dominance, the rise of
firearm-equipped infantry and the use of volley fire mirrored
developments in Europe. Korea in the 1590s responded to the
threat from reunified Japan by developing its "turtle ships,"
ironclad, cannon-armed galleys that provided a technological
advantage that proved essential to defeating three successive
Japanese invasions.
Another example is the interwar period, in which all of the major
powers possessed the same technologies but only a few countries
created new operations concepts and organizations. For example,
the development of carrier aviation took place in the United States
and Japan for the purpose of fighting major naval engagements in
the Pacific. Carrier aviation withered in Britain's Royal Navy,
whose main tasks were fighting in confined waters such as the
Mediterranean Sea and combating German commerce raiders on the
high seas.
In the case of armored warfare, only the Germans employed tanks,
radio, and airplanes in new ways in 1940 even though all of the
essential technologies had been available since World War I. This
situation was due in part to Germany's unique strategic problem of
being surrounded by enemies. This problem led to an operational
requirement for rapid offensives to defeat enemy states quickly, and
the emphasis on offense dictated tactical requirements for mobility,
firepower, and protection.
Germany thus integrated tanks, infantry, and artillery in the Panzer
division and supplemented them with close air support. France and
Britain, constrained by defensive strategic and operational concepts
on land, did not innovate and paid the price in May of 1940.
Past RMAs hold another significant lesson for the current RMA. In
past RMAs many of the key systems were already used in combat
or in civilian applications decades before significant changes
occurred in military organizations. For example, railroads began
carrying commerce in the 1830s, but in the 1860s only the Prussian
army under Helmuth von Moltke, the elder, used them to facilitate
intricate mobilization plans that conferred a significant operational
advantage at the start of a campaign.
Similarly, tanks, radios, and close support aircraft were used in
quantity in World War I, but they did not realize their true potential
until the Germans devised new organizational and operational
concepts for them in the 1930s. Likewise, the implementation of
revolutionary operational and organiza- tional concepts in this
RMA may require a long time even though most of the key systems
probably are already in development or have even been used in
combat. We need to start thinking immediately about the shape of
warfare in 2020 in order to capitalize on the RMA in a timely
fashion.
Future Competitors
II we hope to understand the scope and potential impact of the
RMA, we first must understand our potential future competitors.
The threats and the vulnerabilities of these competitors will clearly
influence how the United States should exploit the RMA.
We must stress that we are talking about potential military
competitors--not political and economic competitors--although
politics and economics are related factors. Developing and
assessing alternative futures--projecting the nature of future
competitors, their force structures, and modes of operation--is far
from an exact science. Indeed, if the events of the last five years are
any indicator, current approaches at predicting the future will
continue to meet with only marginal success.
While it is difficult, if not impossible, to assess accurately which
nations will become peer competitors in 25 years, it is possible to
imagine one nation, or a combination of nations, rising to challenge
US national security interests. History provides many examples of
potential competitors rapidly elevating themselves first to regional
and then to peer competitor status. Japan and Germany prior to
World War II are examples of the ability of nations to evolve
rapidly up the competitor scale through willpower and sacrifice. To
assume that we are unlikely to see a peer competitor in the next 25
years is to ignore history.
Given that a peer competitor is likely to emerge, the most important
question is not who the competitor is but the likely characteristics
of that competitor. Leading experts in the field of assessing the
nature of future competition have provided significant insights into
how we view and think about potential competitors.
Dr Paul Bracken of Yale University, in his article on "The Military
After Next,"1, characterizes nations as Type A, B, and C
competitors. Type A competitors are peer competitors, able to
compete with the United States on a global basis across a full range
of military capabilities. Type B competitors are regional
competitors, able to compete regionally, and only across a limited
set of military capabilities. Bracken's Type C competitors are
terrorists, low-intensity conflict countries, drug lords, and the like.
We feel this type of competitor is not really a national security
competitor but a political competitor. It is more useful to think of
Type C competitors as being niche competitors. A niche competitor
would be a country that has chosen to specialize in a specific
military capability that appears to have high leverage against US
forces. This type of characterization seems useful in bounding the
range of possible competitiveness in a military sense.
Dr Stephen Rosen of Harvard University has framed the debate on
future competitors by dividing the world into "zones of peace" and
"zones of turmoil."2 His fundamental division of the great powers
places the industrialized democracies in the zone of peace with all
other countries in the zone of turmoil. Conflicts will most likely
arise among nations in the zone of turmoil, or between them and
countries in the zone of peace. It is difficult to develop scenarios
that lead to wars among nations in the zone of peace.
So long as the countries remain democratic, Dr Rosen cannot
envision a war between the United States and, for example, a
democratic Japan or Germany. Dr Rosen's analysis reminds us that
it is important to consider political traditions, cultural norms,
economic strength, alliances, and many other factors as we think
about the evolution of competition between states. Furthermore,
states may swing between peace and turmoil, dramatically change
goals and directions, or gain or lose military capabilities, making
our strategic planning even more difficult.
To understand the nature of future competitors and, more
importantly, plan for their potential emergence requires an
understanding of the heart and soul (or national character) of the
countries under consideration. By "national character" we mean
what makes them tick--what factors (current and future) would
push them along the path from niche, to regional, to peer
competitor.
Such considerations might include, but are not limited to, the
following:
Historical context
Cultural and social beliefs (mores, etc.) Demographics (rate of
change, age of population) Geography (landlocked, access to
ports, agriculture) Economic development (trade, industrial base--
indigenous/other) Political system (democratic, autocratic,
stability) Access to foreign markets and technologies (sunrise/
sunset systems, information technologies and capability) Military
force structure (disposition, training) Nature of alliances
(cooperative agreements, traditional/ nontraditional adversaries)
In other words, it is essential that we understand what a nation or
region is to more accurately reflect what it may become.
Understanding the national character and proclivities of a nation is
only part of the equation. Equally important is an appreciation of
national, regional, and/or global trends that may act in synergy with
national character to propel a nation to competitive status. Trends
associated with economics, the pace of technological innovation,
the development of military weapon systems, the growth of new
operational and organizational approaches, and the proliferation
and diffusion of military systems and technologies will all interact
with the national character and daily events of virtually every nation
in the world.
While some analysts may view the birth of competitor states (China
or Japan for instance), as being quite predictable, we should be
cautious in ascribing too much certainty to such predictions.
Trends may cause nations to transform in unanticipated ways,
thereby giving rise to a number of surprise competitors.
Nevertheless, evaluating trends in the context of national character
may help to narrow the field of who these competitor states may be.
Taking into account our understanding of the national character of
potential competitor states/regions, our subsequent analysis should
focus on the three dimensions of the RMA required for a nation to
achieve competitor status. First is the conscious decision on the
part of a state to acquire all or portions of what might be termed an
RMA complex. Second is the ability to acquire or develop the
systems that constitute RMA-type technologies. Last, and perhaps
most important, is the ability, organizationally and operationally, to
adapt technologies in ways that bring into being the full military
potential of an RMA.
In the analysis of the current RMA, which may take decades to
emerge, analysis of likely competitors will be a long, arduous, and
ongoing process. Today, we could identify a number of potential
candidates as peer competitors (Russia, Japan, China, Germany, a
unified Korea, an Asian coalition, etc.), but whether they achieve
that status remains in question. An even more interesting result of
the analysis may be the surprises--new candidates, not unlike Japan
in 1940, which have the potential to rise from niche to regional or
peer competitor status in the early decades of the twenty-first
century. In either of these eventualities, it is likely that for a period
of time in the future, the United States will be faced with a number
of regional competitors while not being forced to deal with a true
peer competitor. However, historical precedent leads us to believe
in the inevitability that a large peer competitor will emerge over
time. It will be critical for the United States to understand the
nature of the challenges posed by such a peer long before the
competitor achieves rough parity across important military areas.
Understanding the natures of competitors is especially important
because of their influence on emerging forms of warfare. Judging
from the example of past RMAs, distinct approaches to harnessing
new technologies will surface in those states seeking to exploit
them. During the interwar period, the Germans, British, and French
followed different directions in the usage of tanks; similarly, the
US and British navies differed in their development of carrier
aviation. The most successful approaches will not necessarily come
from the countries most experienced with the relevant technologies,
as evidenced by Britain's lagging in the development of tanks and
carrier aviation despite having invented them. Success will most
likely come through favorable matchups between competing
doctrines. Obtaining an advantage over a peer competitor through
the RMA will require understanding likely opponents' tendencies
in order to determine the optimum approach.
New Warfare Areas
W e think the current RMA, like the interwar period, will involve
the emergence of multiple new warfare areas. A warfare area is a
form of warfare with unique military objectives and is characterized
by association with particular forces or systems. Examples of
warfare areas that emerged in the interwar period are armored
warfare, carrier warfare, amphibious warfare, and strategic
bombing. We have currently identified four potential new warfare
areas--long-range precision strike, information warfare, dominating
maneuver, and space warfare. Other areas that we have yet to
identify could also develop.
Of the four potential new warfare areas, precision strike is the most
developed conceptually, although even here much analytic work
remains to be done. Much work has been done in the area of
information warfare, yet it remains a poorly understood concept.
Analysis of dominating maneuver and space warfare has just begun.
The warfare areas that we have identified are likely to emerge in the
long run but will not necessarily be developed fully in the near
future. Doctrinal development is a long and uncertain process, and
military history offers numerous examples of unexploited warfare
areas--concepts intended to revolutionize warfare that did not come
to fruition. Technological limitations, conflicts with prevailing
doctrine, or lack of strategic purpose derailed these developments.
In the late nineteenth century, the Jeune cole in France sought to
exploit an emerging weapon, the torpedo, to contest British sea
control with small, cheap torpedo boats for commerce raiding and
coastal defense. Their attempt to create a new warfare area led to a
decade of doctrinal uncertainty in naval warfare but failed by the
turn of the century owing to the ineffectiveness of the primitive
torpedoes and torpedo boats, the rising influence of Adm Alfred
Thayer Mahan, and the emergence of the Anglo-French entente.
After the Korean War, Gen James Gavin and others in the US Army
sought to create a new form of land warfare using the helicopter.
Seeking greater strategic mobility between theaters and a "mobility
differential" over the battlefield, they envisioned helicopter-
equipped units that could rapidly deploy in a crisis and would use
their superior mobility to their advantage in the cavalry roles of
scouting, pursuit, and delaying actions. They succeeded in making
helicopter aviation a significant part of the Army, but the Army
developed the helicopter as part of a combined-arms team rather
than as the basis for autonomous units, fielding only one air assault
division during and since the Vietnam War. The vulnerability of
helicopters to air defenses and the predominance of armor and
infantry in existing doctrine each contributed to this result.
Short-term technological and doctrinal barriers will not diminish
the ultimate importance of a new warfare area. There are past
examples of warfare-area concepts that were abortive in one context
but resurfaced in other settings with the emergence of the right
enabling technologies or doctrinal pressures. The ideas of the Jeune
cole appeared again in Germany during the First World War,
when practical submarines were the enabling technology and the
need to strangle British commerce provided the doctrinal pressure.
Similarly, the nascent armored warfare concepts of J.F.C. Fuller
and the Salisbury maneuvers went undeveloped in Britain but
reemerged in the German army. The fact that concepts discarded by
Britain and France provided the basis for U-boat warfare and the
Panzer divisions illustrates that fundamentally sound concepts will
eventually be exploited--if not by the United States, then by its
competitors.
Precision Strike
Precision strike may well be the most thoroughly understood new
warfare area of the next revolution in military affairs. This is true
because the United States has been a leader in the development and
deployment of such systems since the 1970s. The creation of
precision strike capabilities during the latter stages of the Cold War
in fact cast a long technology shadow and deeply affected Soviet
military thought.
The Red Army gave us far more credit than we deserved for
developing the reconnaissance strike complex. It probably saw tests
of parts of systems, such as the Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency (DARPA) "assault breaker" missiles in the mid-
1970s, as indicative of imminent deployment. Somewhat ironically,
the Soviet military may have more fully comprehended the
revolutionary impact that such systems would have on future battle
than did the US military establishment.
Precision strike in the context of the coming RMA is well beyond
its predecessors of follow-on forces attack (FOFA) and joint
precision interdiction, which are its conceptual forebears. At the
time of the development of such precision strike systems as the
Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) and the
Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS), the idea was to create a
maneuver differential for NATO ground forces.
NATO planned to delay and disrupt the arrival of second-echelon
and third-echelon Warsaw Pact armored forces before they could
overwhelm the outnumbered and outgunned NATO defenders. Such
deep strikes would extend the battlefield; they would delay in time
the advance of the conflict to the nuclear threshold; that would
permit reinforcing forces to arrive from the continental United
States (CONUS). This was planned to allow for the creation of a
conventional counteroffensive force to turn back the attacking
Warsaw Pact armored advance.
The Gulf War demonstrated the potential for such deep strike
systems not only to create a maneuver differential, but at least
potentially to be decisive in themselves. Precision strike, in the
context of the unfolding RMA, is the ability tolocate high-value,
time-sensitive fixed and mobile targets; to destroy them with a high
degree of confidence; and to accomplish this within operationally
and strategically significant time lines while minimizing collateral
damage, friendly fire casualties, and enemy counterstrikes. In 2020,
precision strike technologies will create the potential to achieve
strategic effects at intercontinental distances.
The potential effect of precision strike can be seen in the dramatic
increase of capabilities to strike strategic targets. In 1943 the US
Eighth Air Force prosecuted only 50 strategic targets during the
course of the entire year. In the first 24 hours of Desert Storm, the
combined air forces prosecuted 150 strategic targets--a thousand-
fold increase over 1943 capabilities. By the year 2020, it is not out
of the realm of possibility that as many as 500 strategically
important targets could be struck in the first minute of the
campaign--representing a five thousand-fold increase over Desert
Storm capabilities.
It is envisioned that precision strike will be able to achieve effects
similar to those of nuclear weapons but without the attendant risk
of escalation to intolerable levels of destruction. When directed
against targets comprising the enemy center of gravity, precision
strike might itself prove decisive. For it to do so, however, requires
a much clearer understanding than we have had in past wars about
what constitutes the enemy's center of gravity and what it takes to
affect it.
The precision strike area of warfare presents a significant challenge
to the organizational adaptation of the US military. These systems
achieve decisive impact only if they are integrated at the operational
or strategic level of war. This means that a single theater or global
commander must have control over the employment of precision
strike systems, as was done during Desert Storm.
A potential problem does arise however in the development of
current precision strike systems, which are jealously guarded by the
individual military services and even by some DOD-wide agencies.
This arrangement tends to lead to the acquisition of systems that
are duplicative rather than complementary. Notwithstanding the
potential benefits to be derived from having the services compete
for the precision strike mission area, there is a potential danger that
in the current budgetary climate such competition may prove to be
counterproductive.
There is a further potential problem in that even should we manage
to orchestrate a successful joint program management scheme, the
architecture that frames the development of disparate precision
strike technologies and systems may not be structurally coherent.
This could result in several separate and perhaps inherently
incompatible components, none of which have much military utility
by themselves. There is a growing need for a system-of-systems
framework to define precision strike requirements, as well as a need
for an architecture which would drive the development of advanced
technologies and systems applicable to precision strike.
We must begin now to move beyond the service-specific approach
to the employment of precision strike and experiment with new
organizational approaches to employing these systems on the
battlefields of 2020. These systems will likely be theater-wide or
even global, and there will be no single service able to provide a
service-specific core organizational unit to serve as the basis for the
commander-in-chief's joint task force for precision strike
operations. Therefore, new organizational units may have to be cut
out of whole cloth.
This does not imply that massive new commands or new
organizations must be created. In fact, we may need to consider just
the opposite approach. We may need to consider the power
inherent in the new information technologies that could greatly
expand a commander's span of control, allowing us to eliminate one
or more levels of command and to consequently accelerate the
decision-making and command and control cycle.
The essence of precision strike is the ability to sense the enemy at
operational and strategic depth, recognize his operational concept
and strategic plan, and select and prioritize attacks on enemy
targets of value. All of this is intended to achieve decisive impact
on the outcome of the campaign. To be most effective those attacks
probably should be synchronized in time and space.
The revolutionary potential of precision strike derives from the
technologies that provided a glimpse of their own potential during
Operation Desert Storm. These and related technologies enable
commanders to have continuous wide-area surveillance and target
acquisition, near-real-time responsiveness, and highly accurate,
long-range weapons at their disposal.
Such technologies by themselves have the potential to change
dramatically the way wars are waged. Integrating precision strike
capabilities with dominating maneuver and information war may
create an especially potent RMA.
By 2020, real-time responsiveness of sensor-to-shooter systems
must become a reality. For the first time in history, this
responsiveness will allow the striking force to maneuver fires rather
than forces over long ranges, and allow direct and simultaneous
attack on many of the enemy's centers of gravity.
This warfare area is currently being driven by advances in
technology. The key improvements that are now occurring are in
broadening the environmental conditions for wide area surveillance
and precision targeting; security and counter-measures; data
processing and communications; delivery platforms; precision
munitions; and positioning/locating devices. The advances needed
to exploit our lead in this warfare area include continuous situation
awareness and improve- ments in data fusion, mission planning,
and battle damage assessment (BDA).
At the same time, we need an equal effort in developing new
operational concepts and organizations for the application of
precision strike. As in other new warfare areas, it may be that the
greatest military payoff will come from operational approaches and
organizational adaptation--not from systems.
Information Warfare
Another revolution under way in warfare is that associated with
information systems, their associated capabilities, and their effects
on military organizations and operations. We call this new warfare
area information warfare, which we define as the struggle between
two or more opponents for control of the information battlespace.
At the national level, information warfare could be viewed as a new
form of strategic warfare, one of the key issues being the
vulnerability of socio-economic systems, and the question is how to
attack the enemy's system while protecting yours. At the military
operational level, information warfare may contribute to major
changes in the conduct of warfare; therefore, one of the key issues
is the vulnerability of command, control, communications, and
intelligence systems, and the question is how to attack the enemy's
system while protecting yours.
As we increasingly assimilate information capabilities into our
military structure and focus more and more on establishing and
maintaining an "information advantage" as a war-winning strategy,
we also change the vulnerabilities of US forces, and, ultimately of
the United States itself. The force structure that will implement
information warfare 25 years from now may well be different from
today's military in more ways than just its equipment. Moreover,
the character of warfare may change in ways that affect our thinking
regarding intelligence and crisis and wartime decision making.
Some of the changes might include the whole issue of deciding that
a war has begun. It is not clear at this time whether information
warfare measures taken by a potential adversary at the outset of a
war would be readily detectable. The question of how you know
you are at war may be difficult to resolve in view of the potential
ambiguity associated with information warfare.
Ambiguity and plausible denial are not new phenomena. But the
rapid growth of interconnections manifested already in
communications, banking, and other areas creates vulnerabilities
and presents opportunities to do grievous harm--quickly, with no
warning, and with a minimal "signature." Accordingly, the analysis
of indications and warning that mark the outset of warfare must
change. To date, insufficient thought has been applied to this
aspect of the character of future war.
In addition to its inherent ambiguity, information warfare in 2020
also portends a very different set of potential responses by the
United States to an adversary detected acting in a hostile or
potentially hostile fashion. The information warfare measures that
the United States could take might require quite different policies
with regard to rules of engagement than have previously been
contemplated.
This is both good news and bad news. The good news is that there
may be new tools, short of lethal attacks available to signal an
adversary that warfare with the United States would be a bad idea.
The bad news is the inherent ambiguity noted above. In other
words, it might be hard to signal our intentions. In any case, the
point is that much thought must be given to the examination of
threats, requirements for intelligence, and rules of engagement.
Although countering an adversary's command and control has
always been a feature of warfare, the continental United States has
been somewhat invulnerable to such measures. One clear
implication of warfare in 2020 is that almost any enemy will try to
degrade our information system. The United States must be
prepared for that eventuality. Paradoxically, although the
technology of information systems is becoming more capable and
sophisticated, it is actually harder to secure the US information
infrastructure from attacks.
One potential vulnerability is the fact that information warfare
generates problems at the national level rather than just for the
Department of Defense. Therefore, such problems will not be
solved by creating new military organizations. The problem goes
beyond the armed forces to the entire national security
infrastructure. As the international information infrastructure grows
and elaborates, its reach expands beyond the control of any single
entity or any single nation.
Thus, the infrastructure is beyond the control of those who use it,
and has access points at a myriad of places for others to enter the
system. It is not at all clear, as a result, that today's military
organizational structure (e.g., the Joint Chiefs of Staff, regional and
supporting commanders-in-chief, and military service departments)
is the best way to manage the complexities of information warfare
as it might unfold in 2020.
Another key organizational deficiency is the lack of a coherent
strategic approach to offensive and defensive considerations for
information warfare. Nowhere in our system do we bring together
and integrate the offensive and defensive nature of information
warfare. Nor is there a single locus for requirements generation and
staking claims in the acquisition process for information warfare.
The Defense Information Security Agency (DISA) has been actively
pursuing "information assurance" as a part of the charter to take
responsibility for all DOD information systems. However, DISA is
not an operational command.
The question is, will we be able to plan for war in 2020 with the
view that communications channels will be available, with little
concern for the overall architecture or the nature and characteristics
of those channels? It seems clear that information warfare in 2020
may require operators to have more familiarity with how commands
interact in order for these operators to execute effectively strategy
and operations.
There are examples of the problems we can anticipate if such
"information awareness" is not part of the force. The first example
concerns the logistics information systems, which are both
elaborate and critical to successful military operations. Despite
their criticality, these systems are generally subject to less stringent
security measures than other military systems. The shortcoming
does not involve just cryptologic security, although that is an area
that lags operational channels. We could make the system
cryptologically secure but still be quite vulnerable. A potential
enemy could significantly disrupt our operations merely by denying
us information-by simply interfering with logistics transmission
links.
A second example is the anticipated problems associated with the
presence of automated systems on the battlefield of the future.
These systems are likely to be considerably more widespread in
2020 than they are today. The commander who knows his "human"
systems but who does not understand his "automated" systems will
be vulnerable to surprise--possibly to defeat. Knowing the
automated systems entails an understanding of the software
programming "rules."
There are already many autonomous systems available to the
commander to include unmanned air vehicles (UAVs), unmanned
underwater vehicles (UUVs), smart mines, and Tomahawk cruise
missiles, among others. The commander who does not understand
the details of his logistics information system, or the programming
of his autonomous systems, may face a significant information
warfare vulnerability in 2020.
In dealing with the information revolution that is affecting the
military today, the US military services seem to be engaged in
improving their current communication channels. That is, they are
striving to improve performance elements within the current
organizational structure. They have yet to address the implications
of systems and capabilities that do not fit within the current
structure. This is a fundamental issue. The military traditionally has
viewed information services, including intelligence and
communications, as supporting inputs to the actual warfare
functions of fire, maneuver, strike, and the like.
However, information warfare might not always be a supporting
function; it might take a leading role in future campaigns. This
makes it both more important and more challenging to get the
organizational issue right. By 2020, at least in some militaries, the
requirements of the battlefield will be such that traditional
hierarchical command and control arrangements will be obsolete. In
most organizations today, the decentralization trend is already well
established.
Information technology is making distributed systems
commonplace, and "virtual organizations" are growing like cultures
on a petri dish. The rapid rate of growth of these types of new
organizational entities would seem to suggest strengths that the
military would be wise to examine.
Dominating Maneuver
One of the more recently identified potential new warfare areas is
dominating maneuver. Maneuver has always been an essential
element in warfare, but the RMA potentially offers the ability to
conduct maneuver on a global scale, on a much-compressed time
scale, and with greatly reduced forces.
We define dominating maneuver as the positioning of forces--
integrated with precision strike, space warfare, and information war
operations--to attack decisive points, defeat the enemy center of
gravity, and accomplish campaign or war objectives.
While precision strike and information warfare are destroying
enemy assets and disrupting his situational awareness, dominating
maneuver will strike at the enemy center of gravity to put him in an
untenable position, leaving him with no choice but to accept defeat
or accede to the demands placed on him.
War is typically nonlinear, meaning that the smallest effects can
have unpredicted, disproportionate consequences. In meteorology,
nonlinearity is illustrated through the "butterfly effect"--a butterfly
flapping its wings in the southern hemisphere can set off a string of
reactions that eventually result in a violent storm in the northern
hemisphere.
In the early nineteenth century, Clausewitz made similar
observations when discussing the formulation of successful
strategy. He wrote that victory comes not through winning battles
or inflicting attrition but through attacking the enemy center of
gravity, which--depending on the situation--could be his army, his
capital, his leaders, or his principal ally. In the course of the
twentieth century, it appears that the complexity of warfare has
increased as military forces and their logistical and political
underpinnings have become more complicated.
With increasing complexity, the nonlinear nature of war is likely to
increase. Dominating maneuver seeks to exploit the increasing
complexity and nonlinearity in warfare by striking directly at the
enemy center of gravity in order to disrupt his cohesion and cause
his swift collapse.
Dominating maneuver is distinct from maneuver in several ways.
Maneuver refers to the "employment of forces on the battlefield
through movement in combination with fires, to achieve a position
of advantage with respect to the enemy in order to accomplish the
mission."3
Dominating maneuver refers to the positioning of forces, not
necessarily their employment; they can be positioned anywhere in a
theater, not necessarily on the battlefield. It goes beyond
"combination with fires" by integrating its effects with the effects
from precision strike, space warfare, and information warfare. Its
ultimate purpose is directly to achieve campaign and war
objectives, transcending the role of ordinary maneuver.
Dominating maneuver does not require superiority at all points in
the battlespace or imply domination of the entire maneuver. By
2020 our competitors could well challenge our national interests in
regions where they enjoy the advantage of close proximity, and we
may have neither a lengthy buildup period to marshal our forces nor
access to a continental infrastructure to support our forces in the
theater.
Under these circumstances, we will have to fight using the
continental United States as our principal base of operations,
making the maneuver battlespace orders of magnitude larger than it
was in Desert Storm. Dominating maneuver could allow ground
forces to operate successfully in situations where they cannot
dominate the entire battlespace. The concept has a number of other
implications for operations, organization, and technologies as well.
First of all, dominating maneuver will require new operational
concepts that take into account the decisive importance of time,
making future maneuver more simultaneous than sequential. It will
be essential to attain operational and strategic objectives through
simultaneous information warfare, space warfare, precision strike,
and maneuvers against the enemy's critical points rather than
through a series of pitched battles against enemy forces.
Further evolution of the Army's airland operations or the Marine
Corps's operational maneuver from the sea could lead to such a
concept. On the other hand, entirely new concepts may be required.
The German invasion of Norway in April 1940 was a campaign
waged successfully in a way analogous to dominating maneuver,
although on a smaller scale. A single airborne maneuver into Oslo
on April 9, 1940, induced the surrender of the city's garrison by
creating the perception that their cause was hopeless. Fighting
continued on the fringes of Norway for six weeks, but the airborne
maneuver led directly to decisive results. The maneuver gave the
German commander a time advantage during which he could
reinforce faster than the Norwegians could mobilize or the Allies
could deploy. Moreover, the surrender of the Oslo garrison
precipitated the capitulation of the Norwegian monarchy and forced
the Allied decision not to become heavily engaged on the
Scandinavian peninsula.
The Inchon landing during the Korean War was another operation
that illustrates the principles underlying dominating maneuver. Gen
Douglas MacArthur's plan to capture Seoul through an amphibious
landing at Inchon struck at one of the critical vulnerabilities of the
North Korean forces--their dependence on the transportation
bottleneck at Seoul. Instead of gradually rolling the North Koreans
back from Pusan, MacArthur planned to cut them off and put them
into an extremely vulnerable position. The landing paralyzed the
already overstretched North Korean forces, and they broke into
disorganized fragments that retreated in disarray, incapable of
serious resistance.
To execute dominating maneuver in 2020, the United States will
have to develop new means for the movement of ground forces. The
development of forms of mobility not possessed by the enemy
could help generate maneuver dominance. More advanced concepts
for comparable forms of mobility also could give a decisive
advantage, as the Germans demonstrated in May 1940. The
Germans generated maneuver dominance on the ground by
employing combined-arms units that could mass combat power
quickly, supporting them with fast- moving "aerial artillery" in the
form of close air support, stressing aggressiveness, developing a
faster command and control system to establish C2 dominance, and
employing air interdiction to degrade Allied mobility.
The revolutionary period that we are currently entering will have its
own forms of maneuver that will require new technologies, new
operational concepts, and new organizations. Along with new
forms of mobility, the United States will require advances in
logistical support to maintain the effectiveness of forces engaged in
dominating maneuver. The need to operate far from existing bases,
with little time for logistical buildups and with insecure lines of
communications, will compel changes in the supply and support of
ground forces.
The dangers of failure in this area are exemplified by the German
campaign in the Soviet Union in 1941. In this campaign, the
Germans quickly established complete maneuver dominance over
the Soviets, whose decimated air force and poorly organized ground
forces could not stop the Germans' fast-moving armored columns.
The Germans intended to use their maneuver dominance first to
attrit the Red Army and then to seize Moscow, whose capture
would sever the Soviets' transportation network and paralyze their
political apparatus. Despite their maneuver dominance, the
Germans failed--largely because of their logistics, which were
inadequate to the needs of supporting far-flung advances over the
vast distances of the Soviet Union. Future attempts at dominating
maneuver may similarly come to grief as a result of shortcomings in
logistics.
The dual imperatives of mobility and logistics may create the need
for smaller forces and new transportation technologies. The current
Strategic Mobility Study has as its objective the intercontinental
deployment of a heavy brigade in 15 days and a heavy corps in 75
days. In the future, the United States may require the ability to
move a corps-equivalent force across the oceans in seven days or
less.
This capability might be achieved through the exploitation of new
transportation technology such as fast sea transports capable of 100
knots or more, the national aerospace plane, and supersonic
transports; through organizational changes creating smaller units
with useful combat power that could deploy faster or be forward-
deployed on naval platforms; or through ways not yet conceived.
The organization and tactics of such ground forces are difficult to
visualize today. Some have suggested that twenty-first century
variants of the so-called Hutier tactic developed by the Germans in
World War I--Stingray or infestation tactics--would be useful. Such
tactics would combine deception and bombardment with
infiltration and attacks against strong points. The ground forces
may be a small number of Army infantrymen, marines, or special
operations forces, delivered deep in enemy territory by air and
equipped with high-technology linkages to space-based or
atmospheric strike systems, in effect acting as part of a sensor-
shooter network.
The United States may need new technologies if it employs such
tactics and seeks to maintain the lead that its forces possess in
close combat. As advanced sensors and conventional weapons
technologies proliferate and provide greater stand-off ranges for
enemy forces, the United States should concentrate on achieving
capabilities that will allow it to leap ahead of these developments.
We should begin now to apply low-observability techniques to
maneuver systems. We need to develop advanced propulsion
technologies to give our maneuver systems greater speed, range, and
agility. We also need new means to enhance the lethality of our
munitions and the protective characteristics of our materials and
systems.
Progress in these conceptual and technological areas will enable
maneuver to play a significant role in the RMA. It is possible that
precision strike and information warfare will make maneuver
unnecessary in certain situations or that enemy progress in these
areas will make maneuver difficult. Nevertheless, maneuver will be
essential against an enemy unwilling to concede defeat unless the
United States defeats centers of gravity that cannot be attacked
without maneuver forces. Dominating maneuver may provide the
coup de grace in future wars, and in other situations may serve as
the enabler for war-winning space warfare, information war, or
precision strike operations.
Space Warfare
We define space warfare, the fourth future warfare area of
importance, as the exploitation of the space environment to conduct
full-spectrum, near-real-time, global military operations. It includes
facets of the other three warfare areas but has the potential to
become a qualitatively distinct warfare area in its own right.
The US military's increasing reliance on support from space-based
systems for its everyday operations and especially during times of
conflict has highlighted the importance of space operations.
However, space assets could provide more than support for the
terrestrial war fighter in the future. The space environment offers
the possibility of conducting worldwide military operations in a
greatly reduced time frame.
The evolution of space operations is comparable to the
development of air warfare, which similarly exploited inherent
advantages in altitude and speed. Aircraft filled an essential role in
supporting the ground and naval forces in the First World War
through observation, antiobservation, ground attack, and
communications. Between the wars, larger aircraft came into service
in the form of civil and military transport, a capability that was
greatly expanded during World War II.
Moreover, between the world wars the United States and Great
Britain developed airpower as a means of leapfrogging
conventional ground and naval battles to enable direct strikes on
the enemy's ability to wage war. Although this theory of strategic
bombing met with limited success in the Second World War, the
concept culminated in the development of the intercontinental
nuclear deterrent after the Second World War.
Space operations, like air operations in the First World War,
currently provide support essential for the successful operations of
terrestrial forces. Satellites enable near-real-time, world- wide
communications, sensing, timing, and navigation. These
capabilities, analogous to the roles of the observation balloons and
aircraft of the First World War, may make possible dominant
battlefield awareness and coordination of a global precision strike
architecture.
An effective antisatellite (ASAT) capability could lead to the
ability to achieve aerospace control or superiority in order to deny
an opponent the ability to operate in or from space. An ASAT
system would follow in the footsteps of the first fighter aircraft that
dueled for control of the air over the trenches of the First World
War and is a logical extension of the current role of air superiority
fighters and developing theater air defense systems.
However, space operations will also greatly differ from air
operations. First, the "geography" of space is fundamentally
different from that of the earth's atmosphere. Orbital mechanics
require operating speeds (17,000 miles per hour) that far surpass
those currently achievable in the atmosphere.
Thus, if properly placed and employed, space assets could perform
missions in much less time than state-of-the-art aircraft. One
possible mission is to use space forces to project power to directly
achieve national objectives (operational or strategic) in a particular
theater. Space strike systems based on satellites or on
transatmospheric vehicles could enable precision strikes whose
quantitative advantage in speed would result in a qualitative
difference in capability.
Although currently limited, future capabilities in space transport
may also make possible the movement of critical forces and
equipment from CONUS to a theater in time frames an order of
magnitude faster than with current sea and air transport. Thus,
space operations may provide important advantages in time-critical
situations.
Further, the altitude advantages provided by space greatly improve
surveillance and reconnaissance coverage of the earth and, as a
result, could offer the means to command and control operations in
theaters where distance and terrain complicate or confound
terrestrially based systems.
Space, however, does have limiting factors that could constrain its
military use. First, space is not amenable to human life, thus
limiting the manned presence in future space operations. As a
result, most of the improvements in future space operations will
most likely come through unmanned technologies. In addition, the
speeds associated with space flight and the amounts of fuel
required to maneuver in orbit using current technologies and energy
sources greatly limit the flexibility of spacecraft in orbit.
Therefore, sizable technical hurdles have to be overcome before
space-based strike, antisatellite systems, spacelift, and space
transport become militarily usable capabilities. Systems that could
enable future space operations might include trans-atmospheric
vehicles (TAVs), single-stage-to-orbit (SSTO) launch vehicles,
space-based directed-energy weapons (DEW) or kinetic energy
weapons (KEW), space-based ballistic missile defense (BMD),
satellite defense systems, small satellites, and both space-based and
ground-based distributed networks to reduce the vulnerability of
space capabilities.
However, new technologies such as new materials to reduce weight,
more heat-resistant and stress-resistant materials, and sources of
energy more powerful and efficient than chemical reactions may be
needed to make these systems truly effective.
Space warfare will likely become its own warfare area only when
there is need to conduct military operations in space to obtain
solely space-related goals (not missions that are conducted to
support earth-based operations). For example, if the United States
becomes dependent on resources unique to space (such as He3 on
the moon), it may be forced to develop technologies and
operational concepts to support/defend space-based industries,
command and control nodes, or colonies that are entirely non-earth
dependent. In such situations, space operations would be altogether
removed from any congruence with traditional air operations and
would undoubtedly become a distinct warfare area.
Implications: Dominant Battlespace Awareness
Though our understanding of the unfolding RMA and its
potentially new warfare areas is still evolving, several possible
implications have begun to come into focus. One of our working
hypotheses is that the truly revolutionary effects will come from the
combination of two or more new warfare areas.
For example, some combination of space and information warfare
may provide certain advantages heretofore impossible to generate.
As a result, the United States may be able to achieve a degree of
information dominance over an enemy by both significantly
degrading his information flow and enhancing ours, thereby gaining
a potential step-function increase in our information capabilities.
The application of such a system of systems may generate
significantly greater capabilities in times of conflict. One potential
result may be the ability to generate dominant battlespace
awareness (DBA) over a particular enemy, in a particular conflict.
This awareness would not magically provide perfect intelligence,
but would allow the United States to detect all observable
phenomenology while limiting the enemy's knowledge.
This information would translate into the ability to know force
locations and characteristics (including distinguishing between
targets and decoys and among target types) at all times.
Furthermore, the DBA architecture could include mechanisms for
disseminating this data directly to the appropriate strike systems
and conducting constant battle damage assessments (BDA).
An advantage such as DBA would probably require a large
percentage of the total US sensing, analysis, and data transmission
assets. As a result, to generate dominant battlespace awareness for a
given conflict would require borrowing from both national assets
and those assets dedicated to other theaters.
In the collection arena, the constant monitoring required may
increasingly emphasize airborne and terrestrial sensors rather than
space-based platforms. We may well see stealthy unmanned aerial
vehicles (UAVs), flying at very high altitudes, conducting a greater
share of the collection duties than do manned aircraft.
Advancements in information processing should enable faster
analysis of the data, while dissemination can be directly linked to
the shooters. Efficiency in military strike operations should be
enhanced by such an across-the-board improvement in our
reconnaissance-strike architecture.
Having established the possibility of generating DBA, what might
its implications be in a future conflict with a regional competitor?
The enemy's goal might be to achieve a break-through quickly and
push the US forces out of the country before they could be
reinforced. This would be especially true if the enemy knew of our
ability to generate DBA and feared the consequences. The United
States would presumably desire to stop the attack as soon as
possible, with as few losses as possible. Roughly 24 hours of
warning before the launch of a standing-start attack would improve
the prospect of the United States generating battlespace awareness.
A capability such as DBA could affect both the systems the United
States fields and the operational concepts designed to employ them
in such a conflict. One likely implication may be that a force with a
greater number of long-range strike systems, tied to DBA, would be
far more lethal in attriting enemy forces than would traditional
forces. If the value of DBA can be shared throughout the force,
then the entire time line of the conflict from locating targets,
determining the best time to strike them (e.g., when they are on the
move), striking them, and then assessing the success of the attack
could eventually become seamless. Thus, the efficiency of US
precision strike campaigns could increase substantially as current
problems such as prompt targeting, selection of the proper
munitions, reallocation of assets, and near-real-time BDA begin to
dissipate.
On the other hand, a force designed to maximize the impact of
DBA might exacerbate some difficulties faced by today's forces.
First, the volume of targets made available through DBA could
simply overwhelm US strike capabilities. A force heavily weighted
toward long-range precision-strike weapons may not completely
overcome this problem but may still provide an order-of-magnitude
increase in the force's lethality. Second, such a fire-intensive force
will require a very large inventory of munitions. Both of these
problems, last seen in the Gulf War, may not go away.
As noted above, dominant battlespace awareness may also provide
benefits that extend beyond simply increasing the effectiveness of
long-range strikes. For example, another force structure implication
of DBA may be the ability to truly do more with less. If DBA can
tell us where the main axis of attack is coming, we may be able to
use smaller forces to blunt the attack because they will be covered
more effectively by fire support, and the commander will have the
ability to commit reserves precisely where and when they are
needed. This could lead to much improved loss/exchange ratios and
the opportunity to direct certain assets against other high-value
targets much earlier in a conflict.
Similarly, far lighter forces could also be used for dominating
maneuvers, either airmobile or amphibious, with the goal of
dislodging the enemy and allowing DBA-cued strikes to target
them more easily on the move. These maneuvers can also be far less
risky because the planners can select landing objectives they know
to be free of enemy forces. Finally, a smaller force may be capable
of exploiting a successful defense with a counteroffensive far
sooner than today because we could identify the path of least
resistance and focus our fire support and commit our reserves more
precisely and in a more timely manner.
At the same time, we would have to recognize that there would be
several categories of targets where DBA would not have a large
impact. One example may be a country with large inventories of
nuclear, biological, or chemical (NBC) weapons. Use of these
weapons may take the form of limited chemical attacks on ports and
airbases or could even include nuclear attacks against US forces.
Almost certainly, DBA will not help the United States gauge the
enemy's intentions vis-
-vis NBC use. Furthermore, the deep
underground targets that typically house NBC systems and
infrastructure would be impossible for DBA to penetrate.
Another potential area in which DBA's impact may be limited is
close battle. Even after a highly successful attrition campaign, US
forces may inevitably run into residual enemy forces on the ground
and the resulting battle may be too confined for DBA-cued fires to
be of much utility. Nevertheless, if the above implications are borne
out, DBA could allow the United States to defeat an enemy quicker
and with fewer losses than is currently possible.
Conclusions
This description of the revolution in military affairs is neither
definitive nor conclusive. The discussion is intended primarily to
stimulate thinking--thinking in unique and more meaningful ways
about how warfare in the twenty-first century may be fundamentally
different than it is today and, of equal importance, evaluating what
we should be doing now to prepare ourselves for that eventuality.
We expect that the true revolutionary impact of future changes in
the conduct of warfare will come from the intersection of precision
strike, information warfare, dominating maneuver, and space
warfare. Military operations in all four warfare areas will be
integrated into an overall operational plan that will be decisive in
terms of the course--if not the outcome--of the war.
Precision strike will hold an enemy at a distance and blind and
immobilize him by destroying operationally and strategically
crucial, time-urgent targets. Information warfare will deny an enemy
critical knowledge of his own--as well as our--forces and turn his
"fog of war" into a wall of ignorance.
Dominating maneuver will deploy the right forces at the right time
and place to cause the enemy's psychological collapse and complete
capitulation. Space warfare will enable the United States to project
force at dramatically increased speeds in response to contingencies
while denying the enemy the ability to do the same. At least that is
the overall concept. What we need to do now is develop the details
of how we can conduct such warfare against various categories of
competitors.
A number of changes must occur if the United States military is
going to compete successfully on the battlefields of 2020. First,
there must be a change in outlook--a change in the way we think
about preparing for the future. The military must nurture an attitude
that supports free thinking, that accepts honest mistakes, that
encourages experimentation, that rewards risk takers, and that
makes provisions for starting over. As an organization, the military
must break out of the box, must consider alternative futures, must
think the unthinkable, and must let go of the conventional modes of
operation.
Why are these changes so important? What may be the
consequences if we fail to change? First, failure to change will
ensure that we will not gain the most that we possibly could from
the unfolding RMA. Failure to change will make it difficult for our
military to make the best possible use of the new emerging
technologies.
Failure to think imaginatively about the future may result in a
failure to maintain the military advantages our forces so clearly
demonstrated during the Gulf War. Approaches that are not
innovative may prove adequate in the short term, but in the long run
they may squander potential advantages needed against future
competitors. We must alter our thinking and our approaches to
planning if we are to be prepared for either the emergence of a large
peer RMA competitor or the surprise of a true niche competitor.
To be successful and lasting, the change must come from the top--
from leadership. The impetus for change must flow through the
entire organization, especially through the education system. The
required changes cannot occur without the support and
encouragement of leadership and the enthusiasm and cooperation
of the entire organization.
To be successful, we need to develop a broad strategy--a strategy
robust enough to encompass and cope with the massive uncertainty
we face. We need to be clear (if not always explicit) about our
goals, vis-
-vis our allies as well as our competitors. We need to
think through what we would like the future to look like and
develop a strategy for shaping it to that end.
None of this will be easy. But a concerted, sustained, and focused
effort by the Defense Department could pay dividends in the
decades to come in ways as yet unforeseen.
Notes
1. Paul Bracken, "The Military After Next," Washington Quarterly, 16, no. 4 (Autumn 1993) 157-174.
2. Stephen Peter Rosen, Briefing on Future Competitors, US Army
Roundtable Conference on the Revolution in Military Affairs, HQ
US Army TRADOC, Fort Monroe, Virginia, 27 September 1993.
3. Department of Defense Directory of Military and Associated
Terms, 1 December 1989, 218. See also, JCS Pub 1-02.
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those
of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic
environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official
position of the US Government, Department of Defense, the United
States Air Force or the Air University.
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